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AbstractThe evolution of cooperation scholarship develops evolutionary stable theories that explain the presence of cooperation when there are many reasons to defect from cooperation. In this analysis, these theories are tested using the relations between states. Focusing on the direct reciprocity strategies of Tit-for-Tat and Win-stay/Lose-shift and the indirect reciprocity strategies of Cooperative Reputation and Tag, Tit-for-Tat and Cooperative Reputation are found to be robust, while Tags have mixed results. In the end, it is the direct cooperative action by states and their cooperative reputation and not shared characteristics that are most likely to elicit cooperative action in return.

Trends in international development cooperation point to the increasing networking of initiatives and programmes, facilitated by information and communications technology (ICT). This allows many more people and organizations from around the world to contribute to a given project, as with the case of online volunteers. There are various types of networks active in development cooperation, but network management needs to be incorporated by involved organizations in order to extract the expected benefits from their involvement. Network analysis practices will help determine if they are set up and managed ppropriately.

Der Beitrag enthält vierzehn Aufsätze über die kulturelle Zusammenarbeit zwischen den AKP-Staaten und der EG: u.a. kulturelle Faktoren und Entwicklung in Kenia, Elfenbeinküste und Tansania; kulturelle Traditionen in den AKP-Staaten; Überblick über europäische Kulturen - gibt es eine europäische Kultur? Vorstellung von Initiativen zur Kulturförderung auf nationaler, regionaler, internationaler und privater Ebene; Chancen kultureller Zusammenarbeit; statistische Informationen über verschiedene Kulturbereiche. (DÜI-Gbh)

Most definitions of cooperation provide sufficient but not necessary conditions. This paper describes a form of minimal cooperation, corresponding to mass actions implying many agents, such as demonstrations. It characterizes its intentional, epistemic, strategic, and teleological aspects, mostly obtained from weakening classical concepts. The rationality of minimal cooperation turns out to be part of its definition, whereas it is usually considered as an optional though desirable feature. Game-theoretic concepts thus play an important role in its definition. The paper concludes by answering concrete questions about what should and should not be called cooperation.

Scholars typically model the politics of global public goods or common pool resources as difficult collective action problems. Theories of international organization aim to explain how institutions can promote cooperation by solving the free rider problem. Based on an analysis of a quintessential global collective action problem—international climate mitigation—this article challenges both this diagnosis of the problem and the concomitant institutional remedies. Important elements of climate mitigation exhibit three key features that depart from the canonical model: joint goods, preference heterogeneity, and increasing returns. The presence of these features creates the possibility for "catalytic cooperation." Under such conditions, the chief barrier to cooperation is not the threat of free riding but the lack of incentive to act in the first place. States and other actors seek to solve this problem by creating "catalytic institutions" that work to shift actors' preferences and strategies toward cooperative outcomes over time. While catalytic institutions can be seen in many areas of world politics, the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change has put this logic of cooperation at its core, raising the possibility that similar catalytic institutions may facilitate cooperation in other areas of world politics characterized by analogous problem structures.