Suchergebnisse

In the last decades a growing awareness emerged of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decision-making processes. In spite of a lively scientific debate there is no general consensus on a commonly accepted definition of what corruption is. The A. distinguishes three main paradigms, focusing on different (though not irreconcilable) variables. The first is the economic paradigm, which usually takes the principal-agent model of corruption as its founding pillar. In this paradigm corruption is considered the outcome of rational individual choices, and its spread within a certain organization is influenced by the factors defining the structure of expected costs and rewards. A second approach – the cultural paradigm – looks at the differences in cultural traditions, social norms and interiorized values which shape individuals' moral preferences and consideration of his social and institutional role. These are a leading forces that can push a corrupt public or private agent (not) to violate legal norms. A third neo-institutional approach considers also mechanisms which allow the internal regulation of social interactions within corrupt networks, and their effects on individuals' beliefs and preferences. Though the corrupt agreements cannot be enforced with legal sanctions, several informal, non-written rules, contractual provisos and conventions may regulate the corrupt exchange between agent and corruptor. The A. underlines that corruption is the outcome of a multitude of individual and collective choices which change public opinion towards corruption and its diffusion throughout the state, markets and civil society. There is no univocal recipe to deal with anti-bribery measures, since corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Reforms aimed at dismantling systemic corruption have to be finely tuned against its hidden governance structures, i.e. its internal regulation of exchanges and relationships. Otherwise, a vicious circle may emerge: the more an anti-corruption policy is needed, because corruption is systemic and enforced by effective third-parties, the less probable its formulation and implementation. Only when official rules are complemented by coherent informal institutions, bottom-up initiatives, they tend to produce the expected outcomes and make anticorruption regulation more effective.

Challenging the traditional argument that the French army in the 1650s was marked by significant developments in centralized administrative control, this article looks at the continuing importance of the interplay of three interest groups in determining the effectiveness of military operations: central governement; the generals and their military administrators; the regimental officers. It argues that in the Italian theatre these three interest groups proved unable to work together, and explores the consequences of this for strategy and military outcomes.

Although numerous studies have been carried out at a national and international level, there are very few that detail whether and to what extent criminological theories can yield insights useful for understanding the etiology of corruption. The article first identifies the criminological theories that seemingly possess better explanatory power in regard to corruption in the public sector, distinguishing between theories pertaining to a situational/mechanistic perspective and those related to a more historical/evolutionary one. The article then tests these criminological theories in 51 states of the world. It does so by tranforming these theories into measurable hypotheses with which to test a model where, in each country concerned, the dependent variable is represented by the percentage of firms expected to make informal payments to public officials to "get things done", while the independent variables are represented by: the perception of the legal system's certainty and impartiality and willingness to comply with the laws; the time that the entrepreneur spends with public officials on matters regarding the enterprise; government payments in exchange for goods and services; the percentage of firms that do not report all sales for tax purposes; and the percentage of firms with female participation in ownership. The results of the multiple linear regression between the dependent variable 'corruption' and the independent variables considered show that the model proposed is statistically significant (R square 0.246) and that the independent variable that has explanatory power is the one concerning tax evasion. This was identified as an expression of the differential association theory translated into the hypothesis that an increase in illegal conduct other than corruption by entrepreneurs leads to an increase in corruption itself. ; Nonostante i numerosi studi a livello nazionale e internazionale, rari sono quelli che approfondiscono se ed in che termini le teorie criminologiche possano fornire spunti utili per comprendere l'eziologia della corruzione. Dopo aver individuato le teorie criminologiche che paiono avere migliore portata esplicativa della corruzione nella pubblica amministrazione, distinguendo tra teorie appartenenti ad una prospettiva situazionale/meccanicistica e teorie legate ad una prospettiva maggiormente storico/evolutiva, questo articolo procede ad un loro test empirico in 51 stati del mondo. Le teorie criminologiche sono trasformate in ipotesi misurabili per testare un modello in cui, in ogni paese considerato, la variabile dipendente è rappresentata dalla percentuale di imprese sul totale di quelle presenti che ha dichiarato di avere effettuato pagamenti corruttivi a favore di pubblici ufficiali e le variabili indipendenti, invece, sono rappresentate da: la percezione della certezza ed imparzialità del sistema giuridico e propensione all'osservanza delle leggi; il tempo che l'imprenditore trascorre con pubblici ufficiali per questioni attinenti l'impresa; le spese effettuate dalla pubblica amministrazione per l'approvvigionamento di beni e servizi; la percentuale di imprese che non riporta tutte le vendite al fine di evadere il fisco; la percentuale di imprese con ownership femminile. I risultati della regressione lineare multipla tra la variabile dipendente corruzione e le variabili indipendenti considerate evidenziano come il modello proposto sia staticamente significativo (R quadrato 0,246) e che la variabile indipendente che ha potere esplicativo è l'evasione fiscale, identificata come espressione della teoria delle associazioni differenziali, tradotta nell'ipotesi secondo cui l'aumentare di comportamenti imprenditoriali illeciti diversi dalla corruzione determinerebbe un aumento della corruzione stessa.

