The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered turbulent times across the globe, reminding us of the highly multidimensional and interdependent nature of today's world. Next to diverging national attempts to constrain the spread of the virus, numerous international organizations worked intensely to minimize the impacts of the disease on a regional or/and global scale. Albeit not considered a conventional agency responsible for global infectious diseases, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has surprisingly been one of the most proactive IOs in the pandemic response. In this context, this article examines to what extent the OECD's COVID-19 pandemic response adheres to the role of a global crisis manager. By adapting the theoretical concepts of crisis leadership, we explore the extent of sense-making, decision-making, and learning capacities of the OECD during the pandemic, upon which we draw the organization's position-making. Based on expert interviews and document analysis, this article illustrates that the OECD's concerns regarding the pandemic's severe effects across socioeconomic sectors focused exclusively on its member states. This sense-making enabled prompt and multilayered top-down as well as bottom-up decision-making to provide member states with policy options as solutions to the new challenges. However, the OECD's engagement during the crisis was proactive only to the extent that several limitations allowed, such as resource inflexibility and internal dynamics between the Secretariat and member states. In conclusion, we argue that the OECD did not present itself to be a global crisis manager during the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather, the IO's responses consolidated its position-making as a policy advisor for member states.
AbstractDriven by the academia‐industry co‐identified need to discover new keystones for optimizing organizational crisis communication and management decision‐making, this concept paper proposes a new "READINESS" model. Grounded in the organizational preparedness and resilience literature and drawing predominantly from crisis communication and strategic conflict management elements, READINESS is examined as a multidimensional construct with multilevel efficacy, mental adaptability, and emotional leadership‐focused mindset, with a dynamic process‐driven agility at its core. Another tenet is that READINESS is not just for crises but also essential to manage threats, risks, conflicts, and crises across the board, constantly shaped by complex informational environments and polarizing sociopolitical issues. We begin by articulating READINESS and then illustrate its application in sticky crisis situations, followed by directions for future research, practice, and training innovation and optimization.
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Rhiannon Ruff, Wikipedia Expert and Founding Partner at Lumino, discusses how politicians and brands can effectively manage their Wikipedia presence. We discuss why Wikipedia is important for Google Search and AI like ChatGPT, and how the tone, norms, and editors of Wikipedia make editing your own page difficult. Rhi shares her tips on how to... The post #171: Wikipedia Public Relations for Politics, Brands, and Crisis Communication, with Rhiannon Ruff appeared first on Social Media and Politics.
AbstractAustralia's Higher Education and Research Sector (HERS) must adopt digital resilience strategies to tackle cybersecurity challenges and manage major crises effectively. In this study, we have developed a digital resilience framework to mitigate these cybersecurity issues. Our findings suggest a range of keystone factors for crisis management, such as implementing cybersecurity awareness programmes, providing cyber support, redefining roles and responsibilities, implying risk management tools, partnerships with external security organizations, introducing policies, reconfiguring technologies, adopting new technologies, and evaluating current changes to combat these issues. These keystone factors will help achieve digital resilience and significantly minimize cybersecurity issues in HERS, not only during the current major crisis but also in the future. This research offers valuable theoretical and practical contributions that can be applied beyond the context of the recent crisis.
This article is divided into two parts: Part I and II. This part I discusses the provenance of insecurity in Nigeria, the theories explaining its emergence and the birth of militant groups in the region. Though there is no part of Nigeria that is immune to infectious insecurity, the case of South East is more worrisome. The security crisis in the region has been worsened by the intractable and complex secessionist agitation that started immediately after Nigeria's independence. Common theories for explaining the situation have been long-term political marginalization of the region, state fragility to manage diversities and bad governance from the Igbo political elites. The conclusion of this part, therefore, is that insecurity in the South East Nigeria can be analyzed from these theories.
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The rise of authoritarianism in the world will continue to compel migrants to leave their home countries for years to come. Investing in our immigration system now will not only help the US to manage the current border crisis but will prepare us for future waves of immigration. The post Why Biden's Border Policies Haven't Been Working appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.
