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Cover -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Part I. Introduction and Descriptive Background -- 1. Social Communication and Voting Behavior -- 2 Latin American Political Discussion in Comparative Perspective -- Part II. Social Influence and the Vote -- 3. Voter Volatility and Stability in Presidential Campaigns -- 4. Discussion Networks, Campaign Effects, and Vote Choice -- 5. Neighborhoods and Cities as Arenas of Social Influence -- 6. Discussion and the Regionalization of Voter Preferences -- Part III. Implications of a Horizontally Networked World -- 7. Clientelism as the Purchase of Social Influence -- 8. Discussion, Societal Exclusion, and Political Voice -- 9. Conclusion -- Appendix A. Statistical Results -- Appendix B. Measurement of Variables -- Appendix C. Details of Correct-Voting Analyses -- Notes -- References -- Index.

Candidates, voting choice and election outcomes -- Design and data : district informants and the study of congressional elections -- Polarization in congressional elections since 1952 -- Ideological proximity, valence, and voter choice -- Correct voting on proximity and valence -- Anticipated reactions and challenger entry -- The proximity and valence rules in district voting -- District ideological representation -- Getting it right? : valence and ideology in district representation

Using bilateral migration flow data from the 2010 population census of Nepal, this paper provides evidence on the importance of public infrastructure and services in determining migration flows. The empirical specification, based on a generalized nested logit model, corrects for the non-random selection of migrants. The results show that migrants prefer areas that are nearer to paved roads and have better access to electricity. Apart from electricity's impact on income and through income on migration, the econometric results indicate that migrants attach substantial amenity value to access to electricity. These findings have important implications for the placement of basic infrastructure projects and the way benefits from these projects are evaluated

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 4th International Conference on E-Voting and Identity, VoteID 2013, held in Guildford, UK, during July 17-19, 2013. The 12 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from 26 submissions. The papers include a range of works on end-to-end verifiable election systems, verifiably correct complex tallying algorithms, human perceptions of verifiability, formal models of verifiability and, of course, attacks on systems formerly advertised as verifiable

Intro -- Title Page -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1: The Early Years -- CHAPTER 2: A Love Of Performing -- CHAPTER 3: Family And Friends -- CHAPTER 4: "Magic At The Symphony" -- CHAPTER 5: Follow Your Dream -- CHAPTER 6: An Absolute Brainstorm -- CHAPTER 7: Why A Donkey And An Elephant? -- CHAPTER 8: Let's Have A Voter Rally -- CHAPTER 9: Oh, To Be Politically Correct -- CHAPTER 10: Forging Ahead -- CHAPTER 11: Promoting The Idea -- CHAPTER 12: Lots To Do -- CHAPTER 13: Your Vote Counts... And Recounts -- CHAPTER 14: What It Took -- CHAPTER 15: Abner's Escapades -- CHAPTER 16: Details, Details... -- CHAPTER 17: An Afternoon Learning How Voting Impacts Us -- CHAPTER 18: How We Vote -- CHAPTER 19: Countdown -- CHAPTER 20: Our Very First Rehearsal -- CHAPTER 21: This Is Really It -- CHAPTER 22: The Illusion Is Reality -- Endnotes -- Research Sources.

Much of the science of public opinion focuses on individuals, asking if they perceive or misperceive and why. Often this science will emphasize misperceptions and the psychological processes that produce them. But political debates have outcomes in the aggregate. This Element turns to a more systematic approach, emphasizing whole electorates and examining facts through a dynamic lens. It argues public opinion will converge toward truth over time and frequently finds correct views of facts grow stronger under information flow, while misperception recedes.

Economists have long counseled reliance on markets rather than on government to decide a wide range of questions, in part because allocation through voting can give rise to a "tyranny of the majority." Markets, by contrast, are believed to make products available to suit any individual, regardless of what others want. But the argument is not generally correct. In markets, you can't always get what you want. This book explores why this is so and its consequences for consumers with atypical preferences.

Economic conditions are said to affect election outcomes, but past research has produced unstable and contradictory findings. This book argues that these problems are caused by the failure to take account of electoral competition between parties. A research strategy to correct this problem is designed and applied to investigate effects of economic conditions on (individual) voter choices and (aggregate) election outcomes over 42 elections in 15 countries. It shows that economic conditions exert small effects on individual party preferences, which can have large consequences for election outcomes. In countries where responsibility for economic policy is clear, voters vote retrospectively and reward or punish incumbent parties - although in coalition systems smaller government parties often gain at the expense of the largest party when economic conditions deteriorate. Where clarity of responsibility for economic policy is less clear, voters vote more prospectively on the basis of expected party policies

Voter disenfranchisement occurs when people who have the right to vote are prevented from doing so. Students study its ugly history in the South but rarely learn about worrisome current examples of voter disenfranchisement. African American and Hispanic voters are much more likely to be told that they lack the correct identification to vote, have their names incorrectly removed from voting rolls, or learn that their polling place changed at the last minute. Additionally, individuals with criminal convictions face impediments to their right to vote. Many argue that this constitutes disenfranchisement, with fierce opinions on both sides of the issue. This must-have examines the scope of the problem and discusses recent efforts to stop this violation of civil rights.

