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Debt dilution and debt overhang
We introduce long-term debt (and a maturity choice) into a standard model of firm financing and investment. This allows us to study two distortions of investment: (1.) Debt dilution distorts firms' choice of debt which has an indirect effect on investment; (2.) Debt overhang directly distorts investment. In a dynamic model of investment, leverage, and debt maturity, we show that the two frictions interact to reduce investment, increase leverage, and increase the default rate. We provide empirical evidence from U.S. firms that is consistent with the model predictions. Using our model, we isolate and quantify the effect of debt dilution and debt overhang. Debt dilution is more important for firm value than debt overhang. Debt overhang can actually increase firm value by reducing debt dilution. The negative effect of debt dilution on investment is about half as strong as that of debt overhang. Eliminating the two distortions leads to an increase in investment equivalent to a reduction in the corporate income tax of 3.5 percentage points. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
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Debt overhang and sovereign debt restructuring
After the huge debt increases in the 1940s, due to the WWII, and in the 1980s due to the emerging markets' debt crises, the debt overhang problem is once again at the center of the academic and political debate because of the recent debt crisis that affected the European countries in 2009. The debt overhang theory explains how an high level of debt distorts the optimal investment decisions and reduces government's incentives, in the debtor country, to undertake the necessary "adjustment policies". A huge literature focuses on the negative effects deriving from a debt overhang condition. In particular, this kind of literature has been mostly used to describe and to study poor and less developed countries. Nowadays instead, the situation is quite different with the Greek case that represents a very peculiar and never experienced situation. Chapter 1 of the thesis starts with an introduction of the sovereign debt overhang problem. Then, since the aim is to study the possible policy interventions able to solve it, the focus is posed on sovereign debt restructuring as a resolution mechanism. A relief intervention can be considered, indeed, as a way to reduce the debt burden for a country struggling with an high level of debt. Descriptions of the restructuring process, of the macroeconomic consequences and of the Greek case are then provided in this chapter in addition to some stylised facts and an event analysis useful to communicate the main messages. In the past, several different strategies of debt restructuring have been implemented and the consequences they produced were often different case by case. It is then interesting to study the effectiveness of the several options that can be used to restructure public debt. For this reason, a very simple theoretical model is developed in Chapter 2 in order to study three different strategies that can be used to solve a sovereign debt overhang problem. In particular, two strategies are based on a debt restructuring process, via face value reduction or rescheduling, whereas a third one is based on conditional-additional official lending. This strategy relies on the idea that the debtor country can benefit of new lending from the official sector, in order to undertake a larger amount of investment. The aim of the model is to represent schematically the functioning of the three restructuring processes to gain insights into their differences and to study their consequences in term of incentives to invest in a "troubled country". An empirical evidence of the debt overhang hypothesis is then provided in Chapter 3. The combination of the sovereign debt crisis of 2009 and the fiscal consolidation policies implemented as a result, makes indeed interesting to study this hypothesis in Europe. The Chapter exploits then a panel dataset for the European countries, between 1995 and 2015, in order to examine the extent to which increased levels of public debt have led to reduced public investment. We start the analysis from basic POLS models and then we expand it gradually to FE, IV and GMM estimation models. The results validate the debt overhang hypothesis and remain robust across various model specifications.
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External debt of Indonesia: From debt-led growth to growth-led debt?
Indonesia has received external debt as an external source of finance to fill in the investment-saving gap in achieving economic growth to improve social welfare. Despite Indonesian economy is able to recover to some extent, based on Bank Indonesia (2018), Indonesia's external debt at the end of Q2/2018 still amounted to USD 355,7 billion; consisting of government and central bank external debt of USD 179.7 billion, as well as private sector (including state-owned enterprises) external debt of USD 176.0 billion. Therefore, this study aims to examine the trend and impact of external debt on economic growth in the context of Indonesia's economy. If external debt is found to lead to debt trap, or already in the condition of growth-led debt, its benefits for economic development should be reviewed properly and government policies regarding external debt need to be redesigned. This study is a qualitative research in the form of case study of External Debt and its critical impact in Indonesia. Through observation, data comparison and literature study, it is found that external debt of Indonesia has been dominated by US Dollar and Japanese Yen, which assumed to cause surge in debt repayment.
