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Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination
In: American politics research, Band 37, Heft 5, S. 899-920
ISSN: 1552-3373
Networks can affect a group's ability to solve a coordination problem. We use laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of participants can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that an increase in the number of connections improves coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.
Coordination in Europe
In: MacCarthaigh , M & Molenveld , A 2017 , Coordination in Europe . in E Ongaro & S Van Thiel (eds) , Public administration and public management in Europe . Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 653-670 . https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55269-3
In this chapter, one of the oldest challenges faced by governments is explored. Beginning with an examination of why coordination has remained such a dominant theme in public administration and management, the chapter surveys classical and more recent scholarship on the topic, and unpacks its multiple and increasingly diverse meanings and conceptualizations. As part of this study, coordination is considered in relation to process, management practice, and policy. The dominant basis mechanisms for coordination measures chosen by governments are then presented, followed by the obstacles and challenges to successful coordination within and across all levels of government. The chapter concludes with coordination considered in a multi-level EU context.
BASE
Coordination and development
This paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate the outcome: either the transport infrastructure (i.e., a highway) is not built and firms keep doing "home" production, thus supplying mainly nearby consumers and dispensing with a highway; or they switch to "factory" production, a more spatially centralized regime, where output must be sold over long distances, thus implying the construction of a highway. In relation to the existent literature, this paper presents two main innovations. Firstly, the two sources of linkage, namely cost linkage, through the provision of an indivisible input (the highway), and demand linkage, through the wage rise brought about by industrialization, are not treated separately, but they are integrated in the same model. Consequently, the game has now two levels of equilibrium selection. Secondly, the paper does not limit itself to checking that there can arise multiple Nash equilibria under certain circumstances, but itdiscusses methods for the selection of a unique outcome. Consequently, in addition to the classical Nash equilibria mentioned above, there is a third possible solution where the Government builds the highway but the consumer goods firms refrain from using it and stick to "home" production. Hence, the transport infrastructure becomes a "white elephant" ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
BASE
Coordination and development
This paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate the outcome: either the transport infrastructure (i.e., a highway) is not built and firms keep doing "home" production, thus supplying mainly nearby consumers and dispensing with a highway; or they switch to "factory" production, a more spatially centralized regime, where output must be sold over long distances, thus implying the construction of a highway. In relation to the existent literature, this paper presents two main innovations. Firstly, the two sources of linkage, namely cost linkage, through the provision of an indivisible input (the highway), and demand linkage, through the wage rise brought about by industrialization, are not treated separately, but they are integrated in the same model. Consequently, the game has now two levels of equilibrium selection. Secondly, the paper does not limit itself to checking that there can arise multiple Nash equilibria under certain circumstances, but it discusses methods for the selection of a unique outcome. Consequently, in addition to the classical Nash equilibria mentioned above, there is a third possible solution where the Government builds the highway but the consumer goods firms refrain from using it and stick to "home" production. Hence, the transport infrastructure becomes a "white elephant".
BASE
Cooperation / Coordination
In: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL NETWORKS, pp. 175-180, G. Barnett, ed., Sage Publications, 2011
SSRN
La fonction de coordination (The Coordination Function)
In: Revue française d'administration publique: publication trimestrielle, Heft 69, S. 77
ISSN: 0152-7401
Modelling coordination
In: Australian journal of public administration: the journal of the Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia, Band 47, Heft Sep 88
ISSN: 0313-6647
SSRN
Working paper
MODELLING COORDINATION
In: Australian journal of public administration, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 253-262
ISSN: 1467-8500
Abstract: Coordination is an important concept in both the study and the practice of public administration. Complex tasks are split up into manageable sub‐tasks with the result that the pieces need to be coordinated. Coordination is necessary and sensible, yet it is widely recognised that it can also be a facade to hide coercion and conflict.This article explores the practice of coordination in public adminstration. It develops the four models of hierarchical control, use‐of‐power, adjustment, and common purpose as forms of coordination then illustrates each from the work of the Queensland Co‐ordinator‐General. Each model is described in terms of structure, processes, outcome and values. The models help to draw out important but less visible features of central coordination.
Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination
In: American politics research, Band 37, Heft 5, S. 899-920
ISSN: 1532-673X
SSRN
Working paper
The Coordination Fallacy
In: Florida State University Law Review, Band 43, S. 399
SSRN
Working paper
THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIES
In: The national interest, Band 13, S. 36-42
ISSN: 0884-9382
THE COORDINATION INDUCED AMONG INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS BY THE PRICE SYSTEM HAS BEEN WELL DOCUMENTED. IT IS WIDELY ACCEPTED AS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF ORGANIZING PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION. SO, ASKS THE AUTHOR, IF THE PRICE MECHANISM IS SO SUCCESSFUL IN COORDINATING INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS, WILL IT NOT BE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL IN COORDINATING THE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF NATION STATES?