Front Cover -- Title Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- Viewpoint 1: Prison's Dilemma -- Viewpoint 2: The Criminal Justice System Is Not Unfair to Minorities -- A Perception of Bias -- A Manufactured Problem -- Viewpoint 3: The War on Marijuana in Black and White -- The War on Drugs -- A War on People of Color -- The Enforcement of Marijuana Laws -- The Need for Marijuana Legalization -- Viewpoint 4: The Policy of Stop-and-Frisk Targets Young Men of Color -- The Growth in Stop-and-Frisk -- The Use of Street Stops -- The Call-In Approach -- Other Needed Reforms -- Viewpoint 5: Stop-and-Frisk Protects Minorities -- Viewpoint 6: Minimum-Wage Madness -- Viewpoint 7: A Higher Minimum Wage Will Not Hurt Minorities or Eliminate Jobs -- The Facts About Minimum-Wage Workers -- The Fantasy About Minimum-Wage Workers -- The Myths About the Minimum Wage -- The Effects of Raising the Minimum Wage -- Viewpoint 8: Opposition to Voter ID Laws Is Insulting to Minorities -- The Controversy over Voter-ID Laws -- The Charge of Racism -- An Insult to Minorities -- Viewpoint 9: Voter ID Laws Disenfranchise Minority Voters -- The Concern About Fraud -- Adults Who Lack ID -- The Charge of Racism -- The Barriers to Getting ID -- A Real Solution -- Viewpoint 10: The US Supreme Court Erred in Revising the Voting Rights Act -- The Voting Rights Act -- The Decision of the Court -- The Winners of the Ruling -- The Losers of the Ruling -- A Weakening of Rights -- Viewpoint 11: The US Supreme Court Was Correct to Revise the Voting Rights Act -- The Need for Extraordinary Measures -- Evidence of Discrimination -- Concerns About Section 5 -- The Need for Congressional Action -- A Justified Decision -- Viewpoint 12: Where Do Americans Stand on Affirmative Action? -- Viewpoint 13: Do Race Preferences Help Students? -- Viewpoint 14: The Next Affirmative Action

America is "currently fighting its second Civil War." Partisan politics are "ripping this country apart." The 2016 election "will go down as the most acrimonious presidential campaign of all." Such statements have become standard fare in American politics. In a time marked by gridlock and incivility, it seems the only thing Americans can agree on is this: we're more divided today than we've ever been in our history. In Unstable Majorities Morris P. Fiorina surveys American political history to reveal that, in fact, the American public is not experiencing a period of unprecedented polarization. Bypassing the alarmism that defines contemporary punditry, he cites research and historical context that illuminate the forces that shape voting patterns, political parties, and voter behavior. By placing contemporary events in their proper context, he corrects widespread misconceptions and gives reasons to be optimistic about the future of American electoral politics.

The mainstream media and ultra-liberal Democrats can't understand why white voters, especially white men, are so angry. Wayne Allyn Root is an angry white male, and he knows why. This is his story, his testimony, and a look at what's happening to an entire group of good people: law-abiding, tax-paying, hard-working, middle-class people. They're being targeted, silenced, intimidated, persecuted -- virtually wiped off the planet -- in order to make guilty, politically correct white liberals feel better about themselves. It's open season on white males. And yes, you're damn right they're angry. In Angry White Male, Root makes his case why he and his brethren have every right to be angry. Millions of angry white males are not on the attack but rather responding in self-defense. Root urges the middle class to take charge before they are protested and legislated out of existence, penniless, powerless, jobless, afraid to speak for fear of being shouted down and immediately labeled "racist." Not afraid of being politically incorrect, Angry White Male exposes the unfair and unregulated policies, politically correct attitudes, and reverse racism that have recently oppressed and depressed the shrinking middle class -- in voting, housing, guns, taxes, regulation, and jobs -- and provides the playbook to empower readers to protect their rights. They can do this by verbalizing, mobilizing, and protesting, getting out to vote in record numbers, pushing for term limits, fighting the "not so free" trade battle, fighting for a "Middle-Class Contract with America" and "Middle-Class Income Tax Vacation," and arming themselves with the "Middle-Class Weapon of Self-Defense." Let the revolution begin!.