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Debt seniority and sovereign debt crises
Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However, as senior tranches become sufficiently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one. We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which the government defaults also on senior debt. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
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The Reason Why Everyone Love Stepchange Debt Management Plan Reviews
StepChange Debt Charity is the UK's largest debt advice charity, with about 600,000 people contacting them each year and more than 300,000 receiving free, full, independent debt help. StepChange, which was founded in 1993, provides help to people who are struggling with debt through telephone and online programmes, as well as advocates for change to decrease the pain and stigma connected with debt. Stepchange debt management plan reviews is a charity financed by the credit sector that offers free credit counselling to persons in the United Kingdom. It conducts a first telephone or in-person interview before reviewing your debt history and making a recommendation. A debt management plan, which is handled by stepchange dmp review, is one example. further information from- glassdoor stepchange Types of debt solutions Possibility to improve the industry We are collaborating closely with the credit sector and the government to exploit the sector's prospects and manage its issues – financial, operational, and demand-driven – with other debt advisory charities. It is within our grasp to see a smoother and more efficient citizen advice sector, in which multiple delivery models – face-to-face, telephone, online, supported self-help, and intensively supported for vulnerable clients – all thrive under a stable and sustainable funding system that recognises the increasing roles and responsibilities of devolved national governments, Westminster, and the credit sector. What happens during a review of a DMP? Typically, in a review, we'll; Discuss how you're doing with sticking to a budget, make any required changes, and make sure you and your family have enough money to get by. Just call for free debt help by UK experts 03338803165 Boosting your earnings You could be in debt if you're not getting all of the money you're entitled to, such as: If you're eligible for tax credits, make sure you're not paying too much in taxes. Make sure you're collecting all of your benefits, and that any family or friends who live with you are ...
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Debt consolidation with long-term debt
The Great Recession has sent debt levels to a post-WWII high for several advanced economies, reviving the discussion of fiscal consolidation. This paper assesses the macroeconomic implications of tax-based versus spending-based consolidation within the framework of a New Keynesian model with long term government debt. Three results stand out: First, tax-based consolidations are inflationary whereas spending-based ones are deflationary. Second, the net benefits of inflation increase in the average maturity of outstanding debt: inflation revalues debt more efficiently, while distortions due to price dispersion remain unaffected - the maturity effect. Third, as a result, tax-based consolidations can become superior to spending cuts if the average maturity is high enough. Quantitatively, the threshold is two years for US data in 2013. The previous mechanism illustrates the importance of inflation in the consolidation process, even if raising its target rate is considered not to be an option.
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The road to debt deflation, debt peonage, and neofeudalism
What is called 'capitalism' is best understood as a series of stages. Industrial capitalism has given way to finance capitalism, which has passed through pension fund capitalism since the 1950s and a US-centered monetary imperialism since 1971, when the fiat dollar (created mainly to finance US global military spending) became the world's monetary base. Fiat dollar credit made possible the bubble economy after 1980, and its substage of casino capitalism. These economically radioactive decay stages resolved into debt deflation after 2008, and are now settling into a leaden debt peonage and the austerity of neo-serfdom. The end product of today's Western capitalism is a neo-rentier economy - precisely what industrial capitalism and classical economists set out to replace during the Progressive Era from the late 19th to early 20th century. A financial class has usurped the role that landlords used to play - a class living off special privilege. Most economic rent is now paid out as interest. This rake-off interrupts the circular flow between production and consumption, causing economic shrinkage - a dynamic that is the opposite of industrial capitalism's original impulse. The 'miracle of compound interest', reinforced now by fiat credit creation, is cannibalizing industrial capital as well as the returns to labor. The political thrust of industrial capitalism was toward democratic parliamentary reform to break the stranglehold of landlords on national tax systems. But today's finance capital is inherently oligarchic. It seeks to capture the government - first and foremost the treasury, central bank, and courts - to enrich (indeed, to bail out) and untax the banking and financial sector and its major clients: real estate and monopolies. This is why financial 'technocrats' (proxies and factotums for high finance) were imposed in Greece, and why Germany opposed a public referendum on the European Central Bank's austerity program.