Chapter 1: Preface -- Chapter 2: Era portrait -- Chapter 3: Opponent of the Stolypin reform. Barlybek Syrtanov (1866–1914) -- Chapter 4: Defender of the territory. Alikhan Bukeikhanov (1870–1937) -- Chapter 5: From Court Counselor to People's Commissar of the Kazakh ASSR. Akhmet Beremzhanov (1871–1927) -- Chapter 6: An educator who dreamed of leading the people to freedom through education. Akhmet Baitursynov (1873–1938) -- Chapter 7: Witness to resettlement policy. Satylgan Sabataev (1874–1921) -- Chapter 8: «We are ready to defend our freedom with arms in hand». Zhakyp Akbaev (1876–1934) -- Chapter 9: Innocent and not admitted his guilt. Aidarkhan Turlybaev (1877–1937) -- Chapter 10: To protect the people with the law, pen and weapon in hand. Raimzhan Marsekov (1877–194?) -- Chapter 11: Road builder and defender of the 1916 rebels. Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpayev (1879–1937) -- Chapter 12: Bringing democracy closer. Validkhan Tanachev (1882–1968) -- Chapter 13: A teacher who took up a weapon. Otynshy Alzhanov (1883–1918) -- Chapter 14: He dreamed that one day his country would become a second Japan. Khalel Dosmukhamedov (1883–1939) -- Chapter 15: Translator for the military governor of Zhetysu. Ibrahim Dzhainakov (1883–194?) -- Chapter 16: The poet who awakened the Kazakhs. Myrzhakyp Dulatov (1885–1935) -- Chapter 17: Executed for serving the ideas of Alash. Imammazum Alimbekov (1885–1937) -- Chapter 18: Dreamed of transferring power to the people. Zhakhansha Dosmukhamedov (1887–1938) -- Chapter 19: The negotiator with Stalin. Khalel Gabbasov (1888–1931) -- Chapter 20: Confrontation of literatures. Zhusipbek Aimauytov (1889–1931) -- Chapter 21: Doctor in extreme conditions. Baktygali Beisenov (1889–1938) -- Chapter 22: Creator of the Alash hundreds. Sadyk Amanzholov (1889–1941) -- Chapter 23: Continuing the fight alone. Mustafa Shokay (1890–1941) -- Chapter 24: Deprived of theright to serve his people. Zhumakhan Kuderin (1891–1938) -- Chapter 25: Defended the borders of Kazakhstan. Alimkhan Ermekov (1891–1970) -- Chapter 26: Dreamed of enlightening the people. Seit-Battal Mustafin (1892–1937) -- Chapter 27: Suffered for sincerity. Magzhan Zhumabaev (1893–1938) -- Chapter 28: Saved hundreds of lives and gave his own. Asylbek Seitov (1894–1937) -- Chapter 29: Deprived of the created heritage. Koshmukhambet Kemengerov (1896–1937) -- Chapter 30: Twice sentenced to death and twice exonerated. Gazymbek Beremzhanov (1896–1938) -- Chapter 31: Crisis manager and Kazakh oil explorer. Berkingali Atshybaev (1897–1937?) -- Chapter 32: Steppe philanthropist. Khasen Akayev (1857–1931) -- Chapter 33: Conclusion.
Chapter 1-Introduction -- Part I –Regional cooperation on Climate Change -- Chapter 2- The EU in a multi-speed, multi-dimensional regime -- Chapter 3- Climate Change cooperation in Latin American regionalism -- Chapter 4- Brazilian perspectives on Climate Change -- Chapter 5-Climate Change in the Interregional Relations between the EU and LAC -- Chapter 6 Fostering a dynamic EU-CELAC cooperation in the area of climate change -- Part II- Financing Green Economy -- Chapter 7-Transformation to low carbon economy, role of development banks in EU and Latin America -- Chapter 8-Fixing rising price paths for fossil energy - basis of a "green growth" without rebound effects -- Chapter 9- Climate Change: policies to manage its macroeconomic and financial effects -- Part III - New green solutions to Climate Change -- Chapter 10- Greening EU's Common Agricultural Policy -- Chapter 11- Climate change and the Digitalization of the Agrofood Sector: Opportunities and Challenges -- Chapter 12- Myths and pitfallsof green solutions -- Chapter 13- Building Climate-Resilient Food Systems -- Chapter 14- The international circuits of disavowal of the climate crisis -- Chapter 15-Conclusions.
The article examines the living and infrastructuring practices of homeless newcomer migrants who find shelter in abandoned train wagons in the west end of Thessaloniki, an area described as "one of the biggest train cemeteries in Europe." Hundreds of train wagons have been abandoned there over the years, especially after the 2010 financial crisis, when the state-owned railway company was faced with significant financial difficulties. These abandoned wagons form an urban borderland and have provided temporary shelter to numerous homeless and unregistered migrants who stop in Thessaloniki on their route to Central and Northern Europe. Although there is a significant number of studies which discuss the formal infrastructures provided by the state and the NGOs, little attention has been given to the various ways by which homeless and unregistered migrants create and self-manage their own infrastructures to meet their needs. The article aims to shed light on this shortage while examining the (re)production of arrival infrastructures by the migrants themselves. In doing so, the article builds upon the concept of abandonment and attempts to enrich it by drawing on the theories of arrival infrastructures and urban commons. It combines spatial analysis and urban ethnography in order to explore how an urban borderland with abandoned infrastructures, like the train wagons, are re-used and transformed into commoning infrastructures, where newcomers and settled migrants join their forces in their attempt to support each other, meet their needs and of "becoming otherwise."