The paper analyzes the role assigned by the legislator to the entity in the fight against corruption, paying attention to the provision contained in paragraph 5-bis of art. 25 (bribery, undue induction to give or promise benefits and corruption) d. lgs. June 8, 2001, n. 231. The essay highlights the practical application criticalities of this provision and their main causes, among which the growing tendency to overload the institution with insufficiently rewarded cooperative burdens, which, even according to a constitutionally oriented reading, should, at the very least, to be equally shared with public authorities. The solution proposed is the one recommended by the B20 summit in Los Cabos (Mexico) on 17 June 2012: developing a clear and concrete reference framework that exactly disciplines conditions, terms and advantages of the institution's cooperation in the judicial authority investigations, so as to guarantee an equilibrated and acceptable balance between preventive-repressive efficiency and freedom needs for the institution and within the institution. ; Lo scritto analizza il ruolo assegnato dal legislatore all'ente nella lotta alla corruzione, dedicando particolare attenzione alla previsione contenuta nel comma 5-bis dell'art. 25 (concussione, induzione indebita a dare o promettere utilità e corruzione) d. lgs. 8 giugno 2001, n. 231. Di questa disposizione si segnalano le criticità applicative di natura pratica e le loro principali cause, tra cui la crescente tendenza a sovraccaricare l'ente di oneri cooperativi non sufficientemente ricompensati, che, anche secondo una lettura costituzionalmente orientata, dovrebbero, quanto meno, essere egualmente ripartiti con le autorità pubbliche. La soluzione prospettata è quella raccomandata dal vertice G20 di Los Cabos (Messico) del 17 giugno 2012: elaborare un framework di riferimento chiaro e concreto che disciplini esattamente i presupposti, i termini e i vantaggi della cooperazione dell'ente nelle indagini dell'autorità giudiziaria, sì da garantire un ...

Nell'ambito delle teorie dello sviluppo, un filone di studi, originato dai lavori di North (1973) e consolidatosi negli ultimi anni, individua nelle istituzioni, definite come le regole del gioco o i vincoli disegnati dagli uomini per disciplinare i loro rapporti, i fattori fondamentali dello sviluppo economico. Le istituzioni, nel modello elaborato da Acemoglu, Johnson e Robinson (2004), sono il frutto di interazioni dinamiche tra potere politico de jure, determinato dalle istituzioni politiche, e potere politico de facto, determinato dalla distribuzione delle risorse economiche. Sulla base di questa prospettiva teorica, questa tesi propone uno studio di carattere quantitativo sulla qualità istituzionale, la traduzione operativa del concetto di istituzioni, composta dalle tre fondamentali dimensioni di democrazia, efficienza ed efficacia del governo e assenza di corruzione. La prima parte, che analizza sistematicamente pro e contro di ciascuna tipologia di indicatori, è dedicata alla revisione delle misure quantitative di qualità istituzionale, e individua nei Worldwide Governance Indicators la misura più solida e consistente. Questi indici sono quindi utilizzati nella seconda parte, dove si propone un'analisi empirica sulle determinanti della qualità istituzionale. Le stime del modello di regressione cross-country evidenziano che la qualità istituzionale è influenzata da alcuni fattori prevalentemente esogeni come la geografia, la disponibilità di risorse naturali e altre caratteristiche storiche e culturali, insieme ad altri fattori di carattere più endogeno. In quest'ultima categoria, i risultati evidenziano un effetto positivo del livello di sviluppo economico, mentre la disuguaglianza economica mostra un impatto negativo su ciascuna delle tre dimensioni di qualità istituzionale, in particolare sulla corruzione. Questi risultati supportano la prospettiva teorica e suggeriscono che azioni di policy orientate alla riduzione delle disparità sono capaci di generare sviluppo rafforzando la democrazia, migliorando l'efficienza complessiva del sistema economico e riducendo i livelli di corruzione. ; Amongst development theories, following the work of D. North (1973), a branch of studies has recently developed which sees institutions, defined as the rules of the game or humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, as the fundamental cause of long-run growth. The model constructed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) emphasizes the interaction between de jure political power, influenced by political institutions, and de facto political power, shaped by distribution of resources, in the evolution of institutional paths. Based on this theoretical framework, this thesis adopts a quantitative perspective to investigate institutional quality, which is composed by three main dimensions: democracy, government efficiency and effectiveness and corruption. A survey of available measures of institutional quality is conducted in order to evaluate pro and cons of each kind of indicators. The analysis finds the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators as the most reliable measures of institutional quality, both in terms of internal and external consistency. These indexes are then used for an empirical analysis over the determinants of institutional quality. The estimates of the cross-country regression model show that institutional quality is affected by some exogenous factors, like geography, natural resources endowments and other historic and cultural traits, and more endogenous factors. Amongst the latter, economic development exerts a positive effect on institutional quality, while a negative association, particularly on the corruption side, is shown by economic inequality. Results confirm our hypothesis and suggest that policies aiming at reducing inequality can foster development by strengthening democracy, by improving the overall efficiency of the economic system and by reducing corruption levels.

