Suchergebnisse

Although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises, game-theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly. This paper models a mutually assured destruction (MAD) crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information, sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found. These provide better game-theoretic foundations for the notions of resolve and critical risk and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer, but incompletely specified models, revealing several inconsistencies: several analyses of MAD conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail. Many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate, the greater its adversary's resolve. In our model, however, the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails, and some states prove more likely to escalate if their adversaries' resolve is greater.

Transformational changes have been taking place in the political systems in many countries of the world over the last few decades. This issue arouses the great interest of scientists and researchers. In the article, I pay particular attention to the study of the "traditional" and "new" party systems and their role in the country's contemporary political life. Given the challenge of the day, I see populism as a problem with its impact on democracy along with such issues as the role of populist parties and the citizens' attitude to them; the analysis of problems developing in the political process, particularly, in parties and movements of the populist type; the formation and development of multi-party systems and democracy as a whole.Populism is considered in the article as a political ideology. This phenomenon is investigated as a component of the political parties' activities, especially, of the Ukrainian parties. A comparative analysis of populist parties in the European Union and Ukraine has been carried out.I analyze the main factors of populism's influence on the party-political system on the examples of the European countries and Ukraine. I also prove that populism has always occupied a special place in the implementation of programs of political leaders and parties. It is noted that populism remains the current day phenomenon of both the party-political system and the socio-economic life of the countries in the world. Having a considerable influence over the politics of the countries, where functioning of democratic institutions is relatively inexperienced, populism has a rather clear manifestation in the modern political space and the "old" democracies. There is a clear link between increasing populism and exacerbating socio-economic problems. The inability of the political establishment, including the democratic one, to respond effectively to new problems and challenges is an important factor contributing to the emergence and growth of populist influence.The in-depth analysis of the populist rhetorical and political effects on the development of modern democracy is particularly important, i. e. the margins between the reality and virtuality, truth and falsehood are leveling; facts lose their value; deconstruction of truth takes place; traditional ideologies are destroyed; moral relativism, hypocrisy and double standards are spreading out.

"Crisis Behavior: Miscalculation, Escalation, and Inadvertent War" published on by Oxford University Press.

Why do some international crises escalate into violence while others do not? I argue that an understanding of crisis behavior necessitates awareness of the processes preceding a crisis and propose two mechanisms that link precrisis hostility with crisis violence. The population fatigue mechanism suggests that precrisis hostility interrupts the everyday life of a population, strengthening its demand for a harsher response. If leaders behave with restraint during a crisis and after the crisis hostilities resume, leaders risk facing greater dissatisfaction from their now even more fatigued population. The baseline for resolve mechanism suggests that if states are actively hostile before a crisis, they must maintain hostility during a crisis to credibly demonstrate resolve. Findings on international crises between 1918 and 2010 support the interphase relationship: a crisis escalation is significantly more likely after a hostile precrisis period. The behavior of opponents can indicate how crises might unfold even before they begin.

Why do some international crises escalate into violence while others do not? I argue that an understanding of crisis behavior necessitates awareness of the processes preceding a crisis and propose two mechanisms that link precrisis hostility with crisis violence. The population fatigue mechanism suggests that precrisis hostility interrupts the everyday life of a population, strengthening its demand for a harsher response. If leaders behave with restraint during a crisis and after the crisis hostilities resume, leaders risk facing greater dissatisfaction from their now even more fatigued population. The baseline for resolve mechanism suggests that if states are actively hostile before a crisis, they must maintain hostility during a crisis to credibly demonstrate resolve. Findings on international crises between 1918 and 2010 support the interphase relationship: a crisis escalation is significantly more likely after a hostile precrisis period. The behavior of opponents can indicate how crises might unfold even before they begin.

An introduction to strategic rivalries -- Defining and identifying strategic rivalries in world politics -- Describing strategic rivalies -- Protracted conflict and crisis escalation -- Serial crisis behavior and escalating risks -- Contiguity, space and position in the major power subsystem -- Initiating and escalating positional and spatial rivalries -- Arms build-ups and alliances in the steps-to work theory -- Contested territory and conflict resolution -- Inducements, facilitators, and suppressors.

The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan has been manifold due to the trust deficit, threat perception, and non-resolving nature of their disputes. The hostile nature of the two neighbours demands a deep understanding of their relationship, and focus isrequired on how a particular crisis management approach has helped them manage their conflict and avoid war during the Pulwama crisis. The paper applies Michael Brecher's four-stage model to explain the Pulwama crisis and describe how the situation between India and Pakistan has shifted from a perception of nuclear war to de-escalation after the attack. Crisis management helped the two states to retaliate back from their position and avoid the war-like scenario anticipated at that time. The various dimensions and underpinnings of crisis management entail that the synthesis of traditional and modern concepts of crisis management will better explain the theoretical contours of crisis management.


Bibliography Entry
Khurshid, Tayyaba (2023) "From Crisis Onset to De-Escalation: Examining Role of Crisis Management in the Pulwama Crisis" NDU Journal. 37: 25-33.

This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin's (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare.