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The Brexit referendum and the last presidential election in the USA are just two examples of recent vote results that have been wrongly predicted. This research paper aims to identify the formation of voting behaviour to revaluate the necessary factors and variables in the correct and scientific prediction and analysis of voting behaviour. More specifically, this paper chose anti-European voting behaviour in Germany, which is also a current European-wide societal phenomenon, to analyse and explain the formation of general voting behaviour in detail. Many researchers, including Goodwin and Heath (2016), analysed the quality of existing polling methodology to explain the incorrect prediction of the Brexit result. This research forms a new approach towards the identification of voting behaviour by including more variables than usual. In collaboration with YouGov Deutschland GmbH, a strategic sample of the German population of 993 participants was formed. Participants were asked questions relating to individual differences, political ideology, attitudes towards daily political topics and socio-demographic factors. Voters who voted for the AfD, the main anti-European party in Germany, were more likely to be in some form of relationship, were more likely to be male, and over-represented the age group 40–49. Finally, voters voted for the AfD because the party engaged with political topics in a way that no other party did. This research is somewhat limited because the questionnaire focused on voters voting for the AfD. Furthermore, quantitative research can only identify and analyse individual human behaviour to a certain extent, whereas qualitative data, which this research lacks, can potentially help to identify voting behaviour. Relevant and important factors such as political ideology and individual differences, which are included here, but are usually not part of political research, must play a role in the future identification of voting behaviour.

Voting system using blockchain aims at providing the facility to cast vote from anywhere. It has the workability to allow casting of vote from any remote location. The election is held in full confidentiality that security is maintained in such a manner that voter can vote only if he logs into the system by entering the correct username and password. Voter will get the username and secret password to cast his vote. The voter will log into the system using his unique ID, they will then give his/her vote which will be stored into block-chain. Internet voting focuses on security, privacy, and secrecy issues, as well as challenges for stakeholder involvement and observation of the process. A new approach is proposed for voting system to prevent manipulation of the votes. Block chain overcomes the drawbacks of the previous voting system. It increases the security by not allowing the hacker to affect the rest of the nodes in the block chain. Voters can effectively submit their vote without revealing their identity or political preferences to the public. Counting votes becomes easy for the official since only one vote can be casted by each voter. no fake accounts can be created by anyone.

Candidates, voting choice and election outcomes -- Design and data : district informants and the study of congressional elections -- Polarization in congressional elections since 1952 -- Ideological proximity, valence, and voter choice -- Correct voting on proximity and valence -- Anticipated reactions and challenger entry -- The proximity and valence rules in district voting -- District ideological representation -- Getting it right? : valence and ideology in district representation

With the entrance and growing popularity of populist radical right parties (PRRs) in Western and Eastern European democracies in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the scientific and public debate has recently focused on the 'threatening' and 'corrective' consequences of the PRR for contemporary democracies. Some have claimed that the PRR constitutes a serious threat to democracy because its leaders employ a radical notion of democracy that emphasizes a homogeneous voice —the 'voice of the people'— and excludes minorities. Others have noted that these PRRs actually correct democratic deficiencies by speaking to a large group of citizens disillusioned with mainstream politicians. Citizens believe that there is someone who 'listens to their grievances' and who has enabled them to become passionately involved in politics. This dissertation contributes to the ongoing public and scholarly debate about the consequences of PRR popularity on democracy, and more specifically its influence on the voting behavior of European citizens. The central aim of this study was to gain insight into the extent to which popular PRRs influence (1) the decision of non-voters to vote (again), and (2) the decision of cleavage voters, who are known for their voting stability, to reconsider their habitual votes. This dissertation shows that despite anecdotal evidence that certain PRR leaders seemed able to fuel popular engagement with politics, this is not a shared phenomenon typical of the European PRR family. Departing from the notion that popular PRRs bring more electoral competition and polarization by introducing a different political style and party program, this dissertation shows that in general, nonvoters and cleavage voters do not reconsider their party choice. Nonvoters generally remain nonvoters, religious people remain Christian-Democrat voters, and women remain non-PRR voters. These findings highlight the importance of providing empirical scrutiny to the often-repeated claims in the media that the PRR forms either a 'threat' or a ...

In certain judgmental situations where a correct decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This paper presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters' past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities as probabilities yields some optimal aggregation rule that, in turn, yields a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. Thus, a skill-evaluation equilibrium can be defined as an evaluation of decisional skills that yields itself as a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. We show that such equilibrium exists and offer a procedure for finding one. The obtained equilibrium is locally optimal and is shown empirically to generally be globally optimal in terms of the correctness of the resulting collective decisions. Interestingly, under minimally competent (almost symmetric) skill distributions that allow unskilled decision makers, the optimal rule considerably outperforms the common simple majority rule (SMR). Furthermore, a sufficient record of past decisions ensures that the collective probability of making a correct decision converges to 1, as opposed to accuracy of about 0.7 under SMR. Our proposed optimal voting procedure relaxes the fundamental (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions in Condorcet celebrated theorem and its extensions, such as sufficiently high decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group of decision makers.

We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies perform no better than a coin flip in selecting the correct outcome. Thus, even when adding informed voters is costless, smaller voting bodies often produce better decisions. . Adapted from the source document.

Do citizens hold their representatives accountable for policy decisions, as commonly assumed in theories of legislative politics? Previous research has failed to yield clear evidence on this question for two reasons: measurement error arising from noncomparable indicators of legislators' and constituents' preferences and potential simultaneity between constituents' beliefs about and approval of their representatives. Two new national surveys address the measurement problem directly by asking respondents how they would vote and how they think their representatives voted on key roll‐call votes. Using the actual votes, we can, in turn, construct instrumental variables that correct for simultaneity. We find that the American electorate responds strongly to substantive representation. (1) Nearly all respondents have preferences over important bills before Congress. (2) Most constituents hold beliefs about their legislators' roll‐call votes that reflect both the legislators' actual behavior and the parties' policy reputations. (3) Constituents use those beliefs to hold their legislators accountable.