The dissertation investigates the process of anti-corruption policy implementation in Italian local health agencies from a public management perspective. In detail, it is aimed at empirically investigating the implementation of the anti-corruption policy in Italian Local Health Agencies by following a nested research design, which ends up with a controlled comparison of two Local Health Agencies in order to shed light on the process of implementation of a new anti- corruption regulation issued by the Italian Government in November 2012 after several recommendations coming from international bodies such as the Council of Europe's anti-corruption monitoring body (GRECO). The perspective embraced by the author during the investigation is a public management perspective, that focusing on the achievement of the desired outputs of the implementation process in Italian Local Health Agencies aims at testing a "managerial quality hypothesis" as a tentative framework to investigate the ultimate role that public managers exert on the successful achievement of policy implementation and management. Various factors are controlled during the investigation, including relevant regional healthcare features and critical agencies' features- e.g. the levels of healthcare spending per inhabitant, important regional Quality of Government indicators like the regional levels of perceived impartiality and corruption of healthcare, as well as particular agencies' features like human resource and financial capacities. Finally, the results and conclusion sections are aimed to trace the process of implementation in the particular agencies and to provide insights for the improvement of anti-corruption policy implementation and management at a sub-national level of government in Italy. The results of the study show that the complex system of accountability and punishment introduced by the law, however claiming a bottom-up approach to the problem, still seems to result in practice as a typical top-down implementation with several implications on the successful achievement of the desired goals of the implementation process in Italian Local Health Agencies.

Bribing culture is a concept that has never been elaborated previously with respect to its importance in the society and the dynamics of corruption. The article outlines in the first place a conception of corruption that defines in a complete way the players involved in the bribery practices and we can then look at this phenomenon in relation to the political system and the economic one. The proposed research examines specifically the role of the tangent in the trading of corruption, the way it is perceived by society and the degree of presence in the Italian and Spanish economy and politics. The role of the bribe as a factor of economic growth or aggression to the system of financial and business development, is analyzed firstly in terms of comparison between the countries considered and then related to the political system.

Cover -- Dedica -- Indice -- Introduzione -- Capitolo I. La corruzione nel sistema economico: possibili approcci di studio e caratteristiche rilevanti del fenomeno corruttivo -- Capitolo II. Il fronteggiamento della corruzione nella prospettiva economico-aziendale -- Capitolo III. La gestione del rischio di corruzione: le misure di prevenzione e la risk disclosure -- Capitolo IV. Un approccio sperimentale allo studio della corruzione -- Osservazioni conclusive -- Bibliografia -- Collana di Strategia, Management e Controllo -- Ultimato di stampare -- Volumi pubblicati

Usually, according to the grammar of the modern political-constitutional systems of civil law, the places of politics are the Parliament and the government; judges and courts are governed by other principles, those of merit ascertained impartially and under conditions of equality. On the one hand, the elective principle, on the other, the selective principle. Judges are connected to politics only indirectly, through the law, which the Judiciary must obey. Parliament and government are the places of democracy, the other is the home of the best, or of technicians, or of competence. However, dogmas and concepts that once signaled the distinction between what pertains to the judiciary and what, on the other hand, escapes its dominion, become in turn elusive, and to overcome many difficulties that derive from these ambiguities, it is now silently headed to a hybrid figure of the "political magistrate". Passing through the myth of the "strong man", powered by the anti-elitist spirit and some social bitterness, up to the current absence of gravitas in the management of collective decisions, to the ways of forming public opinion and its influence on political decisions , in this editorial the Authors reflect on the interpretative frameworks of the transformations we are experiencing - widely discussed in the Italian criminal procedure system – aiming to stimulate the debate on the theme of the "fight against corruption", both from a general perspective, and, more specifically, in its relations with the principle of criminal legality. ; Tradizionalmente, secondo la grammatica dei sistemi politico-costituzionali moderni di civil law, i luoghi della politica sono Parlamento e governo; magistratura e corti sono rette da altri principi, quelli del merito accertato in maniera imparziale e a condizioni di eguaglianza. Da una parte principio elettivo, dall'altra principio selettivo. I giudici sono in relazione con la politica solo indirettamente, per il tramite della legge, alla quale detto corpo deve obbedire. Parlamento e ...