Afghan-Pakistan relations in XXI century have been plagued with issues, and the rise of the Taliban has compounded the difficulties. The traditional problems, including the disputed Durand Line between the two nations, persist. The current inflexible policies of the Taliban and the ongoing political crisis in Pakistan have hampered compromise. The article proposes that resolving the border status issue requires involvement from both global and regional powers. It suggests that intensively monitoring efforts, reinforcing interstate dialogue, joint anti-terrorism measures, and mutually beneficial economic projects are possible ways to deescalate tensions along the contentious border. Despite both sides' attempts to manage the border, it remains a primary area of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan has been criticized for not making adequate efforts to eliminate terror groups operating in the border regions. Conversely, extremist groups, including ISIS, have actively targeted Afghanistan, seeking to expand their influence in the region. Coordinated action could eliminate such groups. The lack of political will is the biggest obstacle to progress in solving the mutual problems. As a result, the article suggests the need for international organizations' involvement, such as China offering financial and technical assistance in resolving border disputes and terrorism. The UN can offer a neutral platform and enhance monitoring efforts concerning threats such as ISIS. In summary, the article underscores that despite the Taliban's resurgence, the age-old issues between Afghan-Pakistani nations continue to undermine long-standing relations. The disputed Durand Line and inflexible policies hinder cooperation, but it is possible to resolve the territorial border dispute with the involvement of international actors.
AbstractManuscript TypeThe manuscript is of an empirical nature.Research Question/IssueThe current ecological crisis requires boards of directors to tackle environmental concerns and manage dependencies with the external environment in highly dynamic conditions. Proactive environmental strategies (PESs) seek to establish alternative and innovative processes and products that create new market opportunities. By mobilizing the notion of board demographic faultlines, we investigate their link with PESs and the influence of the internal board dynamics and environmental factors on this relationship.Research Findings/InsightsThe multilevel regression analysis of a 7‐year sample of UK boards reveals that demographic faultlines hinder their information processing in adopting PESs. The results also show that the negative relationship between demographic faultlines and PESs is attenuated by the social similarity of the CEO and chair in the same subgroup and by the financial materiality of the natural environment.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study draws on faultline theory to analyze how the structure of board diversity through the alignment of multiple directors' demographic attributes affects board dynamics by creating polarized boards that shape sustainability decisions. This study underscores the disruptive effect of having socially distanced subgroups within the board and the salience of board leaders' social similarity and environmental factors in attenuating their dysfunctional effects.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsBoard diversity is considered key to improving board decision‐making. By situating our empirical investigation in a country with a corporate governance model that fosters diversity in a dual leadership board structure that has influenced other countries' governance models, this study provides insights for policymakers and market participants on the unintended effects of the global call for board diversity on firms' proactive environmental stance. Our results call for establishing procedures to incentivize board socialization and facilitate directors' information processing.
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Taiwanese voters elected Vice President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as their next president on Saturday, which will be the third consecutive presidential win for the party and an indication voters want to stay the course — in policy and in current US-China-Taiwan relations.Whether it will result in heightened tensions between the island and mainland China, and Beijing and Washington, remains to be seen, and will likely be determined by the public actions and reactions by each party in the immediate days and weeks.Despite a late tightening of the presidential race between Lai and his main opponent, Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), the candidate of the incumbent party prevailed with 40% of the vote in a three-way race that included Ko Wen-je of the Taiwanese People's Party.The failure of the two main opposition parties to unite on a joint ticket last fall paved the way for Lai's victory. While opposition campaign rhetoric painted a win for Lai as a vote for confrontation and conflict with China, enough Taiwanese voters opted to stick with the policies of outgoing president Tsai Ing-wen to give the DPP the unprecedented third term in office. Lai campaigned on a message of continuity with Tsai. In a popular campaign ad, Tsai and Lai were seen driving in a car together and then the outgoing president got out and let Lai get behind the wheel, saying to him, "You can drive better than me." Despite