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European Debt Crisis: How a Public debt Restructuring Can Solve a Private Debt issue
International audience ; The political and economic crisis in Europe is often viewed as an indirect consequence of the global financial and economic breakdowns caused by the US "subprime" crisis. European governments themselves tend to underestimate Europe's responsibility for the crisis and seem to prefer to manage the symptoms of the crisis rather than pursue a real recovery from it. This paper argues that the enforced policies are far from achieving an appropriate economic solution for the Eurozone. Moreover, it suggests that, although the European domestic debt situation is very close to the American one, their most recent evolutions and their main causes differ. If the growth of the American debt can partly be explained by macroeconomics imbalances, the causes of the growth of the European domestic debt must be found in a change in the behavior of the financial sector agents. The conclusion advocates for a more radical European policy to solve the debt bubble. ; La crise européenne est souvent perçue comme le produit indirect de la crise financière et de la récession mondiale causée par l'éclatement de la crise des "subprimes" américaine. Les gouvernements européens eux-mêmes tendent à sous-estimer les responsabilités des européens dans la crise et préfèrent en gérer les symptômes plutôt que de travailler à un redressement en profondeur. Dans cet article nous montrons que les politiques mises en œuvre ne peuvent être considérées comme des solutions appropriées à la situation économique. D'autre part, nous suggérons que bien que les niveaux des dettes domestiques européennes et américaines sont proches, leurs causes et leurs évolutions récentes sont différentes. Si l'accroissement de la dette américaine peut s'expliquer par des déséquilibres macroéconomiques, l'augmentation de la dette européenne ne peut s'expliquer que part des changements comportementaux des acteurs du secteur financier. En conclusion nous proposons de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus radicales pour mettre fin à la bulle du crédit.
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European Debt Crisis: How a Public debt Restructuring Can Solve a Private Debt issue
International audience ; The political and economic crisis in Europe is often viewed as an indirect consequence of the global financial and economic breakdowns caused by the US "subprime" crisis. European governments themselves tend to underestimate Europe's responsibility for the crisis and seem to prefer to manage the symptoms of the crisis rather than pursue a real recovery from it. This paper argues that the enforced policies are far from achieving an appropriate economic solution for the Eurozone. Moreover, it suggests that, although the European domestic debt situation is very close to the American one, their most recent evolutions and their main causes differ. If the growth of the American debt can partly be explained by macroeconomics imbalances, the causes of the growth of the European domestic debt must be found in a change in the behavior of the financial sector agents. The conclusion advocates for a more radical European policy to solve the debt bubble. ; La crise européenne est souvent perçue comme le produit indirect de la crise financière et de la récession mondiale causée par l'éclatement de la crise des "subprimes" américaine. Les gouvernements européens eux-mêmes tendent à sous-estimer les responsabilités des européens dans la crise et préfèrent en gérer les symptômes plutôt que de travailler à un redressement en profondeur. Dans cet article nous montrons que les politiques mises en œuvre ne peuvent être considérées comme des solutions appropriées à la situation économique. D'autre part, nous suggérons que bien que les niveaux des dettes domestiques européennes et américaines sont proches, leurs causes et leurs évolutions récentes sont différentes. Si l'accroissement de la dette américaine peut s'expliquer par des déséquilibres macroéconomiques, l'augmentation de la dette européenne ne peut s'expliquer que part des changements comportementaux des acteurs du secteur financier. En conclusion nous proposons de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus radicales pour mettre fin à la bulle du crédit.
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Public debt sustainability and debt dynamics: The case of Tanzania
Rising public debt in sub-Saharan Africa remains a matter of concern. We provide an analysis of public debt and debt sustainability in Tanzania, focusing on external debt. Though current and previous analyses using the IMF-World Bank debt sustainability framework indicate low risk of public external debt distress, these analyses are sensitive to exchange rate volatility and export shocks and are predicated on strong assumptions of robust future economic growth and reduced government borrowing. Moreover, empirical evidence of debt sustainability based on the fiscal reaction function approach is weak. The challenge lies in ensuring debt remains sustainable, given the need to scale up development expenditure to address infrastructure gaps amid dwindling donor financing and vulnerability to exogenous shocks, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Rapid debt accumulation-particularly commercial debt-could expose Tanzania to external risks. Leveraging on concessional borrowing, efficient public investment, enhanced debt management, and domestic resource mobilization are critical.
