COUNTERTERRORISM IN FINLAND
According to the legislation of Finland, the crimes connected with terrorism, are understood as crimes with intention to make the act of terrorism doing serious harm to the state or the international organization.
According to the legislation of Finland, the crimes connected with terrorism, are understood as crimes with intention to make the act of terrorism doing serious harm to the state or the international organization.
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The terrorist threat has increased in importance over the last decade and Western governments have implemented a multitude of measures to address it. Their numbers and the significant financial cost they involve have, however, not been matched with an adequate evaluation of effectiveness. We can therefore only make limited statements on whether or not counterterrorism policy has been effective. Three conclusions with policy implications can nevertheless be drawn from our analysis: the dependency on the local context; the ineffectiveness of measures entailing the use of force; and the need for more evaluation research on protective measures.
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The European migration crisis beginning in 2014 served as a turning point in Hungarian politics where immigration issues effectively altered the nation's security environment. The migratory routes as a pathway for illegal border crossings positioned Hungary on the frontline as a transit country for migrants seeking asylum in Western Europe. A critical analysis of Orbán's rhetoric and Hungary's behavior in the realm of immigration and counterterrorism (CT) policy during and after the immigration crisis is relevant in understanding the state's security environment. Anti-immigrant sentiments reflected in the population and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's rhetoric aims to tie refugee migration to terrorist acitvity. Migrants were targeted as a risk to the traditional European identity and survival of the state with a specific emphasis on Muslim migration from the Middle East and North Africa. This study seeks to understand Hungary's regional and global security role and how CT activity is used by the government to legitimize government actions, particularly on immigration via securitization theory from the Copenhagen School.Hungary has heightened its role on the international stage through transnational CT cooperation and capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiments through speech acts to further exercise its influence in border control and the international fight against global terrorism.By examining a total of 36 speeches presented by Orbán from 2015 to 2020, the study is able to examine how immigration issues were securitized to develop pathways for extraordinary actions and authoritarian reforms performed by securitizing actors.
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It is widely thought that the international community, taken as a whole, is required to take action to prevent terrorism. Yet, what each state is required to do in this project is unclear and contested. This article examines a number of bases on which we might assign responsibilities to conduct counterterrorist operations to states. I argue that the ways in which other sorts of responsibilities have been assigned to states by political philosophers will face significant limitations when used to assign the necessary costs of preventing terrorism. I go on to suggest that appealing to the principle of fairness—which assigns obligations on the basis of benefits received from cooperative endeavours—may be used to make up the shortfall, despite this principle having received relatively little attention in existing normative accounts of states' responsibilities.
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Since the end of the Cold War, international interventions have increasingly been deployed to deal with internal conflict. Liberal peacebuilding has been a guiding concept for many of these interventions, in particular those deployed by the UN. This article argues that liberal peacebuilding is waning in importance, both as a guiding concept and in practice. After long engagements in Afghanistan and the enduring effects of the financial crisis, Western states are shifting their strategy from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism. In Africa, regional ad hoc coalitions set up to fight terrorists and other armed groups are on the rise, and progressively included in UN peacekeeping operations. To examine these shifts more closely, the article focuses on the crisis in Mali since 2012 and the growing Western security presence in neighbouring Niger. The article concludes that the turn from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism is likely to be counterproductive, as it will lead to more oppressive governments and more disillusioned people joining the ranks of opposition and terrorist groups, as well as undermine the UN in general and UN peace operations in particular. ; From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism ; publishedVersion
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Camera surveillance has recently gained prominence in policy proposals on combating terrorism. We evaluate this instrument of counterterrorism as resting on the premise of a deterrence effect. Based on comparative arguments and previous evidence on crime, we expect camera surveillance to have a relatively smaller deterrent effect on terrorism than on other forms of crime. In particular, we emphasize opportunities for substitution (i.e., displacement effects), the interaction with media attention aspired to by terrorists, the limits of real-time interventions, the crowding-out of social surveillance, the risk of misguided profiling, and politico-economic concerns regarding the misuse of the technology.
