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This paper reports on a series of experiments designed to assess the impact of grouping decision makers by level of cognitive complexity on the outcomes they attain in crisis negotiations. The participants—University of Maryland undergraduates who took roles in a simulated international hostage crisis—used a computer decision support system and a controlled network environment for communications. The goal of the experiments was to better understand the dynamics that lead certain types of groupings to have greater success in negotiations, and that lead certain groups of adversaries to achieve more mutually beneficial outcomes such as compromise and agreement. The findings point to a positive relationship between the level of homogeneity in cognitive complexity among decision makers and the achievement of positive outcomes in crisis negotiations.

This edited collection offers a comprehensive examination of theory, research, and practice in crisis (hostage) negotiation from the perspectives of communication, law enforcement, psychology, sociology, and criminology. The volume identifies promising conceptual frameworks for the development of research on crisis negotiation. This book is also useful to crisis negotiation trainers and leaders in law enforcement who are searching for insight beyond anecdotal stories and who recognize the need for more rigorous application of behavioral science to the practice of crisis negotiation.

ASYMMETRIC NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN FOUND, WHERE THERE IS A POWER IMBALANCE AMONG THE ACTORS, TO YIELD MORE SATIFYING AND EFFICIENT OUTCOMES THAN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ACTORS OF EVEN POWER. IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT INTEREST IN THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF DEMOCRATIC STATES, THE ANALYSIS IS EXTENDED TO DYADS CONTAINING DEMOCRACIES VERSUS DYADS WITHOUT DEMOCRACIES. GENERALLY, WEAK AND INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS LEND SUPPORT TO THE STRUCTURALIST DILEMMA. MORE SATISFYING OUTCOMES OCCUR WHEN DEMOCRACIES ARE PRESENT IN CONFLICT NEGOTIATIONS.

This paper examines whether patterns in communication behavior over time can predict the outcome of crisis negotiations. A sample of 189 interaction episodes was transcribed from 9 resolved negotiations and coded according to differences in the degree and type of behavior. Partial order scalogram analysis (POSAC) was used to produce a graphical representation of the similarities and differences among episodes while simultaneously uncovering the role of each behavior in shaping the negotiation process. Results showed that episodes could be represented along a partially ordered scale of competitiveness, which was structured by the occurrence of two types of behavior: Distributive‐Expressive and Integrative‐Instrumental. The likelihood of negotiation success reduced with movement up the competitive scale, and negotiations involving episodes that passed a threshold of extreme competition on the scale inevitably ended unsuccessfully regardless of future developments. As negotiations developed over time, behavior alternated between periods of increasing cooperation and periods of increasing competition, with unsuccessful negotiations associated with a concluding trend of increasing competitive behavior.

Mehrere Kurzbeiträge verschiedener Autoren zu aktuellen Konflikten: Es geht um die Kriege in Liberia, Rwanda, Tschad und Somalia sowie um die wachsenden Spannungen zwischen den USA und ihrem afrikanischen Alliierten Kenia. (DÜI-Kör)

This paper develops an empirical means of tracking involvement in a relational double‐bind in hostage negotiations as a means of monitoring the extent to which the hostage takers developed more cooperative or competitive relational parameters with police negotiators. Verbal immediacy was used to track the hostage takers double bind problems across nine different hostage negotiations. The results indicated that the purpose for taking hostages greatly influenced the kinds of paradoxes displayed by the hostage takers. Mentally ill hostage takers became cooperative early in the negotiation, but then turned more competitive as the negotiation unfolded. Hostage takers caught in the act of committing a crime became competitive early and then became more cooperative as time elapsed The hostage takers involved in domestic violence remained competitive throughout the interaction.