Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union (EU). This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People's Party (EPP), which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents' behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states.
Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union (EU). This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People's Party (EPP), which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents' behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states.
First published online : 09 January 2020 ; What happens to public administration when populists are elected into government? This article argues that populists seek to realize an anti-pluralist reform agenda, thereby fuelling trends of democratic backsliding. Against this background, the article discusses potential goals and strategies of populist public administration policy and introduces examples of how populists sought to capture (Orbán in Hungary), dismantle (Fujimori in Peru), sabotage (Trump in the United States), and reform (Blocher in Switzerland) the state bureaucracy. In doing so, populists in government aim at structures, resources, personnel, norms, and accountability relationships. The examples suggest that populist public administration policies can have profound impact on policymaking and democracy, underlining the need for a broader research agenda on this issue area.
This is the final version. Available on open access from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record ; Both political parties and differentiated integration (DI) play an ambivalent role in regard to democratic backsliding. Parties' positioning towards democratic backsliding has not always been straightforward, and DI has been seen as facilitating it. We analyse whether party actors view democratic backsliding as a problematic issue for the EU, if they think DI facilitates it, and how they consider the EU should respond to it. Drawing on 35 interviews and a survey of 42 party actors in seven member states, we show that many do view backsliding as problematic. Moreover, around half worried that DI could facilitate backsliding, though others did not link the two. Finally, almost all considered it legitimate for the EU to address democratic backsliding. Although centre-of-left actors are most likely to worry about democratic backsliding and favour EU intervention, actors across the political spectrum are sceptical about accepting DI in matters pertaining to Article 2. ; European Commission
Both political parties and differentiated integration (DI) play an ambivalent role in regard to democratic backsliding. Parties' positioning towards democratic backsliding has not always been straightforward, and DI has been seen as facilitating it. We analyse whether party actors view democratic backsliding as a problematic issue for the EU, if they think DI facilitates it, and how they consider the EU should respond to it. Drawing on thirty-five interviews and a survey of forty-two party actors in seven member states, we show that many do view backsliding as problematic. Moreover, around half worried that DI could facilitate backsliding, though others did not link the two. Finally, almost all considered it legitimate for the EU to address democratic backsliding. Although centre-of-left actors are most likely to worry about democratic backsliding and favour EU intervention, actors across the political spectrum are sceptical about accepting DI in matters pertaining to Article 2.
It has long been argued that the end of the 20th century marked the triumph of liberal democracy. The third wave of democracy has increased the number of democracies in the world unprecedentedly and gave hope to many that democratic revolution is underway. However, in the last decade, this democratization process seems to have halted; there has been decline both in the number and quality of democracies. This thesis proposes an agent-based theory of democratic backsliding. More specifically, it is argued that leaders with undemocratic normative preferences and their ability to mobilize previously persecuted segments of society are the driving factors behind the present-day authoritarian resurgence. While the leader's fight with the oppressors of the marginalized group can bring a short-term of democratization, we argue that the unconditional support given by the marginalized group to the leader can allow the leader to undermine democracy by removing the checks on his power. The paper attempts to investigate similarities in the process of democratic derogation in a comparative case study of Venezuela and Turkey. The study shows that the support given to Erdogan and Chavez by the previously persecuted groups in their respective countries, religious/conservatives in Turkey and poor in Venezuela, allowed both leaders to undermine democracy in a subtle and incremental way. ; 2018-08-01 ; M.A. ; Sciences, Political Science ; Masters ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
This article discusses how electoral irregularities contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela under chavista rule (1999-2019). It draws from an original database of electoral irregularities created from primary and secondary sources covering a total of 24 electoral contests. I find that Venezuela experienced 117 electoral irregularities during this twenty-year period. Almost every electoral contest exhibited one irregularity, if not more. Electoral irregularities served two goals: to provide double insurance for the ruling party, and to encourage abstentionism (and divisions) across the opposition. They also increased every time the ruling party felt more electorally threatened. The article proposes a typology of irregularities applicable to other cases. It also evaluates how the opposition responded to the rise of irregularities, pointing out strategies that failed and those that worked. Resumen: Retroceso democrático por irregularidades electorales: El caso de Venezuela.Este artículo discute cómo las irregularidades electorales contribuyeron al retroceso democrático en Venezuela bajo gobiernos chavistas (1999-2019). Se fundamenta en una base de datos inédita de irregularidades electorales creada a partir de fuentes primarias y secundarias que cubren un total de 24 procesos electorales. Venezuela cometió 117 irregularidades electorales durante este período de veinte años. En casi todos los procesos electorales hubo al menos una irregularidad. Las irregularidades electorales cumplieron dos objetivos: proporcionar un doble seguro para el partido gobernante y alentar la abstención (y la división) en toda la oposición. También aumentaron cada vez que el partido gobernante se vio más amenazado electoralmente. El artículo propone una tipología de irregularidades aplicables en otros casos. También evalúa cómo respondió la oposición al aumento de las irregularidades, señalando las estrategias que fallaron y las que funcionaron.