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Camera surveillance has recently gained prominence in policy proposals on combating terrorism. We evaluate this instrument of counterterrorism as resting on the premise of a deterrence effect. Based on comparative arguments and previous evidence on crime, we expect camera surveillance to have a relatively smaller deterrent effect on terrorism than on other forms of crime. In particular, we emphasize opportunities for substitution (i.e., displacement effects), the interaction with media attention aspired to by terrorists, the limits of real-time interventions, the crowding-out of social surveillance, the risk of misguided profiling, and politico-economic concerns regarding the misuse of the technology.
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In: Bolhuis , M P & van Wijk , J 2020 , ' Citizenship deprivation as a counterterrorism measure in Europe : possible follow-up scenarios, human rights infringements and the effect on counterterrorism ' , European Journal of Migration and Law , vol. 22 , no. 3 , pp. 338-365 . https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12340079
The departure of substantial numbers of 'foreign fighters' and the occurrence of terrorist attacks on European soil have prompted renewed interest in citizenship deprivation as a policy measure. This article aims to contribute to the debate on its utility as a counterterrorism measure by examining recent developments in citizenship deprivation legislation and its use in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK; discussing the wide array of possible scenarios that may follow after an individual is deprived of citizenship; and analysing to what extent the various outcomes are instrumental in countering terrorism. It concludes that most of the outcomes are problematic from a human rights perspective, or counterproductive in the fight against terrorism as they may cause further marginalisation and radicalisation and can play into the hands of terrorist groups, may cause people to disappear from the radar, and may undermine crucial international cooperation.
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In the following research, I investigate whether hard offensive counterterrorism results in the failure or success of a counterterrorism strategy. In the second chapter, the academic literature of counterterrorism strategies is examined. Next, a hypothesis is put forth that if a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy is utilized, indicators such as high troop levels, more civilian casualties, more negative public opinion, and an increased rate of terrorism, will point to a failed counterterrorism strategy. Then, I put forth a methodology to test the hypothesis while introducing troop level databases, various public opinion polling sources, and terrorist attack databases to investigate the given variables. In the third chapter, a case study of the Iraq War is utilized, in which the initial invasion from 2003-2006 and the Surge/Withdrawal eras from 2007-2011 are examined. Both time periods are compared to see if hard offensive counterterrorism used in 2003-2006 resulted in a less effective counterterrorism campaign than the softer counterinsurgency strategies from 2007-2011. Data from the Brookings Iraq Index, Iraq Body Count, and Global Terrorism Database are then analyzed to investigate the variables of casualties, public opinion, and rate of terrorism during each era in Iraq. In the fourth chapter, the war in Afghanistan is presented as a case study. I then evaluate whether hard offensive counterterrorism used from 2001-2008 resulted in less terrorism than the counterinsurgency strategies of Surge and withdrawal used from 2009-2016. Data from the Congressional Research Service, UNAMA, Physicians for Social Responsibility, the BBC, the Asia Foundation, and the Global Terrorism Database are then utilized to assess each variable. Finally, I present my findings and conclude that evaluating a strategy primarily using hard offensive counterterrorism strategies is rather complex and then present ideas for future research in counterterrorism strategy.
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The European Union security and counter-terrorism strategy adopted after 11 September 2001 has not been effective, instead resulted in the increase of Islamist terrorist incidents. Europe has been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks, which demonstrates the limits of the Security and Defence Policy. The EU short-term strategy, tending only to hit terrorist organisations, has not produced the expected effects: attacks in Europe, rather than decreasing, have increased. Little or nothing has been done to develop a successful preventive strategy. After the early 2000s, there is hardly registered Islamic attack within the EU, due to the change in the Al-Qaeda strategy. The recrudescence recorded after 2014 coincides with the rise of ISIS.
