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How do terrorists & terrorist groups make decisions, & what influence do terrorist decision-making styles have on the course of a terrorist campaign? Efforts to answer these questions have centered on three sets of theories. In order of generality, these are (a) strategic theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism & related forms of political violence is considered to be an instrumental choice; (b) organizational theories, in which the sources of violence are found in the internal dynamics of the terrorist group itself; & (c) psychological theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism is explained within the framework of individual psychology. Most observers agree that these lines of inquiry are not mutually exclusive, but each offers a distinctive approach to terrorist decision making. This essay examines each of these theoretical approaches in turn. It concludes with a brief discussion of the decision-making constraints that help shape terrorist life cycles. 1 Figure, 224 References. Adapted from the source document.

IN A SENSE UNINTENDED BY THE AUTHORS, THESE TWO CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS PRESENT A STORY WITHIN A STORY. BOTH RATIONAL DECISION MAKING AND DECISIONS IN CRISIS ARE STRIKING EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND THE DECISION-MAKING SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS OF A KEY ACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST IMBROGHO-ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, THE AUTHORS STRIVE TO EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION MAKING CHOICES AGAINST CURRENT INSIGHTS OFFERED BY NATIONAL AND OTHER DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORKS. AS WELL, THOSE ANALYSES REVEAL IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF DECISION-MAKING CHOICE BY THE AUTHORS THEMSELVES. THEY THUS SHOW THE STATE OF THE ART AS IT EXISTS, AND THEY PROVIDE CLUES OF WHERE THE FIELD MUST MOVE IN THE FUTURE. WHILE THESE ARE CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS, THEY ARE NOT IDENTICAL. NEITHER METHODOLOGICALLY NOR SUBSTANTIVELY DO THEY COVER THE SAME GROUND. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLING ASPECTS OF READING BOTH STUDIES, AT LEAST THE RESPECTIVE COVERAGE OF THE 1967 CRISIS, IS THAT FREQUENTLY ONE WONDERS IF HE IS READING ABOUT THE SAME CRISIS AT ALL. THIS IS EVEN MORE DISTURBING WHEN ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT DATA AND ADVICE WERE OFFERED WILLINGLY BY MICHAEL BRECHEN TO THE AUTHORS OF THE OTHER STUDY. FOR INSTANCE, BRECHER FINDS THE HOLOCAUST SYNDROME A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDINAL PRISM OF MAJOR ACTORS IN 1967, YET STEIN AND TANTER FAIL EVEN TO MENTION IT AS A FACTOR IN THEIR BOUNDED RATIONALITY PRESENTATION.