Tsai's somewhat low overall approval ratings, the appeal to staying on the same course was effective enough to secure Lai the win. Lai's victory is unlikely to trigger a major crisis right away, but it will ensure that cross-Strait dialogue will not resume. The lack of dialogue between Taiwan and China has coincided with and contributed to a period of increasing Chinese pressure and deteriorating relations between the United States and China. As a result, the tensions that have built up between Taiwan and China and between the U.S. and China over the last eight years will remain high for the foreseeable future. The Biden administration was already adding to those tensions last week with the announcement that it would be sending a delegation of former high-level officials to Taiwan after Saturday's election. This move was unwelcome to Beijing, and the Chinese government condemned the decision, saying that the administration should "stop sending wrong signals to 'Taiwan independence separatist forces and refrain from interfering in elections in the Taiwan region in any form."For their part, the Chinese government had been putting additional pressure on Taiwan in the weeks leading up to the election with threats of punitive trade measures. The DPP triumph is not in itself a prelude to war, but it could encourage hardliners in Washington to pursue more aggressive and provocative policies toward China while making the Chinese use of coercive tactics more likely. As the Quincy Institute's Michael Swaine said in response to the election result, Lai's victory "will likely worsen the negative dynamics" in the U.S.-China relationship that he and his colleague James Park discussed in their recent QI brief. Depending on how Lai manages relations with the U.S. in the coming years, there is a danger that his efforts to strengthen ties with Washington will cause a backlash from China that brings all parties closer to a new crisis. Lai has expressed a desire to see a Taiwanese president visit the White House sometime in the future. If Lai were to pursue such a visit, and if the Biden administration indulged him in this, that would almost certainly be met with significant Chinese punitive measures, whether in the form of economic warfare, military drills, or some combination of the two. More modest efforts to build up the relationship with the U.S. may not have such dramatic consequences, but they will contribute to the ongoing strains in U.S.-Chinese relations. The old status quo between the U.S. and China has been steadily eroding for at least the last eight years, and this has accelerated over the last three years under Biden. The bipartisan consensus in Washington in favor of containment and rivalry and ill-conceived gestures of "support" for Taiwan have fed a cycle of threat inflation and overreaction in both countries. Officials in both governments tend to assume the worst about the intentions of the other side, and there are few safeguards in place in the event of a crisis. Cross-Strait relations and relations between the U.S. and China have both suffered significantly since then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei in 2022. Following that and the spy balloon incident, it took almost all of last year for the Biden administration to stabilize the relationship between Washington and Beijing. That has left Taiwan measurably worse off under the "new normal" conditions that have been created. It has also undermined the peace in East Asia that has endured for more than 40 years. It is against this backdrop of growing mutual mistrust and hostility that we need to view the implications of the Taiwanese election results. The U.S. can expect and should prepare for at least four more years of heightened tensions and worsening relations with China.That is why it is imperative that the U.S. approach become much more cautious and responsible than it has been in a long time. The U.S. not only needs to avoid taking provocative actions like extending an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan or restoring normal diplomatic ties, but it must also seek to offer credible assurances to Beijing that it has no interest in encouraging what the Chinese government considers separatism.Reassurance is as important as, and possibly more important than, making deterrent threats. As Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen recently explained in their article in Foreign Affairs, "For effective deterrence, both threats and assurances must be credible." The U.S. has no trouble in convincing other states that it is prepared to use force. The difficulty is in getting other states to believe that the U.S. can be trusted to leave well enough alone. The U.S. should take care in the coming months not to make any moves that suggest that it is upgrading the relationship with Taiwan. The post-election delegation that Biden is sending should be the last one of its kind for a long time. The Chinese government already perceives a gap between the Biden administration's rhetoric and its actions, so it is crucial that this gap not get any wider than it already is. The administration also needs to communicate privately to the incoming president that he should not take any actions that are likely to antagonize Beijing. Given the political incentives in an election year to engage in gratuitous China-bashing, that may be a tall order, but it is what needs to happen if the U.S. and Taiwan are going to navigate the year ahead without serious incident.
