Познато је, и у научној литератури мање-више елаборирано да је повратак религији на подручју бивше СФРЈ ишао руку под руку са стварањем нових националних држава и успостављањем нових/старих етничких граница и идентитета. Због тога је логично што се ова појава често квалификује као религија нације и национализма. Међутим, из ове квалификације често изостаје увид у чињеницу да је повратак религији значио и повећање интересовања за религијска учења и знања, те масовније учествовање у црквеним обредима. Иако је извесно да од високог процента оних који су се на последњем попису идентификовали као православни Срби сасвим мали део одлази на активне вернике, евидентна обнова унутрашњег, литургијског живота Цркве сугерише одређена питања и опрезност при етикетирању савремених облика религиозности и улоге Цркве у њиховом формирању. Историјске околности које доводе до појаве религије нације у Србији у 19. веку чине оправданом хипотезу да религија нације ни тада, а ни данас није изникла из крила Цркве, већ да се она појављује као државни/секуларни идеолошки пројекат, чије су везе са религијом сасвим нерелигијске природе. Да бих поткрепила ову тврдњу, покушаћу да установим и покажем шта се налазило у основама ове световне религије 19. века, те да одговорим на питање начина обликовања њених садржаја. Ово ћу учинити на основу анализе политичке употребе мртвих тела, тј. доношења посмртних остатака Вука Караџића из Беча у Београд и обнављања гроба Доситеја Обрадовића том приликом. ; It is widely known and has been more or less elaborated in scientific literature that return to religion in the area of former SFRY was conducted hand-in-hand with the development of the new national states and establishment of new/old ethnic borders and identities. This is why it is logical that this phe- nomenon is frequently qualified as the religion of the nation and nationalism. However, this qualification frequently lacks insight into the fact that return to religion also meant increased interest in religious teachings and dogmas, as well as greater attendance at Church rituals. Even though it is certain that, among the large percentage of those who declared themselves as Orthodox Serbs during the last Census, a very small number of them are actually active believers; thus, the evident restoration of the internal, liturgical life of the Church suggests certain issues and advises prudence in labeling modern forms of religiousness and the role of the Church in their development. Historical conditions which led to the phenomenon of religion of the nation in Serbia in 19 century justify the hypothesis that religion of the nation was not, and still is not, something to have sprouted out under the auspices of the Church, but that it has occurred as a state/secular ideological project, whose links to religion are of purely non-religious nature. In order to corroborate this statement, I will try to determine and show what was in the basis of this secular religion of 19 century, and answer the question relating to the manner in which its content was shaped. I will do this based on an analysis of political use of dead bodies, i.e. relocation of mortal remains of Vuk Karadžić from Vienna to Belgrade, and restoration of the grave of Dositej Obradović, which was performed on the same occa- sion.
Ovaj rad bavi se životom slikara Save Šumanovića koji je pre 80 godina, 30. avgusta 1942. streljan na pravoslavnom groblju u Sremskoj Mitrovici, zajedno sa 120 građana Šida, mesta u kojem je u roditeljskoj kući proveo najvažnije formativne, kao i poslednje godine svog života. Do danas mu se ne zna grob. Bio je jedna od najpoznatijih žrtava ustaškog režima u Drugom svetskom ratu u Jugoslaviji. Rad ne tumači slikarstvo Save Šumanovića, već nastoji da oslika milje u kojem je slikar živeo i radio te kroz njegovu biografiju i događaje pokušava da objasni istorijski kontekst koji je doveo do tragičnog kraja Šumanovića. Slike i skice Save Šumanovića danas se nalaze u Parizu, gradu u kojem je živeo u tri navrata, u Zagrebu, gde se školovao, u Beogradu, gde je priređena njegova poslednja samostalna izložba, pred sam početak Drugog svetskog rata, u Novom Sadu u Spomen-zbirci Pavla Beljanskog te u Šidu u kojem je nastao najveći deo njegovog opusa i u kojem je 1952. osnovana Galerija slika "Sava Šumanović", zahvaljujući daru Savine majke, Perside Šumanović. U radu su, osim biografskih knjiga i zapisa savremenika o Savi Šumanoviću, korišćena i ekskluzivna pisma Save Šumanovića, koja su ljubaznošću porodice kolekcionara Milana Vereša bila dostupna autoru. Autor je koristio i intervjue koje je radio sa poznavaocima života i dela Šumanovića, kao i arhivske novinske članke, arhivu Televizije Beograd, te knjigu služavke Marije Demšar koja je tokom Drugog svetskog rata radila u kući Šumanovića u Šidu. ; This article is about the life of painter Sava Šumanović, who was executed 80 years ago (on 30 August 1942) at the Orthodox cemetery in Sremska Mitrovica, together with 120 other citizens of Šid, the city in which he spent his most important formative years. His body was never found to be burried. Šumanović is one of the most publically known victims of the Ustashe regime of the WWII in Yugoslavia. This paper does not discuss Šumanović's artistic contribution but rather the social and political context in which he worked and ...
