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During the past decade, analyses drawing on several democracy measures have shown a global trend of democratic retrenchment. While these democracy measures use radically different methodologies, most partially or fully rely on subjective judgments to produce estimates of the level of democracy within states. Such projects continuously grapple with balancing conceptual coverage with the potential for bias (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000). Little and Meng (L&M) (2023) reintroduce this debate, arguing that "objective" measures of democracy show little evidence of recent global democratic backsliding.1 By extension, they posit that time-varying expert bias drives the appearance of democratic retrenchment in measures that incorporate expert judgments. In this article, we engage with (1) broader debates on democracy measurement and democratic backsliding, and (2) L&M's specific data and conclusions.

AbstractThis paper assesses the performance of the Supreme Court as democratic guardrail during five prior periods of democratic crisis in the United States. It finds that most such periods witnessed efforts by the governing regime to entrench themselves in power, and that the Court has rarely provided an effective check on such democratic abuses. Rather than serving as a reliable democratic guardrail, the Court has regularly exercised what Dixon and Landau call "weak‐form abusive judicial review"; that is, it has declined to check attacks on democracy emerging from other centers of power. On one occasion, the Court has undermined democracy even more directly via "strong‐form abusive judicial review"; that is, the Court itself attacked key democratic guardrails. This historical record provides a helpful baseline for evaluating the Court's performance during the Trump era, when it has taken actions that both protect and undermine democratic health. Conflicting signs indicate that the Court is playing a more democracy‐protective role than most of its predecessors in some respects, but a more democracy‐undermining role in others. As such, it is too soon to say with confidence whether the contemporary Court will be remembered, on balance, for resolving or exacerbating a system‐threatening constitutional crisis.

The literature on the decline of democracy and the causes of democratic backsliding primarily emphasize domestic factors as causal variables for the worsening quality of democracy. However, analysis on the extent to which external factors influence democratic backsliding is largely neglected. My paper attempts to grapple with this lacuna, by looking into the effects of terrorism, as a causal variable of democratic backsliding. I hypothesize that increased casualties out of terrorism result in change in the quality of democracy subsequently leading to backsliding. The study of democratic backsliding has mainly concentrated on Europe and Latin America, and to some extent, on South-east Asia. This research delves deep into the South Asian region to understand the impact of terrorism on the quality and stability of democracies and hence, forms my case study. All seven states that this region is comprised of - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka along with all cases of terrorism, within the period 1970-2017 come within the purview of this research. South Asia features within the top five regions of the IPE Global Terrorism Database as the acute sufferer of terrorism, both domestic and international. Operationalizing terrorism in terms of the count of casualties that resulted from various acts of terror, I specifically hypothesize that increased terrorism result in change in the quality of democracy subsequently leading to backsliding.

Scholars have paid increasing attention to democratic backsliding, yet efforts to explain this phenomenon remain inchoate. This article seeks to place the study of democratic backsliding on sturdier conceptual, operational, and theoretical foundations. Conceptually, the challenge of backsliding is to define changes that take place within a political regime. Methodologically, the challenge involves measurement of intraregime changes, as alternative coding schemes change the population of units that have experienced democratic backsliding. Theoretical challenges are dual: First, despite a rich and diverse literature, we lack readily available theories to explain backsliding, and second, the theoretical debates that do exist—centered on the causes of democratic transitions, democratic breakdowns, authoritarian resilience, and democratic consolidation—remain unresolved. We consider how these theories might be called into service to explain backsliding. By doing so, the article aims to set the terms of the debate to create a common focal point around which research can coalesce.

Both political parties and differentiated integration (DI) play an ambivalent role in regard to democratic backsliding. Parties' positioning towards democratic backsliding has not always been straightforward, and DI has been seen as facilitating it. We analyse whether party actors view democratic backsliding as a problematic issue for the EU, if they think DI facilitates it, and how they consider the EU should respond to it. Drawing on thirty-five interviews and a survey of forty-two party actors in seven member states, we show that many do view backsliding as problematic. Moreover, around half worried that DI could facilitate backsliding, though others did not link the two. Finally, almost all considered it legitimate for the EU to address democratic backsliding. Although centre-of-left actors are most likely to worry about democratic backsliding and favour EU intervention, actors across the political spectrum are sceptical about accepting DI in matters pertaining to Article 2.

