Suchergebnisse

The concept, crisis escalation, has three distinct but closely-related meanings: change from incipient to full-scale crisis; change from non-violence to violence; and change from no/low violence to severe violence. These are examined through a model of crisis escalation and a group of seven hypotheses derived from the model. Testing of the propositions on crisis escalation with the evidence from 388 international crises and 829 foreign policy crises from the end of 1918 to the end of 1988 reveals strong support for most of the postulated linkages in the crisis escalation model. Moreover, the evidence from ten indepth case studies indicates a widely shared pattern of coping with high stress, despite notable diversity in crisis attributes. This finding challenges conventional wisdom about how states cope with foreign policy crises.

Based on conference paper. What determines whether, once deterrence has failed, full-scale war is the probable outcome?

Analyzes escalation patterns in interstate disputes among nation's with both identical and different levels of weapons technology; based on conference paper. Whether nuclear weapons can be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists.

The effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on patterns of international conflict is the subject of an extensive but generally impressionistic body of work. Assumptions in this area determine one's confidence in superpower deterrence and fuel the debate over the proper expenditure of military allocations. This study presents an analysis of escalation patterns in interstate disputes among nations with both identical and different levels of weapons technology. The results demonstrate that the distribution of nuclear capabilities does impact the patterns of escalation in serious international conflicts. The findings are supportive of the thesis of competitive risk taking in disputes between nuclear powers but also indicate that the possession of nuclear weapons has no apparent inhibitory effect on the escalatory propensities of nonnuclear opponents. The principal policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists.

Although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises, game-theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly. This paper models a mutually assured destruction (MAD) crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information, sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found. These provide better game-theoretic foundations for the notions of resolve and critical risk and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer, but incompletely specified models, revealing several inconsistencies: several analyses of MAD conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail. Many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate, the greater its adversary's resolve. In our model, however, the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails, and some states prove more likely to escalate if their adversaries' resolve is greater.

We develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game. Players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation; the more cooperative player (if there is one) may then choose to retaliate. In a crisis, players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes. Players can, by threatening their opponent, stabilize the new status quo. In addition, points of threat escalation are identified at which neither player can prevent the opponent from escalating further without threatening the opponent more severely than before the crisis erupted, thereby heating up an already tense situation. Crisis stabilization is aided by being close to the full-cooperation position, though, paradoxically, both players may benefit from having created a crisis that only escalating threats may resolve. We discuss ways of avoiding threat escalation and the increased risk of war that it entails, especially in conflicts between the superpowers.

AbstractUsing a modified version of Chicken, referred to as the Threat Game, Brams and Kilgour have developed a theoretical model of threat escalation and stability in superpower crises. More specifically, they derive explicit thresholds for sufficient pre-emption to stabilize a crisis before it escalates out of control. An appropriate degree of coercion thereby is designated for the response to an adversary, in order to deter further escalation. The overall objective of this study is to use data on superpower crises to test a modified version of the model developed by Brams and Kilgour. Mixed results emerge from testing the most general propositions. The choice of response level usually does not surpass the model's recommended value. However, stabilization is feasible in virtually all crises and, when an actor does meet the threshold, satisfaction with the outcome occurs more frequently than otherwise. Two more specific hypotheses also are tested, with partial support for the model once again being the result.

USING A MODIFIED VERSION OF CHICKEN, REFERRED TO AS THE THREAT GAME, BRAMS AND KILGOUR HAVE DEVELOPED A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THREAT ESCALATION AND STABILITY IN SUPERPOWER CRISES. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THEY DERIVE EXPLICIT THRESHOLDS FOR SUFFICIENT PRE-EMPTION TO STABILIZE A CRISIS BEFORE IT ESCALATES OUT OF CONTROL. AN APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF COERCION THEREBY IS DESIGNATED FOR THE RESPONSE TO AN ADVERSARY, IN ORDER TO DETER FURTHER ESCALATION. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY IS TO USE DATA ON SUPERPOWER CRISES TO TEST A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE MODEL DEVELOPED BY BRAMS AND KILGOUR. MIXED RESULTS EMERGE FROM TESTING THE MOST GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. THE CHOICE OF RESPONSE LEVEL USUALLY DOES NOT SURPASS THE MODEL'S RECOMMENDED VALUE. HOWEVER, STABILIZATION IS FEASIBLE IN VIRTUALLY ALL CRISES AND, WHEN AN ACTOR DOES MEET THE THRESHOLD, SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OCCURS MORE FREQUENTLY THAN OTHERWISE. TWO MORE SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES ALSO ARE TESTED, WITH PARTIAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODEL ONCE AGAIN BEING THE RESULT.