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Since October, Egypt has joined most of the international community in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. With Egypt being the only Arab country to border Gaza, Cairo's stakes are high. The longer Israel's war on the besieged enclave continues, the threats to Egypt's economy, national security, and political stability will become more serious.Located along the Gaza-Egypt border is Rafah, a 25-square-mile city that until recently was home to 300,000 Palestinians. Now approximately 1.4 million Palestinians are sheltering in Rafah because of the Israeli military's wanton destruction of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and other parts of the Strip. Having asserted that four Hamas battalions are now in Rafah, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that deploying Israeli forces to this Palestinian city is necessary for his country to defeat Hamas amid this war. As of writing, Israel's military is preparing to launch a campaign for Rafah.Officials in Cairo fear that Israeli military operations in Rafah could result in a large number of Palestinians entering the Sinai. "An Israeli offensive on Rafah would lead to an unspeakable humanitarian catastrophe and grave tensions with Egypt," said European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on February 10.Not only could such a scenario fuel massive amounts of friction between Cairo and Tel Aviv, but it could also severely heighten tensions between the Egyptian public and President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi's government. It's easy to imagine a mass expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, which would amount to essentially a "Nakba 2.0," triggering widespread unrest in Egypt if the government in Cairo is widely seen by Egyptians as playing a role in permitting, if not facilitating, such an ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. Along with economic considerations, this is one of the main reasons why Cairo has articulated that Israel depopulating Gaza of Palestinians and forcing them into Egypt is a red line that Tel Aviv must not cross."The biggest concern for Cairo is related to the fate of the [Palestinians in Gaza] forcibly evacuated by the Israelis and who might find a 'safe haven' in Sinai. An uncontrolled influx of Palestinians into the [Sinai] Peninsula would be an enormous burden on Egypt, which would have to manage a problematic situation from a political and security point of view, as well as having to justify internally to its own public opinion an imposition that came from outside," Giuseppe Dentice, head of the Middle East and North Africa Desk at the Italian Center for International Studies, told RS."It is no coincidence that Cairo has reinforced the border with Gaza, closed the Rafah crossing, and warned Israel that any unilateral action involving a forced exodus of the Strip's inhabitants to Egyptian territory could jeopardize not only bilateral relations, but the preconditions for peace and stability guaranteed in the [Camp David Accords]," added Dentice.On February 15, Maxar Technologies, a Colorado-headquartered space technology company, captured satellite images showing Egypt's construction of a wall roughly two miles west of the Egypt-Gaza border. The following day, the London-based Sinai Foundation for Human Rights said that this construction "is intended to create a high-security gated and isolated area near the borders with the Gaza Strip, in preparation for the reception of Palestinian refugees in the case of [a] mass exodus."What might happen to the Camp David Accords?On February 11, two Egyptian officials and one Western diplomat told the Associated Press that Cairo might suspend the 1979 Camp David Accords if Israeli troops wage an incursion into Rafah. A day later, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry denied such reports about his government's plans to freeze the peace treaty with Israel, yet he emphasized that Egypt's continued adherence to the 1979 deal would depend on Tel Aviv reciprocating. Alarming to Egyptian officials were Netanyahu's statements late last year about the Israeli military taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor (a nine-mile-long demilitarized buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt which was established in accordance with Egypt and Israel's peace treaty) because such a move on Israel's part would be a breach of the Camp David Accords.Are Egyptian officials serious about possibly freezing the historic peace deal? Or does such talk amount to empty threats issued for political purposes at home, as well as pursuing certain Egyptian aims vis-à-vis Washington and Tel Aviv? Mouin Rabbani, a political analyst and co-editor of Jadaliyya, told RS that if these statements from anonymous Egyptian officials are geared toward a domestic audience but Cairo doesn't follow through, Sisi's government could have a "potentially serious problem on its hands."Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with the Chatham House and a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, doubts that Egypt would go as far as suspending the Camp David Accords. "In the end, Egypt is unlikely to take the first step to tear the treaty up unilaterally," he said.But what Egypt is doing is embracing "discursive strategic posturing" whereby Cairo uses "rhetorical escalation" and directs messages at three audiences, Aboudouh told RS. First is the domestic audience to say that Cairo is standing up for Egypt's core security interests as well as the Palestinian cause. The second is Washington to relay the Egyptian government's anger at the Biden administration for not stopping Israeli actions that threaten to displace Palestinians into the Sinai. Third is to Netanyahu, generals in the Israeli Defense Forces, and the Israeli intelligence community.Gordon Gray, a former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, also discounts recent suggestions that Cairo would suspend its peace treaty with Israel for three main reasons. "First, Egypt does not seek military confrontation — even an inadvertent one — with Israel. Second, Egypt does not want to risk losing U.S. military assistance ($1.3 billion annually), which was granted as a direct result of the Camp David Accords. Finally, while Egypt abhors the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, it shares Israel's views about the threat Hamas poses," said Gray in an interview with RS.What would come from Egypt freezing the treaty?Despite many experts believing that Egypt would not freeze the Camp David Accords, that potential scenario should be considered. There are important questions to raise about what it could lead to in terms of region-wide ramifications, as well as Cairo's relationships with Western capitals. But it's difficult to predict how events would unfold if Egypt took that step because there would be so many unknown variables in play.Egypt could act in different ways after suspending the peace treaty with Israel. Rabbani asked, "Would it simply declare the peace treaty suspended and leave it at that or would it stop implementing provisions of that treaty?"Regardless, any freezing of the Camp David Accords by Egypt would inevitably bring a layer of instability to Egyptian-Israeli relations never seen since Jimmy Carter's administration, which — with help from Iran, Morocco, and Romania — brought Egypt's then-President Anwar Sadat and Israel's then-Prime Minister Menachim Begin together in northern Maryland's Catoctin Mountains to sign the peace treaty in September 1978. The response from Washington would likely be extreme, particularly given how central Egyptian-Israeli peace has been to U.S. foreign policy agendas in the Middle East for almost half a century while surviving a host of regional crises, including Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and all the previous Gaza wars."The U.S. is certain to act true to form and retaliate against Egypt without holding Israel in any way accountable for producing this crisis, and Washington may well cease foreign assistance to Egypt, which is a direct function of its peace treaty with Israel. The EU will probably announce it is launching an investigation of the Egyptian school curriculum or some other nonsensical initiative," Rabbani told RS.Irrespective of how Egypt approaches its relationship with Israel, the fact that officials in Cairo are suggesting a potential freeze of the Camp David Accords speaks volumes about the Gaza war's impact on Israel's diplomatic standing in the Arab world. With the probability of more Arab countries joining the Abraham Accords in the foreseeable future having essentially dropped to zero, the pressing question is not which Arab government might be next to normalize with Tel Aviv. The focus has shifted to questions about how Arab countries already in the normalization camp, such as Egypt, will manage their formalized relationships with Israel at a time in which Israeli behavior in Gaza is widely seen across the Arab-Islamic world as genocidal.
