Holsti, Ole R., Crisis, Escalation and War, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montréal, 1972, 290 p
In: Études internationales, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 424
ISSN: 1703-7891
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In: Études internationales, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 424
ISSN: 1703-7891
In: Politique internationale: pi, Heft 138, S. 1-2
ISSN: 0221-2781
For thirty years now, the triple alliance of the Assads in Syria, the Islamic regime in Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon has deployed a redoubtable regional strategy. But since February 2011, the Syrian crisis in the wake of the Arab Spring has shaken the foundations of this long-standing union. Iran and Hezbollah first sought to protect their own interests. They each continued, in their own inimitable way, to display their support for Bashar al-Assad, while also seeking to mediate between the government and the rebels and negotiate a resolution to the crisis. Having crossed a new threshold of violence in mid-2012, the government is now fighting for its life. And its two allies are caught in the trap of a headlong rush that could have dramatic consequences. Furthermore, the escalation of this conflict has resulted in Iran's and Hezbollah's expanded presence in the Syrian theater of operations, and a regional expansion, in particular into Lebanon. Adapted from the source document.
In: Annuaire français de droit international, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 173-195
Immediately after the start of fighting between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, Georgia brought actions in several courts to denounce, more or less directly, the destabilization manoeuvres conducted against it by Russia since independence in 1991. This outbreak of hostilities was merely the violent escalation of a much older, silent war preventing Georgia from enjoying full sovereignty. However, the fragility of the Georgian state is also the result of internal struggles by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist regions that have been claiming their own independence for several years. Both of these aspects must be considered in order to understand the various issues at stake in the current crisis in Georgia.
In: Politique étrangère: PE ; revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 79-89
ISSN: 0032-342X
World Affairs Online
In: Studia diplomatica: Brussels journal of international relations, Band 53, Heft 5, S. 151-172
ISSN: 0770-2965
Crises in the Belgian state are examined in a systemic perspective focusing on interactions between the political elite & public opinion. Social & theoretical backgrounds of the Belgian government's developing federal administration are sketched. The concept "crisis" is defined via five criteria: (1) a social problem without a solution, (2) mobilization, (3) gridlock, (4) climax & outcome, & (5) changes. Crises have been inherent in the functioning of Belgian society & are normal in a democracy. Patterns in Belgian crises are sought in three examples: the two philosophical-religious school wars of 1979 & 1955 & the royalty problem of 1950. Popular mobilization & its interaction with the pressure tactics of the political elite are analyzed. Graphs representing three evolutionary phases in these cases suggest that crises follow a pattern of public opinion mobilization, followed by escalation, then pacification tactics by political actors. 3 Figures, 5 Graphs. E. Taylor
In: Africa development: a quarterly journal of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa = Afrique et développement, Band 30, Heft 1-2, S. 183-209
ISSN: 0850-3907
Since the abortive coup in October 1993, Burundi has been in a severe crisis, however, lately reaching a more hopeful situation. The international community has made substantial efforts at preventing the escalation of the conflict and at contributing to a process for sustainable peace in the country. This includes the UN system, bilateral countries and in particular the neighbouring states. A number of NGOs have been among the actors. Here the efforts of some major NGOs lending their support to Burundi's peace process are discussed both as regards their support for peace building and for support to peace mediation. The aim has been to assess their performance based on their aims and objectives in relation to respective NGO's overall reasons for coming to Burundi in the first place, as well as their wider aims. Efforts are made to find common denominators and possible conclusions and recommendations useful for others involved in similar activities in Burundi and elsewhere. (Afr Dev/DÜI)
World Affairs Online
In: Politique étrangère: PE ; revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Heft 1, S. 123-136
ISSN: 0032-342X
Eight years of inspections & monitoring by UN weapons Inspectors & the Iraq Survey Group (reporting to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) have yielded extensive information on the Iraqi biological weapons program & some useful lessons. Iraq's pursuit of biological weapons during the 1980s was shaped both by geostrategic factors & by the unique characteristics of the Iraqi regime, including the personal idiosyncrasies of Saddam Hussein. For Saddam, biological weapons served multiple strategic functions: pre-conflict deterrence, intraconflict deterrence, & escalation dominance. Iraqi BW use doctrine & command-&control arrangements were influenced both by external threats & domestic factors (such as Saddam's fear of a coup d'etat) & evolved over time in response to crisis. The UN investigation of the Iraqi biological weapons program demonstrated the effectiveness of an approach combining multiple methodologies, including aerial surveillance, on-site inspections, import monitoring, interviews, & sampling & analysis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi defectors provided little useful information &, indeed, were often a source of deliberate distortions. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politique internationale: pi, Heft 144
ISSN: 0221-2781
An interview with Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda since April 17, 2000. It was felt that the Franco-Rwandan relationships tend to subside. Until a new crisis erupted in April when you have accused France of refusing to recognize what you call its 'responsibility' in the genocide of 1994. So, no French official was present at the commemorations 20th Anniversary. How do you explain this escalation of tension? Our relations with foreign countries are guided by the principles of truth and mutual respect. Our relationship with France is no exception to the rule. We have noted some positive developments in recent years, including the first trial of a genocide suspect in France. But the basic problem lies in the persistent tendency to distort history. Everyone has the right not to attend the 20th commemoration of the genocide against the Tutsis, but that does not change the historical reality. This changes nothing to the involvement of a number of people before, during and after the genocide, nor the fact that the genocide took refuge abroad, particularly in France. It is impossible to twist reality for convenience or to please this or that. Adapted from the source document.