Suchergebnisse

This paper addresses the debate of assigning counterterrorist functions to the Argentine Armed Forces from a series of questions that have been little explored in local literature. Based on the possibility of considering terrorism as external aggression, we wonder, what types of operations could the Argentine military carry out according to the nation's strategic-military interests? Under what assumptions? To what extent can Central Powers' counter-terrorism experience serve as a parameter for the Argentine case? These questions should take as a starting point the strategic defensive position maintained by Argentina during most of its history. Recently, this condition has been ratified by the latest National Defense Policy Directive, according to which the country will not make offensive military interventions outside its sovereign areas. In relation to this premise, this paper analyzes defensive counterterrorism missions undertaken by Central Powers' Armed Forces and detects which of them could contribute to strengthening Argentina's capabilities to anticipate and respond to such aggressions. ; En este trabajo es abordado el debate acerca de la asignación de funciones contraterroristas a las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas, desde una serie de interrogantes que han sido poco explorados en la literatura local. A partir de la posibilidad de considerar el terrorismo como una agresión externa, nos preguntamos: ¿Qué tipo de operaciones podrían desarrollar los militares argentinos en función de los intereses estratégico-militares de su nación? ¿Bajo qué supuestos de empleo? ¿Hasta qué punto la experiencia contraterrorista de las Potencias Centrales puede servir de parámetro para el caso argentino? Estas preguntas deben tener como punto de partida el posicionamiento estratégico defensivo que ha mantenido la Argentina durante la mayor parte de su historia, condición que ha sido ratificada recientemente en la última Directiva de Política de Defensa Nacional y según la cual el país no desarrollará intervenciones militares ofensivas fuera de sus espacios soberanos. En relación a esta premisa, este trabajo explora qué tipo de misiones contraterroristas defensivas desarrollan las Fuerzas Armadas de las Potencias Centrales, con el fin de detectar cuáles de estas podrían contribuir al fortalecimiento de las capacidades de anticipación y respuesta de Argentina ante este tipo de agresiones. ; Neste trabalho, aborda-se o debate sobre a atribuição de funções antiterroristas às Forças Armadas da Argentina, a partir de uma série de questões pouco exploradas na literatura local. Com base na possibilidade de considerar o terrorismo uma agressão externa, nos perguntamos: que tipo de operações os militares argentinos poderiam realizar de acordo com o interesse estratégico-militar do seu país? Sob quais pressupostos de emprego? Até que ponto a experiência antiterrorista das Potências Centrais pode servir de parâmetro para o caso argentino? Essas questões devem ter como ponto de partida o posicionamento estratégico defensivo que a Argentina manteve durante a maior parte de sua história, condição que foi recentemente ratificada na mais recente Diretiva Política de Defesa Nacional e segundo a qual o país não desenvolverá intervenções militares ofensivas fora de seus espaços soberanos. Em relação a essa premissa, este artigo explora que tipo de missões de antiterroristas defensivas são desenvolvidas pelas Forças Armadas das Potências Centrais, a fim de detectar quais delas poderiam contribuir para o fortalecimento das capacidades de antecipação e resposta da Argentina frente a esse tipo de agressão.

Counterterrorism strategies that mainly rely on hard power have long been used to defeat terrorism. In recent years, governments have begun incorporating soft power approaches not as a substitute, but as a complementary strategy to be applied alongside hard power approaches. Disengagement and deradicalization programs are important components of soft power approaches, and are regarded as significant contributors to traditional counterterrorism methods. In this paper, we analyze a locally developed counterterrorism program in Turkey, which resulted in the disengagement and deradicalization of hundreds of militants. In this paper we present an examination of a pilot program that focused on applying individual disengagement and deradicalization counterterrorism measures that was conducted by the Adana Police Department in Turkey between 2009 and 2015. This program was designed to reach out to the members of extremist groups and their families for the purpose of persuading them to disengage from their groups, change their radical mindsets, and help them reintegrate into society. We also discuss how the change in the government's counterterrorism strategy from one which prioritizes the use of soft power approaches to another, which mostly utilizes the hard power approach, and almost completely discards the soft power method, influenced the implementation of the program.

This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government's counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for "spectacular" terrorist attacks is inversely related to the governments toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

For many decades now, terrorism & counter-terrorism have dominated the news. The time has now come to analyze resources available to oppose terrorism with a view to consolidating certain fundamental aspects so that what is seen by some as a global cataclysm can be effectively countered.

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.484028 ; Motivated by the links between terror and crime and the difficulty in directly detecting terror activity, we formulate and solve a resource allocation problem on overlapping networks to determine if interdiction efforts may be able to take advantage of these connections. The government, knowing only the general structure and overlap of the networks, allocates its scarce resources to investigate each terror aand criminal network. There are two stages to the investigation: an initial investigation of all nodes (i.e., terrorists or criminals) and a secondary investigation of criminals identified during the initial investigation to determine if they are terrorists. Applying our model to data derived from a population of terrorists in the United States between 1971-2003 suggests that the government may be able to exploit the terror connections of crimes that are relatively uncommon, somewhat easy to detect, and are attractive to terrorists. ; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; Stanford University, Stanford, CA