Under the oppressive Serb-dominated regime of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, A. Moskov became an ardent Croatian nationalist. After he was forced to emigrate in 1933, he joined the Ustashe movement and pledged his allegiance to A. Pavelic. In 1941, after the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was proclaimed, Moskov returned to Croatia and became a prominent member of the Croatian military. After the dissolution of the NDH, he was captured by the British forces and extradited to Tito's communists. Even though the circumstances of his death are not preserved, he was undoubtedly sentenced to death by communist military tribunal in 1948. (SOI : CSP: S. 150)
Upon researching archival sources dating from the periods of Austro-Hungarian, Italian and Croatian rule, the author attempts to examine the condition of health and hygene in Istria between 1900-1950. He believes that these conditions were crucial in shaping urban and rural mentalities during a period which witnessed rapid industralization and urbanization. This study shows the difficult and constant struggle of a small number of enthusiasts, often outside of official institutions. It was a struggle against backwardness, prejudice and death. It is a tale of poverty, hunger, sickness and death, but it also speaks of the indestructability of the spirit in this region. The study will shed light on and important part of the social history of urban and rural Istria. (SOI : CSP: S. 545)
The author surveys the public activities of Slavko Kvaternik, one of the leading Croatian nationalists of the 1930s, and for a time, minister of the Croatian Home Army during the Second World War (1941- 1942). The article states that Kvaternik occupied a peculiar position with respect to the radicals grouped around Ante Pavelic, the leader of the Ustasha regime. Kvaternik was not an ideologue of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), nor did he agree with Pavelic's repressive internal policy or Pavelic's dependence on fascist Italy. Because of this conclict, Kvaternik was pushed out of office and left Croatia at the end of 1942. None of these facts prevented the communist Yugoslavian government from proclaiming him a "war criminal" and carrying out the death sentence in 1947. (SOI : CSP: S. 398)
Because it was the estate of a junior branch of the Habsburg family, Belje was treated as land confiscated by the state after 1918. At first it was occupied by the army, then it came under the administration of the National government of Baranja, Backa and Banat, and finally it fell under the control of the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Finances in Belgrade, which meant that it was officially the property of the crown. All this had a negative effect on the economy of the estate, which became a problematic enterprise instead of a model of successful agricultural production. Following the death of King Alexander, and with the establishment of commercial ties between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Third Reich, Belje attained relative independence in its export policy. Nonetheless, as regards the hiring of labourers and connections with Croatia, Great Serbian policy continued to hold sway. (SOI : CSP: S. 525)
Since his student days in Zagreb, Milivoj Magdic, one of the leading Croatian political publicists in the first half of the twentieth century, was well-disposed towards Marxism. On a result, he gained a prominent place in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But in his writings he soon divorced himself from official communist ideology. As a result, he was proclaimed a traitor to the party and a provocateur in the pay of the police. He nevertheless remained a committed Marxist until Stalin's purges in the USSR in 1935 left him disillusioned. Thereafter, he became the Yugoslavian communists most dangerous ideological opponent. Magdic' believed that Marxism was flawed because it attempted to build socialism by controlling people, because it left the responsibility of establishing socialism exclusively at the feet of one social class, and because, most fatally, it relied too heavily on materialism. For holding ideas such as these, the communists at one point even atempted to murder Magovac. During the period of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945) he wrote mostly for the periodical Spremnost (Readiness), but he held no political office. At the end of the Second World War he emigrated across Austria to Italy, but he was arrested in Rome in 1947 by the English and handed over to the Yugoslav government. He was proclaimed a war criminal, brought before the court, and sentenced to death. This was primarily due to his writings against communism and Marxism. (SOI : CSP: S. 116)
The paper analyses the problems that have been undermining the US recruitment policy for the last two decades - which is aimed at providing soldiers for imperial disciplining wars waged on the planetary periphery - as a case study to test the validity of theoretical assumptions about the transition to the age of post-heroic warfare. The departing hypothesis is based on stance that the United States, being the only remained superpower, experience a gradual and less visible process of losing popular support for military conscription, which the author employs here as an ideal of national vitality and a pillar of modern citizenship, as well as a feature of masculinity and the realm for self-realisation. The analysis takes place primarily in the field of anthropology and sociology and employs theoretical positions of social constructivism to complement narrow theoretical and methodological approaches of political science which are typically applied in the study of international relations. The analysis focuses on the "cracks" and deformations in the construction of ideals of warfare and heroism, which emerge as a result of the interaction of man - both as an individual and a member of the political community - the public, and the US foreign policy decisions designed to meet the needs and requirements of successful disciplinary imperial warfare. The author concludes that theoretical assumptions about entering the age of post-heroic warfare are valid due to the recruitment crisis in the US military, the unpopularity of the military profession, the commodification of warfare and death, the transformation of war into an industrial process, and misleading media portrayals of dead and wounded soldiers.