The United States has been the main promoter of democratic values in the world for decades. After the Cold War, promoting these values in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, was their important strategic goal. Poland, striving for the closest possible relations with the US, joined its efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. While this had tangible effects in the vicinity of Poland, doing so as part of military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq ended in failure. In recent years, Polish-American cooperation to promote democracy has been limited due to democratic backsliding in Poland. The American authorities have criticized the legal changes in Poland that limit the independence of the judiciary and freedom of the media, as well as other actions that violate the principles of liberal democracy and the rule of law. Criticism has a limited impact on stopping the regression of democracy in Poland. Moreover, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the issue of democratic backsliding has been overshadowed by the military aspects of Polish-American cooperation. ; Stany Zjednoczone od dziesięcioleci są głównym promotorem wartości demokratycznych na świecie. Po zimnej wojnie promowanie tych wartości w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, w tym w Polsce, było ich ważnym celem strategicznym. Polska, dążąc do jak najściślejszych stosunków z USA, włączyła się w działania na rzecz promocji demokracji w Europie Wschodniej i innych częściach świata. Choć miało to wymierne skutki w sąsiedztwie Polski, to w ramach misji wojskowych w Afganistanie i Iraku zakończyło się fiaskiem. W ostatnich latach polsko-amerykańska współpraca na rzecz promocji demokracji została ograniczona ze względu na demokratyczny regres w Polsce. Władze amerykańskie skrytykowały zmiany prawne w Polsce, które ograniczają niezależność sądownictwa i wolność mediów, a także inne działania naruszające zasady liberalnej demokracji i rządów prawa. Krytyka ma ograniczony wpływ na zatrzymanie regresu demokracji w Polsce. Ponadto ...
Despite growing concerns expressed by international organisations about the deterioration of democracy in Vučić's Serbia, the country has been neglected by the literature on the 'crisis of democracy'. Using a combined qualitative/quantitative research strategy for detecting changes in regime types, including various V-DEM measures and over three dozen indicators provided by the competitive authoritarian framework, the analysis confirms the recent regression of Vučić's Serbia to competitive authoritarianism. The peculiar features of the Serbian case—a double transition to and from democracy in less than two decades—appear to support a pessimistic outlook for the future of democracy. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
This paper analyzes the extent to which neo-cleavage theory can explain democratic backsliding in the European Union, focusing on the role of the GAL/TAN cleavage and an alternative explanation, populism. It brings together different factors into a causal model based on the willingness-opportunity metatheoretical framework, which is then evaluated empirically using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The results indicate that both TAN ideological stance and populism provide two alternative motivations for democratic backsliding, but do not produce backsliding in the absence of certain opportunities. ; März 2019
The following study examines the future of democratization and the apparent trend towards autocratization within the context of democratic backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa. Initially, the findings indicate that regionally, backsliding is not acting fundamentally different in Sub-Saharan Africa when compared to other regions. The analysis finds that regime duration and civil conflict are both significant when it comes to the study of democratic backsliding. The variable for the prior military regime's is extremely significant in all of the models and is, therefore, a strong indicator of backsliding in Africa. The chief takeaway from the study is in the variable for economic growth and finds that as economic growth increases the likelihood of backsliding decreases. This variable is negative and significant for all of the models, but if Africa is taken out of the analysis the trend ultimately disappears, which indicates that Africa is potentially driving this trend of economic growth and backsliding. ; 2018-12-01 ; M.A. ; Sciences, Political Science ; Masters ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
Following the 2006 post-electoral crisis, important changes were made to the Constitution and several ordinary laws in Mexico. Authorities touted that electoral reform as a major triumph for the country's democracy. However, this paper will document at least four serious drawbacks: (1) weakening electoral institutions, (2) solidifying the hegemony of party bosses within their parties, (3) reducing freedom of speech during campaigns to protect the parties' image, and (4) monopolizing political communication in the hands of parties. I analyze such problems based on a detailed reading of the new law, a scrutiny of legislative opinions, a review of the public debate, and interviews with top officials in charge of implementation. I argue that Mexico illustrates two risks that other third-wave democracies may be facing too: democratic backsliding and partyarchy. ; A raíz de la crisis postelectoral del 2006 se hicieron importantes cambios a la Constitución así como a varias leyes secundarias en México. Las autoridades argumentaron que dicha reforma electoral fue un gran logro para la democracia en México. Sin embargo este ensayo va a documentar cuatro problemas causados por la reforma: (1) debilitar de la autonomía de las instituciones electorales, (2) solidificar la hegemonía de las élites partidistas dentro de sus partidos, (3) reducir la libertad de expresión durante las campañas para proteger la imagen de los partidos, y (4) monopolizar la comunicación política en manos de los partidos. Analizo dichos problemas en base a una lectura minuciosa de las nuevas normas, un examen de los dictámenes legislativos, una revisión del debate público y entrevistas con altos funcionarios a cargo de implementar la ley. Argumento que México ilustra dos riesgos que otras nuevas democracias también pueden estar enfrentado: retroceso democrático y partidocracia.
