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During the 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis, Greek military intelligence provided essential information on Turkey's limited military preparations, so helping to prevent an escalation to confrontation. In the 1996 crisis, Greek military intelligence failed to provide tactical information and details of the Turkish intent to deploy troops on one Greek islet. This failure allowed the Turks to turn the tables on the Greeks

A generic asymmetric two-stage escalation model of incomplete information is used to examine strategic relationships in which one player adopts a defense posture akin to the "Massive Retaliation" policy of the Eisenhower administration that relies only on the threat of escalation to deter aggression. In the model, a challenger must decide whether to contest the status quo and a defender must choose between capitulation and escalation. Each player has probabilistic knowledge of the other's preference between conceding and fighting an all-out war. All perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Incomplete Information Escalation game are identified and interpreted. Unlike two-stage games of complete information, war and escalation may be rational outcomes under incomplete information. At certain times, these outcomes may be inevitable. Challengers preferring conflict to capitulation always initiate conflict, whatever the information state of the game. But when information is incomplete, even challengers with an aversion to all-out war may rationally precipitate a crisis. Similarly, when it is unsure of a challenger's preferences, even a defender preferring not to wage war may rationally choose to escalate a conflict. The conditions associated with a stable status quo, a successful challenge, an escalated conflict, and war are discussed.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: Conflict and Evil -- Images of Evil -- Humiliation -- Conclusion -- Chapter 1: Living with Others: The Inevitable Conflict -- Others and Conflicts -- The Dynamics of Conflict: The Escalation Spiral -- Anxiety -- Agitation -- Alienation -- Accusation in a Mirror -- Conclusion -- Chapter 2: Media and the Spiral of Escalation -- Mediatized Conflict -- Studies on Media Violence -- Media and Anxiety -- Climate Crisis -- Mental Health Crisis -- Financial Crisis -- Media and Agitation -- Media and Alienation -- Dehumanizing Language and Genocide -- The Huntington Thesis -- Media and Accusation in a Mirror -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3: Taming the Spiral of Escalation -- Communication and Conflict -- Peace Journalism -- Human Rights Reparations -- The Mont Fleur Experience -- Beyond Peace Journalism -- New Media -- Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Mindful Communication -- Mindfulness -- The Modalities of Mindless Versus Mindful Communication -- Training -- Children -- Music Teaching -- Enabling Environment -- Conclusion -- Chapter 5: The Communicative City -- Disarming Conversation -- Right to the Communicative City -- Heterogeneity -- Speed -- Mindlessness -- Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Collective Evil: Can It Happen Again? -- Collective Conflict and Evil-Doing -- The Present State of Group Conflict in the World -- The Three Essential Conflicts Today -- Urban-Based Conflicts -- Resource-Based Conflicts -- Identity-Based Conflicts -- The Recurrence of Lethal Collective Conflict in Contemporary History -- Conclusion -- Chapter 7: International Media Alert System (IMAS) -- Crimes Against Humanity -- Early Alert -- Elimination Beliefs -- International Law -- Prosecution and Trial -- The International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg.

Social value orientations (SVOs) of a society determine peoples' behaviour and are critical for young democracies in crises. This paper draws on the Maldives Values in Crisis survey, conducted during the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic. SVOs assessed using the Schwartz Personal Values Questionnaire shows that Maldivian society weigh slightly towards prosocial. Urban-rural, age, and gender determine the SVOs on the dimension of Openness to change versus Conservation while age and gender determine the SVOs on Self-enhancement versus Self-transcendence dimension. Confidence in the public institutions were moderate and not associated with the SVOs. The moderate level of SVOs and confidence in institutions reflects the democratic landscape of the country. Although prosocial SVOs are favourable for implementing containment measures of the pandemic, without a strong value orientation towards conservation and self-transcendence, and confidence in the institutions, the country faces the risk of non-compliance to measures and escalation of the crisis.

This open access book offers an analysis of why preparations for digital disruption should become a stated goal of security policy and policies that aim to safeguard the continuity of critical infrastructure. The increasing use of digital technology implies new and significant vulnerabilities for our society. However, it is striking that almost all cyber-security measures taken by governments, international bodies and other major players are aimed at preventing incidents. But there is no such thing as total digital security. Whether inside or outside the digital domain, incidents can and will occur and may lead to disruption. While a raft of provisions, crisis contingency plans and legal regulations are in place to deal with the possibility of incidents in the 'real world', no equivalence exists for the digital domain and digital disruption. Hence, this book uniquely discusses several specific policy measures government and businesses should take in order to be better prepared to deal with a digital disruption and prevent further escalation.

Over the past decade, both official defence establishments and independent strategic analysts have devoted increasing attention to the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems which support the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and to the role of these systems in crises and in strategic nuclear war-fighting. In particular, specific consideration has been given to such critical issues as the extent to which current strategic C3I systems enhance crisis stability or instability, and whether or not they would serve to control escalation in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange or, because of their vulnerabilities, would in fact contribute to the dynamics of the escalation process.

Concerns specificity of the sociocultural integration and considers the principle factors producing the identity­based conflicts. The author emphasises the destabilising role of ethnicity politicisation and lists the civic identity crisis, traditionalisation, and ethnic tensions among the systemic circumstances that support escalation of the identity­based conflicts.