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The European Union security and counter-terrorism strategy adopted after 11 September 2001 has not been effective, instead resulted in the increase of Islamist terrorist incidents. Europe has been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks, which demonstrates the limits of the Security and Defence Policy. The EU short-term strategy, tending only to hit terrorist organisations, has not produced the expected effects: attacks in Europe, rather than decreasing, have increased. Little or nothing has been done to develop a successful preventive strategy. After the early 2000s, there is hardly registered Islamic attack within the EU, due to the change in the Al-Qaeda strategy. The recrudescence recorded after 2014 coincides with the rise of ISIS. The EU shortsighted strategy adopted so far to combat Islamic terrorism has proved ineffective. Attacks within the EU, rather than decreasing, have increased. The high number of terrorist incidents and casualties within the EU demonstrates that terrorism can not be stopped only with criminal provisions, freezing of assets and financial resources, blocking immigration and strengthening of border controls. Only a long-term cultural strategy, adequately funded, can be effective to counter terrorism. ; Poster presented at Encontro Ciência 2017 (National Cience Summit 2017), the Science and Technology Summit in Portugal, held at Lisbon Congress Centre, Lisboa, Portugal, 3-5 July 2017 Seminal research has been presented at the international conference Europe as a Global Actor (EGA) 2016 in Lisbon on 24 May 2016. See: "A Critical Assessment of the European Cultural Approach to Counter Terrorism" (DOI:10.5281/zenodo.810533)
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This Research paper tries to bring to the causes of the current terrorist threats in Jordan in the chaotic region and the methods of combating terrorism. It focuses mainly on the Jordanian policy and strategy for combating terrorism including legal, diplomatic, and security efforts. The impact of the Syrian crisis on this poor resources country causing undeniable political, economic, social, and security threats. The article shows the efforts of Jordan to fight terrorism through national and international strategy by joining the International Alliance against ISIS. Jordan holds a significant role in this battle on multi-dimensions.
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After US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and Special Operations Forces [SOF] counterterrorism [CT] operations routed al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, planning for the next phase was underway. It was determined that security and stability operations or counterinsurgency [COIN] operations would be necessary to stabilize the country. Soon after transitioning from CT to COIN operations, COIN operations stalled. Several factors have played a part in the unsuccessful attempts at COIN. First, the Global War on Terror [GWOT] campaign was designed to address a narrow set of goals including destroying, dismantling, and disrupting al Qaeda and its affiliates. Second, US leaders have consistently undermanned the effort with a light military footprint. Next, the various forces continuing CT operations have remained uncoordinated from Joint Forces pursuing the COIN operation. Presently, US financial and political support for the conflict is rapidly declining. With US leaders already beginning troop withdrawals, it is imperative that the US adjust its strategy. Narrowing the focus back to a CT campaign will maximize the available resources and cut back on associated costs. Finally, a CT strategy will keep terror networks off balance, buying time to allow US forces to build Afghan security forces necessary for long-term stability.
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Since the proclamation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Caliphate in June 2014, an unprecedented number of jihadi supporters in Europe have left their countries to fight alongside the organisation in Iraq and Syria. Over the years, ISIS has lost much of its territory and was militarily defeated in 2019, leaving a large number of members waiting in Kurdish camps and Iraqi prisons for their fate to be decided. Instead of repatriating foreign fighters, many European countries have started to use citizenship deprivation as a tool of preventing them from returning. Under the rationale of protecting national security and deterring possible supporters, it has been argued that citizenship deprivation is nothing more than risk exportation, with notable implications for a whole international community. This article provides an overview of the rationale behind citizenship deprivation as a counterterrorism measure and highlights how, from a counterterrorism perspective, shifting the problem instead of addressing it, could be counterproductive and undermine the fight against terrorism. The article concludes that despite numerous implications, following the public pressure to harshly respond to terrorism, it is unlikely that the popularity and use of citizenship deprivation as a counterterrorism measure will be in decrease soon.
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This paper is an effort to critically evaluate Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy, based on both military and non-military means. The paper argues that the counterterrorism strategy of Pakistan has proved ineffective and counter-productive to combat the homegrown threat of terrorism, unleashed by militant sectarian groups, following the Takfiri ideology. Although Pakistan's Military claims that the latest on-going security operations, Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and Khyber-II in Khyber Agency, have succeeded in clearing most of the area, however, the matter of fact is that the security operations have not considerably damaged the ability of terrorists, particularly the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The terrorists' network, their strength and structure have until now remained intact. The key to longterm prevention of terrorism, beyond security operations for clearing any area of the militants, is to discontinue the supply chain of terrorists. This requires the creation of a new counter-extremism religious narrative, which will help re-formulate a concrete and effective counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan to ensure domestic peace and security.
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