Introduction -- Characterization of international parliamentary bodies -- The European Parliament -- Inter-Parliamentary Union -- The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe -- The Council of Europe -- Cooperation between the OSCE PA and PACE -- Parliamentarization at the global level -- Conclusion .
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Anckar, D. Foreign Policy Leadership in Finland: Towards Parliamentarization? Cooperation and Conflict, XIX, 1984, 219-233. According to the Finnish Constitution, the President determines Finland's relations with foreign powers. It is commonly believed in Finland that this arrangement is expedient and to the benefit of the nation. This is generally backed with arguments pertaining to the specific nature of foreign policy and to the need for continuity in political life. This paper calls these arguments into question, and it is argued, on the one hand, that the doctrine which emphasizes the specific nature of foreign policy is not well substantiated, and, on the other, that the potential of the presidency lies in discontinuity rather than continuity. It is also argued that attempts at moderating the role of the President in Finnish political life must, if they are to be realistic, involve interferences with his powers in foreign policy.
In the past 20 years, two related literature strands have gradually moved centre stage of the attention of EU Studies scholars. The first is preoccupied with the 'politicization of European integration', a multi-faceted concept that aims to tie together a multitude of political and societal manifestations underlying an increasing controversiality of the EU. A second concerns the parliamentarization of the EU, referring to the changing (institutional) role and EU-related activities national parliaments engage in. The key point of this contribution is simple, but often overlooked: We can and should be seeing parliamentarization as a necessary, yet insufficient, component of a wider process of politicization. Doing so goes beyond the often ad hoc or pars pro toto theoretical assumptions in both literature strands, sheds new light on the normative consequences attached to these phenomena, and furthers a more complete understanding of how a 'comprehensive' politicization of European policies develops.
In: Wagner , W M & Raunio , T 2017 , ' Towards parliamentarization of foreign and security policy? ' , West European Politics , vol. 40 , no. 1 , 1 , pp. 1-19 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1240411
It is customary to argue that foreign policy is very much dominated by the executive, with parliaments wielding limited influence. However, with the exception of the US Congress, legislative‒executive relations in the realm of foreign and security policy have attracted remarkably little scholarly attention. Drawing on a principal‒agent framework, this collection scrutinises the conventional wisdom of 'executive autonomy' in foreign affairs, indicating that even though parliaments have arguably become more involved in foreign and security policy over time, any notions of parliamentarisation need to be treated with caution. While expectations of consensus in the name of the national interest continue to play an important role in foreign policy decision-making, the papers highlight the role of party-political contestation structuring parliamentary debates and votes in this increasingly politicised issue area. This introductory paper introduces the analytical framework and hypotheses guiding the contributions in this collection, summarises their main findings and suggests avenues for future research.
In the past 20 years, two related literature strands have gradually moved centre stage of the attention of EU Studies scholars. The first is preoccupied with the 'politicization of European integration', a multi-faceted concept that aims to tie together a multitude of political and societal manifestations underlying an increasing controversiality of the EU. A second concerns the parliamentarization of the EU, referring to the changing (institutional) role and EU-related activities national parliaments engage in. The key point of this contribution is simple, but often overlooked: We can and should be seeing parliamentarization as a necessary, yet insufficient, component of a wider process of politicization. Doing so goes beyond the often ad hoc or pars pro toto theoretical assumptions in both literature strands, sheds new light on the normative consequences attached to these phenomena, and furthers a more complete understanding of how a 'comprehensive' politicization of European policies develops.
AbstractHow is the use of political lotteries related to party development? This article discusses the effects of a lottery-based procedure used to distribute committee appointments that was once common across legislatures in nineteenth-century Europe. The authors analyze the effects of a political lottery in budget committee selection in the French Third Republic using a microlevel data set of French deputies from 1877 to 1914. They argue that the adoption and benefit of lottery-based procedures were to prevent the capture of early institutions by party factions or groups of self-interested political elites. The authors find that partial randomization of selection resulted in the appointment of young, skilled, middle-class deputies at the expense of influential elites. When parties gained control of committee assignments in 1910, selection once again favored elites and loyal party members. The authors link lottery-based procedures to party development by showing that cohesive parties were behind the institutional reform that ultimately dismantled this selection process. Lottery-based procedures thus played a sanitizing role during the transformation of emerging parliamentary groups into unified, cohesive political parties.
Ina contribution to this journal, Volker Berghahn regretted the fragmentation and lack of focus in the recent research on the German Empire. While he may have overstated his case, his criticism certainly applies to the historiography of Germany's parliamentarization. The dearth of research, especially of recent vintage, has left the debate about the exceptionalism of Germany's governing institutions indeed "fragmented and decentered." Since Manfred Rauh's two volumes in the 1970s, little has been published. His thesis about Germany's silent parliamentarization has been attacked, it seems, more for the haughtiness of its footnotes than the substance of its argument. As a result, Rauh's provocative interpretation coexists far too quietly with other accounts, and thereby preempts the sort of dialogue and scholarly integration Berghahn so misses. In her response to Berghahn, Margaret Anderson points out that such a dialogue can be found in, without being confined to, the new work of Germany's electoral politics, that looked anew and more skeptically at the exceptional political development of Imperial Germany. Its findings indirectly raise questions about why the development of Germany's governing institutions — the Reichstag, the Bundersat, and the chancellor — continue to be interpreted in much more exceptionalist terms than the evolution of electoral politics.
The question concerning whether the formation of interinstitutional arrangements, especially those formed within the Common Foreign & Security Policy, have facilitated processes of parliamentarization within the European Union is addressed. An overview of the legal foundations & limitations of interinstitutional arrangements is presented, emphasizing how these cooperative devices are not easily located within existing European legal frameworks. Intergovernmentalist, neo-institutionalist, & structurationist approaches to understanding constitutional development within the European Union are subsequently discussed to better comprehend the role in interinstitutional arrangements within the European constitution. Analysis of the treaties of Amsterdam, Maastricht, & Nice is performed to determine how the competencies of the European Parliament were enlarged during the 1990s. Additional attention is dedicated to reviewing the establishment of interinstitutional arrangements in 1997 regarding the financing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy & explaining how these agreements enhanced the European Parliament's power within regional foreign & security policy. Various recommendations for future research are also offered. J. W. Parker