Suchergebnisse

Part of a Swiss National Research Program study addresses victim perceptions of racist violence in French-speaking Switzerland to argue that a victim-oriented perspective provides a better understanding of racist acts. Data were obtained from calls made to a racist hotline, 1995-98. A quantitative analysis of the calls was complemented by a qualitative study of selected cases followed up by hotline personnel over several weeks or months. William Thomas's (1966) interactionist perspective is drawn upon to introduce a typology of racist violence based on victim-perpetrator interaction as initially reported to the hotline. Power & organization are defined as two crucial dimensions of the victim-perpetrator relationship, with power described as either formal or informal, & the level of organization delineated as that expressed either by a structured institution, or by a nonaligned individual. Excerpts from actual calls are used to illustrate examples of institutional violence, power abuse, "doctrinaire organized violence," & interpersonal violence. The impact of Swiss immigration policy on racist acts is discussed & suggestions are made for future research. 1 Table, 29 References. J. Lindroth

Introduces selected papers concerned with the discovery of HIV in the blood supply in six West European countries. With the discovery that HIV was in the blood supply & was being transmitted to hemophiliacs & recipients of blood transfusions, policymakers had to change regular routines & standard operating procedures in an atmosphere of fast adaptation that involved quick learning not typical of government bureaucracies. Prompt action was required in a situation of great uncertainty & amidst contradictory information. Within four years, the advanced industrial nations had adopted preventive measures. Both the speed in stopping the transmission of a disease & the controversy raised were unprecedented. Contributors seek to discover why such an apparent medical success could be considered a political failure & why the blood crisis was considered a political failure in some countries, but not others. 2 Tables. L. A. Hoffman

The presence of HIV in the blood supply in France created probably the biggest political scandal of the 20th century; three former ministers (including the prime minister), doctors, scientific experts, & government advisers have stood trial or have trials pending. The structure of the system contributed to what was also a global failure in technical risk management: (1) Political forces had worked to promote solidarity with the gay victims of the epidemic, rather than to defend public health concerns. (2) Cost containment became important, & the health ministry was subordinated to the ministry of social affairs & could not obtain a budget for AIDS. (3) Decision-making competence shifted from ministers to advisory staff, further marginalizing the power of the central health administration. While France controlled the risk within the normal time frame of other Western countries, the scientific advance in HIV research & the public service structure of the entire blood sector could have could saved more lives. The political fallout was considered a policy failure, but the learning process from the investigations created long-term policy success as the public demanded accountability from public authorities & politicians. L. A. Hoffman

Explores the comparative success of Sweden's programmatic management of the HIV & blood crisis in the 1980s as the country applied some of the most restrictive measures in the world & kept the transmission of HIV through the blood supply as merely a marginal health problem. Sweden possessed a professional blood policy community with effective international connections & a politically autonomous blood policy subsystem that allowed the national board of health & welfare, the blood banks, the hemophiliac community, & Kabi, the blood products manufacturer, to take swift & effective actions as research on HIV infection progressed. For example, in Feb 1985 & before a public mandate, Kabi submitted its entire production of clotting factor concentrate to heat treatment. Some counterproductive action & lax supervision of Kabi on some practices allowed 98 hemophiliacs & 80 transfusion recipients to become infected. Two existing compensation plans were immediately applied to these victims, thereby avoiding controversies over compensation that raged in other countries. L. A. Hoffman

An overview of the emergence of the nation-state determines that the bases for intervention were rooted in the multicultural heritage of every nation-state & that, unless there was a security or economic threat, indifference was registered to the actions of other states. Thus, considered is the significance of the nation-state in determining when to intervene, particularly in the context of globalization. The weakness of states is examined to underpin the assertion that global consensus regarding responses to complex emergencies is really more myth than reality. In this light, whether the UN ought to evolve into a true form of global governance is pondered, concluding that the state, weaker though it may be, remains the major political institution mediating between local cultures & the emerging global civilization. Attention turns to the bifurcation points (vs turning points) in conflicts, contending that they are the most significant point of intervention. After noting the theoretical conflicts at play, the huge gap between theory & actual foreign policy is examined, focusing on Rwanda. In conclusion, the humanitarian intervention implemented in Zaire is scrutinized, finding that proponents of intervention were in such conflict that the chance for founding an intervention on norms & rules & for utilizing the crisis to express a consistent rational was forfeit. A call is made to articulate the rules for justifying intervention. J. Zendejas