AbstractIt is time to correct the ongoing injustice of the under‐representation of women in governing institutions at all levels, perpetrated by the strenuous promotion of single‐member districts. Without an appropriate remedy, the full promise of the 14th and 19th Amendments will not be realized.

In most states it is permitted to write in the names on the ballot, and these write-in candidates can win if they assemble enough votes. Thus, in all elections in which I might conceivably participate, there are at least three candidates: the Republicans, the Democrats, and my own favorite candidate for president—Gordon Tullock. Indeed, using the notation of the Ferejohn and Fiorina article, assuming that we are talking about 1972, I would find k having a value of about .001. Under the circumstances, if I understand the article correctly, I should always vote, and the vote should always take the form of writing in my own name. Further, as far as I can see, this advice can be generalized. Everyone who would really like to be president should vote and write in his own name, because the minimum regret that they produce for three-candidate elections is also correct for the elections in which there are 30 million candidates. The only problem here is that it would, of course, amount to participating in a lottery, and my possible gain from writing in my own name might turn out to be less than the cost of writing it in. Granted that people are willing to buy lottery tickets, even when the various states offering them take very substantial rakeoffs, I do not imagine this would be much of a disadvantage.This same conclusion could have been deduced from the Casstevens article, which Ferejohn and Fiorina quite properly criticize as being mathematically incorrect.

An investigation of how US Supreme Court justices have decided whether to accept cases (certiorari voting) from a lower appeals court, covering seven US Supreme Court terms (the 1950/1952 Vinson Courts, 1963/1965/1967 Warren Courts, 1972/1974 Burger Courts), using data collected from the docket books of justices Harold Burton, Tom Clark, & William Brennen. Results show that the major decision-making strategies used were error correcting, prediction, & majority; ie, the justices voted to accept cases to: correct what they felt was an erroneous judgment on the appeals level; elevate an appeals decision to the national level, predicting that the judgment would be affirmed at the Supreme Court level; & vote with the majority. Interactions between these strategies are discussed, & the impact of conservative vs liberal orientation is considered. 3 Tables, 14 References. A. Cole

The expression "vote" intends to choose from a given rundown, or decide. The center motivation behind voting is to think of best pioneers of the general population's predominant. It is investigated from the writing that the conventional voting framework has various blemishes i.e. tedious, printed material, high cost and more extreme issue is ragging particularly in Asian Countries. To defeat distinguished issues in the constituent procedure, another technique was purposed by a few analysts; Electronic Voting. A few E-voting frameworks have been created and accessible in the market. Besides, it is additionally recognized that the current E- Voting System needs in giving the proper arrangement in term of the discretionary procedure. In this modification, the structure of the information gathering strategy, the present framework assessment and the structure of the framework of the framework of the framework has been shown. This particular technique has been used as part of the use, specific needs to meet project targets, specific requirements for honor of venture and a clear explanation that such strategy Why has been used to correct the proposed framework, in addition to the current management of voting. To accomplish these targets a philosophy is defined and isolated into five stages in like manner: Stage I: Examination of current v-system. Stage II: outlining new structure. Stage III: EV System planning based on web. Stage IV: EV System development based on web. Stage V: EV System testing based on web. This framework helps in overseeing/directing discretionary process advantageously and safely

The recent wave of populism sweeping Europe and the Americas generated considerable interest among political scientists, economists, sociologists and to some extent, geographers. The vast majority of these studies focuses on individual voter decisions or national comparisons over time but neglects the within-country spatial variation of the populist vote. This paper addresses this shortcoming and applies spatial econometric techniques to explore possible explanations for spatial variation in the increase of the populist right vote between the 2013 and 2017 national elections in Austria for 2118 municipalities. Spatial variation in voting shares can result from (1) compositional effects, regional differences in the composition of voters with different characteristics, (2) broad spatial, historically evolved institutional differences, such as membership to one of the nine states, (3) unequal integration of different types of regions into the global economy, such as peripheral regions, central urban regions, old industrial regions or tourist areas, (4) spatial vote spillovers due to localized social networks, and (5) unobserved spatial processes. We find that the populist right vote gains in Austrian municipalities are affected by all processes, but that the type of regions becomes insignificant once we correct for unobservable spatial structures in the regression framework. The increase in the share of foreigners, the share of foreigners, income and inequality levels, educational differences, selected state membership, as well as spatial spillovers of populist right voting are all important to explain spatial variation in the rise of the populist right vote.

This paper develops several simple multivariate statistical models and applies them to explain fluctuations in the aggregate vote for the United States House of Representatives, over the period 1896-1964. The basic hypothesis underlying these models is that voters are rational in at least the limited sense that their decisions as to whether to vote for an incumbent administration depend on whether its performance has been "satisfactory" according to some simple standard. Because of data limitations, the analysis focuses on measures of economic performance, treating other aspects of an incumbent's performance, such as its handling of foreign affairs, as stochastic perturbations of the underlying relationship to be estimated. (Examination of residuals suggests this assumption is not unreasonable, at least during peacetime.) Possible effects of coattails from presidential races, of incumbency, and of secular trends in the underlying partisanship of the electorate are also taken into account. The models, estimated by maximum-likelihood methods, are found to be successful. Close to two-thirds of the variance in the vote series is accounted for, and the structural coefficients of the models are of the correct signs and of quite reasonable magnitudes. Economic growth, as measured by the changes in real per capita income, is the major economic variable; unemployment or inflation have little independent effect. Presidential coattails are also found to be of some importance.