1. Power and Discourse in La Fontaine's Beast Fables 2. Lockdown: Real-life Paradoxical Experience to Sustain Human Relationships, Healthy Lives, and Well Being 3. Effect of Parenting Stress on Parenting Sense of Competence AmongMothers of Children with ADHD 4. Sustainable Development Goals and Juvenile Justice System: A Comparative Analysis5. Influence of Karma at Workplace: With Special Reference to Higher Education Institutions in South Gujarat Region6. Cross-Walk of Professional Competencies for Social and Emotional Wellbeing to Cater Mental Health Problems in Schools 7. Emotional Intelligence Manages Sustainable Development for an Organization -the Contribution of Psychological Well-Being 8. The Enactment of Social Sustainable Goals in IT Organizations 9. Role of Higher Education in Achieving the Sustainble Development Goals (SDGs) 10. "Happiness Engineering": Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for University Students' Classroom Engagement, Mental Health, and Psychological Flexibility 11. Work-Life Balance and Its Challenges for Medical Professionals in the Health Care Sector 12. Political Representation of Aesop's Beast Fables in Augustan Age 13. Miro Application of Web Whiteboard for Sustainable Development in Teaching and Learning Research 14. A Study of Female Identity and Marital Discord in the Selected Works of Anita Desai 15. Role of Digital Competency in Sustainable Quality Education 16. Digital Infrastructure for SHGs of Tribal Women in Odisha: Means for MSMEs to Achieve SDGs 17. Fetishism: Paradoxing the Narratives of Sustainable Development Goals 18. A Systematic Review Study on the Quality of Life Associated withDepression Among the Elderly in India 19. Influence of Personality and Sector of Employment on PerceivedSocial Support and Work Family Conflict 20. Prophesying the Future Retailing Model of Emerging Markets withSpecial Focus on India 21. Family Conflict and Rivalry in The Shipwrecked Prince and King Lear: A Comparative Study22. The Subtle Warnings Signs of Suicidal Thought and Behaviour Exhibited by Hannah Baker in "Thirteen Reasons Why" by Jay Asher 23. Demographic Variables and Job Satisfaction Among College Lecturers 24. Sustainable Crisis: Psychoanalytical Reading of Populism and Trauma in Select War Narrative 25. Impact of Problematic Internet Use on Psychological Well-Being, Hyperventilation and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Among Youth 26. Psychological Distress Among IT Sector Employees During COVID-19 Pandemic in India 27. Triangulation Study on LGBTQ Inclusion with Sustainable Development Goal 10 using Twitter Data and Topic Modelling 28. Community Participation in Public Space Planning and Management: Cases of Indian Cities 29. Surveying Interest and Engagement in Political Discourse 30. Opinion Mining of National Education Policy 2020 to Improve Its Implementation for Women Empowerment 31. Factors Affecting Entrepreneurship Intention: An Empirical Study with Reference to Indian University Students 32. Criminogenic Cognition of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law and Use of theInternet with the Victim-Offender Overlap 33. Testifying Legal Admissibility: Germline and Embryo Editing Focusing on SDG 15-Life on Earth 34. Exploring Psychological Wellbeing of College Students in Relation to Their Demographic Identity: Predictors and Prevalence 35. India and Nepal Bridging the Gap with Hydropower Project EnhancingScience and Technological Partnership 36. Systematic Literature Review of Interlinkages between SustainableDevelopment & Human Development 37. Impact of COVID-19 on Domestic Workers with Special Reference to Pune Region38. Entrepreneurial Education and Entrepreneurial Intentions: Mediation of Entrepreneurial Mindset and Moderated Mediation of Creativity 39. Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals40. Feasibility of DREAMS Afterschool Intervention to Implement SDG - 4, 5 and 11 in Rural India 41. Crowdsourcing: A Technique to Sustain the Educational Industry 42. Identity of Scheduled Tribes in India - A Systematic Review 43.Strategies Employed to Acquire and Reflect Political Knowledge 44. Impact of Select Vocabulary Learning Strategies (VLS) on Vocabulary Acquisition of Tertiary Level Learners 45. Socialization of Culture: Sociopolitical and Sociocultural Contexts Ensuing Cultural Transition and Hybridity 46. Parables of the Lost and Found: A Semiotic Dissection of Religious Discourse 47. Incorporating Research-based Pedagogical Implications in Grammar Through the Android Application: An Experimental Study 48. Legacy and Evolution of Panchayati Raj Institutions and TribalSelf-Governance in India 49. Prospects of PESA Act and Inhibitions in its Implementation in ScheduledAreas of Jharkhand, India 50. Exploring Health Information Seeking Behaviour Among Young Oraon Women in Jharkhand51. Evolution and Implementation of Land Acquisition Legislations in India 52. Change in Gender Relations: Re-Visiting Gender-Based Violence in Tribal Communities of India 53. "Sarna Adivasi" Religion Code: Contextualizing Religious Identity of Tribals in India 54. Sustainable Fashion: "Form Leisure"- Deconstructing Men's Formal ShirtsInto a Women's Wear Collection 55. Kondapalli Toys: White Woodcraft of Andhra Pradesh 56. Role of Consumer Perception on Genderless Fashion in Deconstructing Gender Stereotypes in Indian Society 57. Denial of Human Right to Water During Pandemic: Experience of Indian Slum 58. Dynamics of the Demographic Transition on Economic Development: Evidence From SRS Data in India 59. From Function to Fashion, Face Masks as a Flourishing New Product60. 