When the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries joined the European Union, it was expected that membership of the Union would result in the stabilization of democratic institutions and democracy in the region. However, in recent years the quality of democracy in two CEE countries – Hungary and Poland – seems to be falling backwards. If we look at the process of Eurozone accession of the CEE region, we see that is precisely these countries, and indeed some others, that are opposing membership of the Economic and Monetary Union. Is it only by chance that challenging the basic EU principles of democracy and rule of law and staying away from the Eurozone seem to relate to the same countries? This question will be addressed in the chapter by looking at longitudinal data obtained from Freedom House, V-Dem and the Economist Intelligence Unit on the quality of democracy in the region from the perspective of Eurozone membership. Ultimately, the conclusions that are drawn might be relevant not only for social scientists but for decision-makers as well.
Noch nie in der Geschichte gab es so viele Demokratien auf der Welt wie heute. Dennoch wird das Konzept der liberalen Demokratie zunehmend in Frage gestellt. Die Abkehr von dem, was im "Westen" lange Zeit als ideale Staatsform verstanden wurde, wird in der Literatur als "democratic backsliding" bezeichnet. Diese Entwicklung ist gekennzeichnet durch die schrittweise Abschaffung der Gewaltenteilung, die Aushöhlung der Kontrolle über die Exekutive und eine ernsthafte Bedrohung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Opposition durch Medien oder zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure wird systematisch zum Schweigen gebracht. Diese Entwicklung ist nicht nur in neu etablierten Demokratien, sondern auch in Ländern mit einer langen demokratischen Geschichte zu beobachten und hat sich somit zu einer großen Herausforderung innerhalb Europas entwickelt. Wenn das Phänomen "backsliding" und der mögliche Einfluss regionaler Organisationen in der Literatur diskutiert wird, liegt der Fokus meist auf der Europäischen Union (EU), während andere Organisationen oft außer Acht gelassen werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die Instrumente des Europarates (CoE) und ihr Potenzial, "democratic backsliding" entgegenzuwirken. Obwohl Ungarn lange nicht mehr das einzige Land ist, in dem demokratische Praktiken schrittweise abgeschafft werden, gilt es nach wie vor als eines der frühesten und deutlichsten Beispiele für "backsliding" in Europa. Seit der Machtübernahme der Partei von Premierminister Victor Orbán im Jahr 2010 werden individuelle Freiheiten beschnitten und die Tyrannei der Mehrheit schrittweise institutionalisiert. Eine Untersuchung der unterschiedlichen Reaktionen der Institutionen des Europarats auf die genannten Reformen zeigt, dass in der Theorie zwar ausreichend Handlungsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung steht, es in der Praxis jedoch oft an der effektiven Umsetzung scheitert. ; Although never before in history there have existed as many democracies as there are today, the concept of liberal democracy seems to be increasingly questioned. This turning away from what we in the "West" have designated to be the ideal form of government is referred to as democratic backsliding. It is characterized by the elimination of the separation of powers, undermining checks and balances on the executive, and constituting a serious threat to the rule of law. Opposition through the media or civil society actors is systematically silenced. This development cannot only be perceived in newly established democracies but also countries with a long democratic history and has thus developed into a major challenge within Europe. When the phenomenon of backsliding and the possible impact of regional organizations are discussed in literature, the focus usually lies on the European Union (EU), while other organizations are mostly disregarded. This thesis aims at addressing this lacuna by concentrating on the Council of Europe (CoE), an organization that has set itself the aim to act as a guarantor for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across Europe. Although not being the only country anymore, Hungary is still considered one of the earliest and most blatant examples of backsliding in Europe. Prime minister Victor Orbán has been curtailing individual freedoms and gradually institutionalizing the tyranny of the majority since his party took over in 2010. In theory, the CoE disposes of several tools with the potential to address democratic backsliding. An analysis of the different responses of CoE institutions to the reforms carried out in Hungary however shows, that their effectiveness is limited due to the lacking will of the Member States. ; eingereicht von Idia Luise Ohenhen ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung des Verfassers/der Verfasserin ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Diplomarbeit, 2021 ; (VLID)5898256
The ruling RHDP's victory in legislative elections in March 2021 has tightened incumbent President Alassane Ouattara's grip on political power in Côte d'Ivoire. Though Ouattara has taken a conciliatory stance towards the opposition since his re-election, his control of political institutions, low voter turnout, electoral violence and the president's international status heighten the risk of further democratic backsliding in Côte d'Ivoire.