The "May Declaration" of the Yugoslav Club (Vienna, 1917), regardless of its original intent, enabled various political parties and groups in the South Slav areas of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to promote the "Yugoslav idea" and work toward the creation of a unified Yugoslav state. In Croatia, as well as in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the most vociferous advocates of the "May Declaration" were members of the Croatian Catholic Seniorate, the leading organization within the Croatian Catholic movement. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Franciscans were the leading proponents of the "May Declaration" alongside the Seniorate. The greatest opposition to the "May Declaration" was voiced by the "Frankist-Rightist" circle centered around Archbishop Josip Stadler. Especially prominent among this group was Ivo Pilar, author of the "Memorandum" (July 1917), wherein he called for the creation of a "united administrative territory," or, the political unification of Croatian lands elevated to the status of a "condominium" relative to both component halves of the Monarchy. In his "Declaration" (November, 1917), Archbishop Stadler and his supporters came out in favour of the unification of "Croatian historical lands" within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but on the basis of a subdualistic formula. Considering the existence of the dualistic system in the Monarchy a historic reality, they believed that this was the best possible resolution of the problem of political/constitutional fragmentation of the Croatian lands. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs , Croats and Slovenes rendered irrelevant the demands voiced in Stadler's "Declaration". Symbolically, the death of the Archbishop occurred at precisely the same time as these ominous events befell the Croat people. (SOI : CSP: S. 71f.)
Pavković vidi nestanak Jugoslavije kao niz činova otcepljenja republika i jedne pokrajine. Nasuprot tome, tvrdi se da je proces raspadanja jugoslovenske države kompleksna pojava, da je prouzrokovan nedostatkom političke legitimnosti nakon Titove smrti, nestankom geopolitičke uloge Jugoslavije, ugrađenom malfunkcionalnošću savezne države, ekonomskim teškoćama koje su spontano tumačene kao pojave proizašle iz navodne privilegovanosti drugih jedinica unutar sistema, nesposobnošću stare elite da modifikuje institucionalni, posebno privredni sistem, transformacijom elita u republičke i nacionalne građanske elite, širenjem straha za opstanak nacija i u suštini spontanim prestankom delovanja savezne države. Slovenija i Srbija prve su 1990. g. preuzele uloge nezavisnih država, pošto je savezna institucionalna ravnoteža bila poremećena oduzimanjem ovlašćenja pokrajinama. Jugoslovenska država prestala je da postoji prestankom njenog efektivnog delovanja, njene efektivne vlasti. Sami činovi otcepljenja u tome imali su malu ulogu. Čak ni ceo subjektivni faktor (htenja, namere, akteri, izvršioci) nije imao znatniju uzročnu težinu. ; Pavković understand the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a series of acts secession by republics and a province of the former SFRY. Contrary to this, here, it is asserted that the process of dissolution of the Yugoslav state was a complex one, involving the failure of political legitimacy after Tito's death, the disappearance of Yugoslavia's geopolitical role, the built in malfunctioning of the federal state, economic difficulties which were spontaneously interpreted as pursuing from the alleged privileged position of other units within the system, the inability of the old elite to modify the institutional, particularly the economic system, the transformation this elite into republic and national bourgeois elites, inciting of fears in lower strata on the possibility of the very disappearance of nations and, not least, the substantial cessation of operation of the federal state. Slovenia and Serbia were the first in 1990 to take over roles of independent states, after the federal balance was disturbed by the stripping of jurisdiction of provinces. The Yugoslav state disappeared by the cessation of its effective operation, its effective power. The acts of secession played a small role in this process. The entire subjective factor (will, intentions, actors, executors) did not bear a major causal weight.