Essays -- Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy -- Public Choice: An Introduction -- Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct? -- Constitutional Political Economy -- Corruption -- Dictatorship -- Environmental Politics -- Experimental Public Choice -- Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation -- Interest Group Behavior and Influence -- International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade -- James M. Buchanan -- Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution -- Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior -- The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics -- Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought -- Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology -- Public Finance -- Regulation and Antitrust -- Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson -- Shadow Economy -- Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling -- Spatial Theory -- Trade Liberalization and Globalization -- William H. Riker -- Concepts -- Academia -- Al-Qaeda -- Alternative Voting Methods -- Altruism -- The Anatomy of Political Representation -- Approval Voting -- Arbitration and Bargaining -- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- An 'Austrian' Perspective on Public Choice -- Autocracy -- Autocratic Succession -- Bicameralism -- Blackmail -- Black's Single-Peakedness Condition -- Budgetary Processes -- Budget Deficits -- Bureaucratic Discretion -- Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance -- Campaign Finance 1 -- Campaign Finance 2 -- Central Banks -- Chicago Political Economy -- The Clayton Act -- Coalitions and Power Indices -- Coalitions and Social Choice -- Coase Theorem and Political Markets -- Coercion -- Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation -- Committee Assignments -- Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions -- Committees in Legislatures -- Commons and Anticommons -- Constitution -- Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress -- The Constitution of the European Union -- Constitutional Political Economy -- The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy -- Contractarianism -- Corruption 1 -- Corruption 2 -- Cost and Choice -- The Cost Disease of the Personal Services -- Customary Law -- The Demand-Revealing Process -- Deregulation of Postal Service -- Dictators and Social Contracts -- Direct Democracy -- Discrimination -- Dynamic Inconsistency -- Economic Freedom and its Measurement -- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom -- Economic Regulation -- The Economic Theory of Clubs -- Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy -- Education and the State -- Efficiency of Democracy -- Efficiency of Democracy? -- The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis -- Elected Versus Appointed Regulators -- Election Models -- Electoral College -- Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation -- The Elusive Median Voter -- Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle -- Endogenous Morality -- Enron -- Environmental Politics and Economic Development -- The Euro -- European Political Integration -- Evolution of Institutions -- The Evolution of Law -- Experimental Economics and Public Choice -- Experimental Public Choice -- Expressive Voting and Redistribution -- Fair Division -- Fame and Politics -- Federal Reserve System -- Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States -- Game Theory -- Game Theory in Public Choice -- Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making -- Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition -- Growth of Local Government in the United States -- The Growth of Public Expenditure -- The Growth of the Relative Size of Government -- Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution -- Homo Economicus -- Human Evolution and Political Behavior -- Ideology -- The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics -- Initiative and Referendum -- Institutions of Trade Protection -- Interest Groups 1 -- Interest Groups 2 -- International Game of Power -- International Organization -- Internet Voting -- Is Russia a Market Economy? -- Is Voting Rational? -- The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice -- The Judiciary -- The Law and Economics Movement -- Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion -- Legal Rules and Standards -- Legislative Politics -- Legislators -- Leviathan Models of Government -- Logic of Collective Action -- The Logic of Liberty -- Logrolling 1 -- Logrolling 2 -- Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown -- The Median in Politics -- The Median Voter Model -- Medieval Church -- Mercantilism -- Monetary Politics -- The New Deal -- Nonprofit Organizations -- The Origins of Social Choice Theory -- The Paradox of Rebellion -- Parchment Versus Guns -- Political and Cultural Nationalism -- Political Business Cycles -- Political Economics and Public Choice -- The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments -- The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform -- Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation -- Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters -- Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy -- Prohibition -- Public Choice and Socialism -- Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust -- Public Choice in Italy -- Public Enterprise -- Public Finance and the Median Voter Model -- Public Finance in Democratic Process -- Public Goods -- Public Schools -- Public Utility Regulation -- Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History -- Rational Ignorance -- Rational Irrationality -- Reciprocity -- Redistributive Politics 1 -- Redistributive Politics 2 -- Regulating Government -- Regulatory Takings -- Rent Dissipation -- Rent Extraction -- Rent Seeking -- Rent Seeking and Political Institutions -- Rent-Seeking Games -- Rent Seeking in Development -- The Rule of Law -- Rules Versus Standards -- Self-Interest -- Selfish Gene -- September 11, 2001 -- Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems -- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking -- Sortition -- Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons -- State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity -- Structure-Induced Equilibrium -- Supply of Public Goods -- The Supreme Court -- Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price -- Term Limits 1 -- Term Limits 2 -- Terrorism -- The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom -- Totalitarianism -- Trade Protectionism -- Transitional Economies -- Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy -- Triangulation -- Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector -- The Value of Voting Rights -- Votes for Women -- Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor -- Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections -- Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation -- The War on Drugs -- Welfare Economics and Public Choice -- Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State -- Why Government Succeeds.