Both political parties and differentiated integration (DI) play an ambivalent role in regard to democratic backsliding. Parties' positioning towards democratic backsliding has not always been straightforward, and DI has been seen as facilitating it. We analyse whether party actors view democratic backsliding as a problematic issue for the EU, if they think DI facilitates it, and how they consider the EU should respond to it. Drawing on thirty-five interviews and a survey of forty-two party actors in seven member states, we show that many do view backsliding as problematic. Moreover, around half worried that DI could facilitate backsliding, though others did not link the two. Finally, almost all considered it legitimate for the EU to address democratic backsliding. Although centre-of-left actors are most likely to worry about democratic backsliding and favour EU intervention, actors across the political spectrum are sceptical about accepting DI in matters pertaining to Article 2.

Abstract
Democratic backsliding, or the debilitation of democracy by those elected to protect it, looms large in the current debate about the global crisis of democracy, including Sara Wallace Goodman's Citizenship in Hard Times: How Ordinary People Respond to Democratic Threat. In keeping with the prevailing view of backsliding as a political phenomenon rooted in extreme partisanship and polarization, Goodman is concerned with strengthening the citizenry's commitment to democratic norms and practices—in other words, boosting democratic citizenship. Placing the roots of backsliding in the political system itself, this essay argues for pushing the debate about backsliding beyond citizen solutions and toward institutional remedies, especially accountability against those who harm democracy and modernizing the democratic infrastructure.

A third wave of autocratization is manifest today.1 Universities are no exception to the institutions that are affected by democratic backsliding in a given country: according to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, academic freedom has declined by 13 percent in autocratizing countries in the 2010–20 period, whereas almost no change has been recorded in other countries.2

Democratic backsliding by incumbents is one of the most prevalent forms of backsliding in recent global trends of democratic erosion. Understanding the attitude of voters toward backsliding incumbents is crucial because popular support is the basis of legitimacy for these incumbents. This article studies voter attitudes in the Philippines, where democracy was subverted by the incumbent president, Rodrigo Duterte, who served from 2016 to 2022. Specifically, we examine the validity of the claim that Filipino voters are acquiring a "taste for illiberal rule" made by some scholars. First, we analyzed the survey data regarding the support for various types of political systems, where part of the data comes from our originally commissioned survey at the Social Weather Stations. Second, we explored Pulse Asia's longitudinal survey data on martial-rule support. Our investigation of these survey data did not find substantive support for the "taste for illiberal rule" proposition. Further, we argue that Filipino voters are contingent supporters of illiberal politics while supporting the procedural principles of democracy at the baseline.

It has long been argued that the end of the 20th century marked the triumph of liberal democracy. The third wave of democracy has increased the number of democracies in the world unprecedentedly and gave hope to many that democratic revolution is underway. However, in the last decade, this democratization process seems to have halted; there has been decline both in the number and quality of democracies. This thesis proposes an agent-based theory of democratic backsliding. More specifically, it is argued that leaders with undemocratic normative preferences and their ability to mobilize previously persecuted segments of society are the driving factors behind the present-day authoritarian resurgence. While the leader's fight with the oppressors of the marginalized group can bring a short-term of democratization, we argue that the unconditional support given by the marginalized group to the leader can allow the leader to undermine democracy by removing the checks on his power. The paper attempts to investigate similarities in the process of democratic derogation in a comparative case study of Venezuela and Turkey. The study shows that the support given to Erdogan and Chavez by the previously persecuted groups in their respective countries, religious/conservatives in Turkey and poor in Venezuela, allowed both leaders to undermine democracy in a subtle and incremental way. ; 2018-08-01 ; M.A. ; Sciences, Political Science ; Masters ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

A notable development in 21st-century American politics is the rise of affective polarization: partisans increasingly dislike and distrust those affiliated with the other political party. We offer a wide-ranging review of the nature of party identification; the factors that contribute to affective polarization; and the consequences of this kind of polarization on electoral politics, democratic transgressions, and democratic functioning. We conclude that there is scant evidence of a direct link between affective polarization and democratic backsliding in the U.S., and we argue that understanding the erosion of democratic norms and institutions means that we should consider a wider range of potential causal factors among elites and the general citizenry. Affective polarization has likely made democratic functioning more difficult, though, so interventions to address it are worthwhile: these should focus on core causes rather than on behavioral symptoms.