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Euro area sovereign debt crisis and debt mutualisation
We study debt mutualisation in the Euro area. Bearing in mind other existing proposals we provide an alternative Blue, Yellow and Red Bonds proposal: blue, would cover debt up to 60% of GDP, yellow would include debt from 60% up to 90% of GDP, and red would cover debt above 90% of GDP. Although not with joint liability, the rationale behind the Yellow Bonds with a joint issuance is the attraction of liquidity, which would be beneficial, especially for the countries with high yields. This could give more room to public authorities.
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PUBLIC DEBT IN THE CEECS: IS THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS OVER?
The paper investigates how the global financial and the ensuing European sovereign crisis affected the public debt dynamics of the EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which countries are generally facing difficulties in keeping fiscal discipline as a negative consequence of global and regional financial turbulences. It reveals how economic factors (real GDP growth, interest rates, primary deficit) affected the trend of public debt in the period after 2008 among new EU members on the basis of Eurostat and European Economy statistics. After the briefing of some relevant government debt theories (among others Marcet and Scott, 2003, Díaz-Giménez and Giovanetti, 2007, Garcia et al., 2011, Broner et al., 2014), the paper provides a descriptive analysis of the debt structure of eight Central and Eastern European countries in recent years. It compares the currency composition of the governments' liabilities, discusses the role the domestic public sector plays in financing public debt, and whether there is evidence of domestic financing crowding out private investment in these countries. In the light of CDS premia and reference yields financing costs are contrasted and the way debt management strategies are formulated and government debt instruments are chosen in order to mitigate the financial burden caused by government indebtedness are compared. Finally, the paper summarises the lessons of the Hungarian self-financing programme launched in April 2014 by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
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Mozambican Illegal Debts: Testing the Odious Debt Doctrine
In June 2019, the Constitutional Council of Mozambique delivered a judgment declaring a financial transaction arranged by the government in violation of the parliamentary prerogatives in budgetary matters unconstitutional. This was only the tip of an iceberg consisting of a series of transactions tainted with corruption. In the face of this illegality, many antidebt campaigners have invoked the application of the odious debt doctrine to block the enforcement of contractual claims and the availability of restitutionary remedies. Under the odious debt doctrine, a debt is odious if, in the awareness of the creditors, it is contracted without the consent of and not for the benefit of the population. The operation of the odious debt doctrine presupposes an inquiry into its legal status. Lacking a proper normative characterization, the doctrine is to be understood more as a matter of policy than as a matter of law. As a result, its ideal systematic placement would be under the umbrella of transnational public policy. Transnational public policy establishes universal principles to serve the common interests of mankind. The key point, then, is to ascertain whether and to what extent the values enshrined into the odious debt doctrine may belong to the realm of the transnational public policy. In this context, the controversy on the validity of the Mozambican debt can become the touchstone for testing the legal status and operation of the odious debt doctrine.
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Debt As Power
FROM THE EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION: In Debt as Power, Di Muzio and Robbins present a historical account of the modern origins of capitalist debt by looking at how commercial money is produced as debt in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They expertly demonstrate their key contention -- that debt is a technology of power -- and identify the ways in which the control, production, and distribution of money, as interest-bearing debt, are used to discipline populations. Their sharp analysis brings together histories of the development of the Bank of England and the establishment of permanent national debt with the intensification and expansion of debt, as a "technology of power", under colonialism in a global context. The latter part of the book addresses the consequences of modern regimes of debt and puts forward proposals of what needs to be done, politically, to reverse the problems generated by debt-based economies. The final chapter presents a convincing case for the 99% to use the power of debt to challenge present inequalities and outlines a platform for action suggesting possible alternatives.
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