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Implementation of Rawls Theory of Justice in the Present Indian Reservation System 72. Financial Inclusion: Conceptual Understanding to Indian Report Card 73. Contemplating the Problems and Issues Related to Corporate Social Responsibility in India 74. Untapped Power of Music-Integrated Pedagogy: Its Role in Enhancement of "Behaviour and Self-Confidence" among School Students 75. Casualty of Dignity and Other Rights of Children Born Out of Casual Relationship: A Legal Conundrum 76. Women in Civil Engineering Profession: Career Profile of Indian Women 77. Factors That Make Public-Private Partnerships Appealing for Highway Projects in Gujarat 78. Risk Management in Public-Private Partnership-Based Infrastructure Projects: A Critical Analysis79. Construction Safety Practices: An Analysis 80. The Relevance of Kitchen Vastu Guidelines in Relation to Architecture 81. Drone Rules 2021: Analysis and Implications for India's UAV Programme 82. Toy Companies Using Unconventional Methods to Stay Relevant and Reach Evolving Minds of the Parents and Children 83. Behavior of Speed Breaker in Urban Context 84. Aesthetics of Distortion and the Absurd: Fusing Redemptive Existentialism andBerkeley's Metaphysics in Beckett's Plays 85. Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem of Narcissists and Non-Narcissists.
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With Israel's invasion of Gaza inching toward the possibility of a long-term ceasefire, if not a formal resolution, we can begin to draw certain conclusions about the strategic course of the latest Middle Eastern conflagration. Above all, despite inflicting widespread destruction on the impoverished Gaza Strip, Israel's stated maximalist objective of destroying Hamas appears firmly out of reach. While part of this failure to strike a decisive blow follows from the inherent difficulty of counterinsurgency operations, Hamas's major allies — Iran, Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthis, and Shia Islamist militias in Iraq — also played a significant role. Crucially, these forces, constituting a loose coalition called the Axis of Resistance, are pressuring Washington to push Israel to the bargaining table by striking American weak points in the Middle East.Central to the Axis of Resistance's apparent logic in the latest conflict, and its struggle against the U.S.-Israel alliance more generally, lies the inescapable fact that its enemies possess overwhelming military, technological, and economic advantages. Yet the very global primacy of the United States that underlies this disproportion can make Washington uniquely vulnerable to smaller, more tactically nimble opponents.The regional ripples of the current war make this vulnerability especially clear. Rather than face the U.S. and Israel head-on, Iran and its allies took advantage of the overstretched American position in the Middle East. The efforts of Yemen's Houthis in the Red Sea provide perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this asymmetrical strategy. Central to the United States' international status is its naval dominance, which has allowed American policymakers to confer on their nation the mantle once worn by Britain in its imperial heyday: global manager and guardian of seaborne commerce.With just a few cheap drones and missiles, the Houthis instituted an effective blockade of the Red Sea, thus challenging this U.S. claim to be the worldwide arbiter of freedom of navigation. While U.S. forces have apparently proven relatively effective in destroying Houthi projectiles once launched, even President Joe Biden has admitted that U.S-UK airstrikes on Houthi positions in Yemen have largely failed to degrade the group's capacity for action. According to one metric, as of this writing the volume of traffic moving through the Red Sea's Bab al-Mandeb strait, as measured by weight, remains less than half of what it was this time last year.Elsewhere in the Middle East, other members of the Axis of Resistance similarly turned building blocks of American global preeminence into liabilities for Washington. In Iraq, Islamist Shia militias, formally integrated into the country's military as components of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) even