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The geopolitical evolution represents a permanent process. It is mostly influenced by the geopolitical condition, in which the geopolitical relations and processes are evolving. The understanding of geopolitical evolution is impossible without the critical review and even rejection of the dominant geopolitical visions. There are various theoretical perspectives that reject the dominant geopolitical visions and discourses as well as geopolitical practices of the political elites. Those theoretical perspectives are known as: critical geopolitics, anti-geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics, feminist geopolitics, radical geopolitics. There are also various comprehensions of relationship between these theoretical perspectives, although it is clear that each of them is overlapped with others, and all of them are overlapped with critical geopolitics, differing in the focus of study and the identification of new moments, and at the same time being similar by their deflection from the dominant geopolitical vision and practices, to which they react in different ways: by criticizing, by putting resistance or offering alternatives. In this paper, the research focus is mostly on anti-geopolitics, a radical geopolitical vision that puts into question the relations of exploitation and dominance. Anti-geopolitics also represents a theoretical perspective that poses the most serious challenge to the dominant ways of representing the World. The proponents of anti-geopolitics focus their research on the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles, as well as on the social movements and networks that offer a resistance to globalization and geo-economic logic that are advocated and practiced by the political-economic elites of states and multinational corporations and intergovernmental institutions, especially the financial ones. The paper also brings a brief review of the key aspects of other theoretical perspectives that represent a more or less radical deflection from the dominant geopolitical visions. Adapted from the source document.

The cognitive worth of the concept of totalitarianism is constantly refuted. In this text, the author begins by confronting his perception of totalitarianism as a new social formation, which he advocated in many of his works, with four scientific arguments raised by historians against totalitarianism as a political category or in favour of a limited use thereof. The first is that communism and fascism are fundamentally different, that the ideologies which characterize them are radically opposed to one another. This argument overlooks the fact that in such regimes ideology is not merely the prevalent discourse -- it has a new function and efficiency, it establishes a totalitarian "regime" of language and thought in which the power of discourse and the discourse of power are made equal. The second argument is that totalitarianism is evident, in Germany and Russia, only during limited periods. To this the author replies that it is a "realistic" illusion to assume that the totalitarian project was ever fully realized in history. According to the third objection, the concept of totalitarianism is of no cognitive worth to the historian, and totalitarian regimes belong to the order of contingency, and not of historical necessity. On the other hand, the author stresses the historical novelty of totalitarianism, which does spring and can spring only from the modern "democratic revolution" (in Tocqueville's sense) as a radical refutation thereof. The final objection of a methodologically aware historian (F. Furet) is that the concept of totalitarianism can be analytically fruitful only if used as an "ideal type", as a common trait of regimes established in atomized societies through total domination by way of ideology and terror. To this the author replies that we cannot be satisfied with the use of the concept "ideal type", although it is true that it liberates the historian from the naivety of positivistic descriptive historiography. The making of an ideal type thus makes it possible to avoid the choice between philosophy and descriptive history, but only inasmuch as the historian is transformed into a cognizant subject which is external with regard to history. In the second part of the text, the author provides a critical evaluation of the theory of totalitarianism by H. Arendt, particularly her central thesis that totalitarian society comes into being in modern atomized society. Namely, totalitarianism is characterized, on the one hand, by an artificialist project of organization, and, on the other, by a substantialist ideal of incorporation: both are realized in the Party, which is not only devised as an organization, but is also a "mystical person" in which all its members are brought together. As such, it incorporates the people. The figure of the indivisible people is put forward in the Party; the figure of the indivisible party is put forward in the figure of the people. In the first, organizational aspect the Party contains the project of an organisable whole, while in the other, substantialist aspect it contains the project of an incorporable whole. Adapted from the source document.

Autori članka propituju zašto je pojam postdemokracije postao sporan iako je tek nedavno uveden u raspravu. Ovaj pojam se koristi kao model intepretacije aktualne krize demokracije. Collin Crouch uvodi ovu poziciju u svojoj knjizi Postdemokracija. Na istom je tragu Sheldon Wolin koji drži da je postdemokracija vrsta demokracije koji je na djelu u postmoderno doba. Neovisno o njihovim razlikama, obojica smatraju da je aktualna kriza demokracije poseban fenomen. Međutim, izgleda da ona i nije toliko posebna pojava, prije svega, u europskim kontinentalnim demokracijama. Tako je još pedesetih godina prošlog stoljeća Hans Kelsen pisao o autorima koji su tada pokušavali redefinirati demokraciju na isti način na koji to rade današnji teoretičari postdemokracije. Isto diskurs kao i isti lijek (više demokracije u ekonomskoj sferi) može se pronaći mnogo prije Drugog svjetskog rata. Štoviše, ima mnogo primjera u kojima je narod u zadnjih 200 godina, u ime demokracije, tražio novu ravnotežu s predstavničkom demokracijom. Autori članka smatraju da Jacques Rancière nudi prikladnije objašnjenje ovog problema. On naime ne pronalazi postdemokraciju samo u postmodernom dobu ili u poretku koji nastupa nakon predstavničke demokracije nego uvijek kad se javlja 'legitimiranje demokracije nakon demosa'. ; The authors try to show why the concept of post-democracy has already become contestable even though it was only introduced recently. The concept of post-democracy has been used as a critical model to interpret the crises of democracy in last twenty years or so. Collin Crouch outlines this attitude in his book Post-democracy. Sheldon Wolin also occupies a similar position. He speaks about post-democracy as a democracy functioning in the postmodern era. Regardless of their differences both authors believe that today's crises of democracy is specific. It seems that today's crises of democracy is not particularly new, especially for the continental European democracies. Even in the 1950s Hans Kelsen was writing about such authors who tried to redefine democracy because of its crises between the two world wars. They used a similar discourse on democracy as that which is been used by some theoreticians of post-democracy. We can also find the same discourse on 'the crises of democracy' and the same cure (greater democracy in the economic sphere) much before the 2nd World War. Moreover, there are a lot of examples in which people, in the name of democracy, try to find a new balance with representative democracy in last 200 years. The authors find that Jacques Rancière offers a more appropriate explanation of this problem. He doesn't find post-democracy only er in the postmodern era, or in an order that comes after representative democracy but every time when there is 'legitimization of a democracy after demos'.