"Negotiation in the Law Enforcement Context" published on by Oxford University Press.

In the context of the geographic analysis of war & peace, an introduction is offered to the field of postwar recovery across the 20th century, highlighting the interaction of state responsibilities, international interventions, & citizen participation. The relationship between national & international efforts to rebuild societies devastated by war in the context of territorial sovereignty & subnational spaces is examined & different "scales" of recovery are identified. The impact of nongovernmental organizations on the "front lines" of geopolitics is discussed & various types of recovery field activity -- technical assistance, governance, capacity building, & economic support -- are delineated. Recommendations are offered for synthesizing postwar recovery & geography; these are illustrated via a case study of northern Afghanistan, demonstrating regional elements/dimensions of postwar environments & their impact on field-level recovery. Tables, Figures, References. K. Hyatt Stewart

The Dutch model of cooperative governance was relatively effective in reducing the number of hemophiliacs exposed to HIV through the blood supply, with only 13% contacting HIV compared to 35% throughout Europe & 81% in France. In the Netherlands, the Red Cross blood banks controlled the blood supply with the principle of voluntary, unpaid blood donation. A policy network of relevant actors formulated six responses to the problem of HIV-contaminated blood & blood products, including encouraging high-risk groups to refrain from donating & other measures ensuring the use of concentrated heated blood products. In the 1990s, this programmatic response was the center of public debate & controversy regarding hemophiliac concern about negligence in government policy as well as homosexual accusations of discrimination. This perceived loss of effectiveness & legitimacy is traced to the distinction between network & governmental responsibility, the horizontal & vertical modes of interaction to enhance both mechanisms. The government was found lacking in policy initiatives, strict state regulations, & coercive interventions. 3 Tables. L. A. Hoffman

The response of public health officials in Spain to the discovery of HIV in the blood supply was reactive, driven by media exposure. The dawning of the AIDS crisis was simultaneous with a period of democratization & decentralization of the public health system; & struggles over responsibilities & lack of coordination often paralyzed initiatives to take measures to protect the largely imported blood supply. Blood management was a major programmatic failure. The first outbreaks of AIDS among hemophiliacs brought some media & public attention, but Spain did not experience a scandal such as those in other European countries. Analysis revealed that the absolute number of people infected by blood products in Spain was the highest in Europe. After quiet bargaining, the government in 1993 reached a settlement with hemophiliacs without acknowledging its delays in controlling blood banks & blood products between 1983 & 1987. L. A. Hoffman

Investigates the failure of the German Bundesgesundheitsamt (Federal Health Office) to stop the distribution of HIV-infected blood & blood products at its earliest opportunity in 1984. HIV infection of hemophiliacs in the former West Germany was determined to be due predominantly to the 1984 blood supply, with evidence that 50%-75% of those receiving coagulation factors were infected with HIV. In 1982, the Federal Health Office promptly recognized & informed the medical community of the discovery that HIV could be transmitted through the blood supply, but it did not formulate or implement strategies to prevent the use of contaminated blood. The Federal Health Office put greater energy into securing its place in the healthcare network than in reacting to health risks to the population, a case of goal displacement leading to programmatic failure. Political response to the problem consisted of a decade of silence followed by an outcry that brought a parliamentary investigation & the closing of the Federal Health Office. This response may be considered a successful outcome only if the system is prepared for the next health care crisis. 1 Figure. L. A. Hoffman