as they sustain close links with Iran, have maintained a steady stream of attacks against U.S. military infrastructure. Though the U.S. withdrew from Iraq in 2011, its forces returned in 2014 as part of the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In the minds of American planners, the bases thus established both bolster the U.S. presence in the world's major oil-producing region and its efforts to contain Iran. Now, though, they look more like sitting ducks than strategic assets. In fact, reflecting the entwinement of the Axis's goal of relieving pressure on Hamas with the narrower interests of its constituent parts, the consistent series of militia attacks likely contributed to Washington's recent ascension to formal negotiations with Iraq over a phased withdrawal of American troops — 2,500 of which remain in the country despite a 2020 resolution by the Iraqi parliament calling for their removal.The international struggle against ISIS also presented the U.S. an opportunity to gain a foothold in conflict-torn Syria, where American arms and training for rebel factions helped fuel a brutal civil war. The main U.S. presence in Syria is concentrated in the country's oil-rich northeast, though American forces also control the strategically vital al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq.The roughly 900 American troops in the country assist U.S.-allied Kurdish forces and allow Washington to deprive the Syrian state of critical oil revenue. But, like their counterparts in Iraq, they have lately been at the mercy of drone and rocket strikes, largely from the aforementioned Iraqi PMF. Indeed, analogous to the situation in Iraq, the precarity of U.S. positions in Syria as driven home by these assaults has reportedly spurred debate within the Biden administration about an American departure from that country as well.While such attacks in the Red Sea, Iraq, and Syria demonstrate the upside of the Axis of Resistance's regional campaign, its asymmetrical calculus is not without risks. Perhaps the best illustration of this was a recent drone strike, undertaken by Iraqi militia, against a secretive U.S. base in Jordan, near that country's tri-border region with Iraq and Syria. The attack killed three American troops, the first U.S. combat casualties in the present conflict.This result set off alarm bells in Tehran (and prompted the most wide-ranging series of American strikes yet against targets in Iraq and Syria). Central to the Axis's overall strategy, coordinated, if not — as many Western commentators insist — wholly directed, by Iran's national security apparatus, is the need to avoid full-scale conventional war with the United States. Without even factoring in the massive power disparity with the U.S., Iran's elite, in particular, can ill afford such a confrontation right now. The state is beset by a crisis of legitimacy, enflamed by its propensity for repression, and the nation's economy faces deep-rooted challenges, due in part to punishing American sanctions. As a result, Iran has taken steps to, temporarily at least, mitigate the chance of open conflict with the U.S. — most notably by curtailing strikes by PMF groups against American targets in Iraq.Yet, in taking that step, Iran's leaders likely feel secure in the knowledge that, despite the delicate balance required to tiptoe around the possibility of full-blown escalation, the Axis of Resistance's regional calculus has paid off significantly. In undertaking their broader campaign against the U.S., Hamas's regional allies leveraged Israel's intense dependence on its American patron. Without American support, Israel cannot hope to continue any major military campaign for very long — it is thus critically susceptible to pressure from Washington. While public opinion also plays a major role, the shower of blows rained upon American positions in the Middle East over the past few months has likely factored into U.S. policymakers' efforts to steer Israel away from its most maximalist aims and toward negotiations.Enabling both Israel's brutal assault on Gaza and the Axis of Resistance's ability to exert pressure on Tel Aviv through the U.S. are, of course, Washington's imperial ambitions. Iran and its allies have, unwittingly, presented American policymakers with a precious opportunity to pivot away from the kind of unilateralist overreach that, in large part, structures the present conflict. In doing so, they could begin to craft the kind of constructive foreign policy that puts the needs of U.S. citizens first — precious few Americans, after all, want to stumble into another Middle Eastern "forever war" just because of a few drones launched by Iraqi militias. And, perhaps most crucially, such a shift could perhaps prevent the kind of destruction unleashed on Gaza over the last few months — its scale a horrifying corollary to the depth of hubris that fuels American great power pretensions.