Autor se bavi odnosima Sjedinjenih Država i Venezuele zaključno sa aktuelnom predsedničkom krizom ne bi li odgovorio na pitanje kako i zašto je Venezuela postala problem za spoljnu politiku SAD koji zahteva pojačanu pažnju i radikalne mere. Analiza ovih odnosa u toku 20. veka pokazuje da su oni zasnovani na naftnoj međuzavisnosti dveju država. Kada je krajem veka višedecenijsko loše upravljanje naftnim bogatstvom u Venezueli izazvalo društvenu i ekonomsku krizu koja je dovela na vlast Huga Cháveza, spremnog da koristi prihode od nafte protiv interesa regionalne hegemonije SAD, ove su Venezuelu označile kao problem. Američki establišment je prema tom problemu nastupio oportunistički – naftna međuzavisnost je sprečavala da sukob eskalira sve dok aktuelna ekonomsko-politička kriza u Venezueli nakon Chávezove smrti nije dala Washingtonu priliku za konačni obračun sa režimom, po cenu privremenog prekida u trgovini naftom. Godinu i po dana od izbijanja predsednička kriza u Venezueli još nije razrešena, jer se čavistički režim održao, a SAD odustale od vojne intervencije, pa autor nastoji da ukaže na perspektive problema i mogućnosti njegovog prevazilaženja nakon što tekuća pandemija korona virusa bude obuzdana. ; The author deals with the United States and Venezuela relations up to the current presidential crisis, in order to answer how and why Venezuela became a problem for U.S. foreign policy which requires increased attention and radical measures. The analysis of these relations during the 20th century shows that they were based on oil interdependence of the two states. When a decades-long mismanagement of oil riches in Venezuela at the end of the century caused a social and economic crisis that brought to power Hugo Chávez, who was ready to use oil revenues against U.S. regional hegemonic interests, it marked Venezuela as a problem. American establishment treated the problem with opportunism – oil interdependence prevented the conflict from escalating until the current economic and political crisis in Venezuela after the death of Chávez gave Washington an opportunity for the final clash with the regime at the price of a temporary break in the oil trade. A year and a half after the presidential crisis in Venezuela erupted, it has not been resolved yet, for the chavista regime remained in place, while the U.S. gave up on military intervention. The author points to the perspectives of the problem and the possibilities of its overcoming once the current coronavirus pandemic gets contained.
Branimir Altgayer was the most prominent Croatian of German nationality in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but he was especially so during the period of the Independent State of Croatia. Altgayer was born December 8, 1897 in the town of Przekopane (Galicia), where his father (born in Osijek) served as an Austro-Hungarian cavalry lieutenant. Altgayer spent his childhood in Slavonia, where he was brought up in a Croatian cultural atmosphere. After completing Croatian public school in Kutjevo and Croatian Gymnasium in Osijek and Zemun, he attended an Austro-Hungarian cavalry cadet school in Moravia between 1912 and 1915. He was an officer (ensign) in the Austro-Hungarian army (after 1915) until the end of the first world war, serving on the Russian, Rumanian, and Italian fronts. He was wounded twice and decorated several times. In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes he was a cavalry captain (first class) of the Royal army. Following four years of service, he resigned. He worked at various civilian occupations for a time, but returned to the military between 1924 and 1927. He was very active in the cultural and political life of the German minority of Osijek and Slavonia. He was selected to the united council of the German minority association, the Kulturbund of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund), in December 1934. He was a prominent representative of the so-called Renewal movement (Erneuerungsbewegung), a radical current in the Kulturbund. Following a conflict between the old leaders of the Germans in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Renewalists which occasioned a split in the Kulturbund, Altgayer and the Renewalists are ejected from the Kulturbund for insubordination. At the beginning of 1936 he established a cultural and charitable organization for Germans of Slavonia in Osijek (Kultur-und Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen in Slavonien). In January, 1939, he became a regional leader (Gauobmann) of the Germans in Slavonia (following the re-admittance of the Renewalists to the Kulturbund at the end of 1938). In early 1939, he leaves the Yugoslavian Radical Union, whose city councilor he was in Osijek, and joins the Croatian peasant party. After the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941, he was named leader of the German National Assembly for the NDH (Volksgruppenführer). From December 1941 he was director of state for the presidency of the NDH, but after January 1943 he was secretary of state for the same, and he was likewise promoted to the rank of reserve colonel in the Ustasha army. He was decorated by Leader of the Ustasha Dr. Ante Pavelic with the title "knight". For a short time in mid-1943 he went to the Eastern Front. At the end of the second world war he was deported to Yugoslavia from Austria by the British. In 1950, the district court of Zagreb sentenced him to death by firing squad. The sentence was carried out May 15, 1950. The investigative material of the Office of State Security (UDB-a) concerning Altgayer, especially the transcript of the trial from 1949, is an excellent source of information about the German minority in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the thirties and during the period of the Independent State of Croatia. (SOI : CSP: S. 638)
Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.