The author examines the indirect macroeconomic roots of the global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis: the escalation of global trade imbalances between the US and China and regional trade imbalances in the Eurozone. He provides new insights into the sources and dynamics of power and instability in the contemporary global monetary system, Over the past few years the global monetary system was destabilized by the eruption of the global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis. Mattias Vermeiren examines the indirect macroeconomic roots of these crises: the escalation of global trade imbalances between the US and China and regional trade imbalances in the Eurozone. Drawing on the insights of the IPE literature on international monetary power and CPE literature on comparative capitalisms, he shows that understanding the sources and dynamics of these imbalances requires an analytical focus on the distribution of international monetary power between the US, the Eurozone countries and China and on the domestic institutions of their distinctive national models of capitalism. The author demonstrates the heuristic value of conjoining these two strands of literature, providing new insights into the sources and dynamics of power and instability in the contemporary global monetary system

Much of the debate about China's rise in recent years has focused on the potential dangers China could pose as an eventual peer competitor to the United States bent on challenging the existing international order. But another issue is far more pressing. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak compared to the United States, there is a real danger that Beijing and Washington will find themselves in a crisis that could quickly escalate to military conflict. Unlike a long-term great-power strategic rivalry that might or might not develop down the road, the danger of a crisis involving the two nuclear-armed countries is a tangible, near-term concern-and the events of the past few years suggest the risk might be increasing. Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington have managed to avoid perilous showdowns on several occasions: in 1995-96, when the United States responded to Chinese missile tests intended to warn Taiwanese voters about the danger of pushing for independence; in 1999, when U.S. warplanes accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air assault on Serbia; and in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, leading to the death of the Chinese pilot and Beijing's detention of the U.S. plane and crew. But the lack of serious escalation during those episodes should not breed complacency. None of them met the definition of a genuine crisis: a confrontation that threatens vital interests on both sides and thus sharply increases the risk of war. If Beijing and Washington were to find themselves in that sort of showdown in the near future, they would both have strong incentives to resort to force. Moreover, the temptations and pressures to escalate would likely be highest in the early stages of the face-off, making it harder for diplomacy to prevent war. Adapted from the source document.

The paper examines negotiated resolution of armed conflicts through an account of the war between El Salvador and Honduras. The situation before the conflict, characterized by deep political instability and marked influence of the military is dealt with. After mentioning the reasons of constraints in their relationship attention is focused on war operations as well as on the various vain attempt made by regional organizations to solve the conflict before both parties signed a peace treaty. Finally, some comments are offered regarding action mechanisms used in the case, suggesting the appropriateness of counting with permanent crisis management systems which would prevent their escalation to an armed conflict ; El trabajo examina la esolución negociada de los conflictos armados a partir de una reseña de la guerra entre El Salvador y Honduras. Se revisa la situación previa al conflicto en ambos países, caracterizada por una profunda inestabilidad política y la marcada influencia militar. Tras mencionar las razones del distanciamiento, se centra la atención en las operaciones de guerra y en los esfuerzos de las organizaciones regionales por resolver la situación, que luego de diversos altibajos culminaron en el tratado de paz de 1980. Finalmente, se formulan algunas observaciones acerca de los mecanismos de acción a los que se recurrió en el caso y se sugiere la conveniencia de contar con sistemas permanentes de manejo de crisis que permitan impedir que ellas lleguen a constituir un conflicto bélico.

Clausewitz's concept of material warfare is a reaction to the trend of reducing the art of war to the application of self-evident rules of engagement. By putting tactical outcomes in the perspective of strategic decision-making, the battlefield becomes the place where the trend to the extremes plays out. Based on his concept of material warfare, immateriality will be presented not as an abstraction of material circumstances but rather as the tendency to escalation that is inherent to every combat. Some conclusive remarks will be dedicated to the relation between military history and interpretations of military genius, in order to support the claim that materiality and immateriality are semantic concepts that express a state of equilibrium between evidence and decision.

The objective of this article is to describe the Conflict Resolution interventions used throughout the conflict cycle. The article first presents five levels of conflict intensity of the conflict cycle, namely the levels of Stable Peace, Unstable Peace, Conflict, Crisis, and War. Each level of conflict intensity is characterized by analyzing the variables of Galtung's conflict triangle (behavior, attitudes, and goals), actors' perceptions (friend, rival, and enemy), and the dominant strategy of interaction between actors (positive-sum, compromise, zero-sum, and negative-sum). Each level is illustrated with typical events associated with civil wars and wars between states and proposes threshold events of a possible change in the level of conflict intensity. The article then presents a set of Conflict Resolution approaches that can be carried out in each of the conflict intensity levels of the escalation and de escalation periods of the conflict cycle. Conflict Resolution is subdivided between interventions whose main objective is to contain violent conflict, here called Conflict Management, and interventions with a main objective of solving political problems, which can be Conflict Prevention, if they occur in the period of conflict escalation, or Conflict Termination, if they occur in the period of conflict de escalation. In Conflict Management we identify the interventions of: Crisis Management; Unilateral and Joint Internal Management; External Management in the form of Peacemaking or Peace Enforcement, and Traditional Peacekeeping. In Conflict Prevention we identify Structural and Direct Prevention. In Conflict Termination we identify Multidimensional Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Peace Consolidation (associated to Conflict Transformation). Additionally, we present two alternative approaches, Cosmopolitan Peace and Critical Approaches. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion