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As we witness a rise in radical right politics in Europe and beyond, our host ⁠Cassandra van Douveren⁠ speaks to ⁠Dr. Vicente Valentim⁠, a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. Vicente's work focusses on the role of social norms in normalising the expression of views and behaviours associated with authoritarianism. Join us as we discuss his upcoming book, ⁠The Normalisation of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand⁠ (forthcoming: September 2024), pathways to restore democratic norms and Vicente's hopes for the future. Politics, Re-Imagined is a series by the Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR) at the University of Oxford focused on exploring tangible and sustainable solutions to the ...

AbstractLiberal democracy has become vulnerable to illiberal political movements and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. To safeguard liberal democracy, we propose the concept of the Guardian State, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. We need strong administrative institutions that uphold liberal democratic norms and resist pressures from populist politicians. Institutionalizing guardianship as the key norm within the civil service fortifies democratic institutions against backsliding. The principle of neutrality alone cannot ensure that only liberal citizens come to power. Structural measures at the individual and organizational levels are essential to fortify the foundations of the Guardian State and protect liberal democracy against evolving threats. Proactive efforts are necessary to defend and strengthen the public service to ensure the long‐term viability of democratic governance. The Guardian State places the bureaucracy in a key role in preserving the core principles of democracy.

Recently, various Central and Eastern European countries have experienced a regression of democratic quality, often resulting in the emergence of competitive (semi‐)authoritarian regimes with an illiberal governing ideology. This has often been accompanied by a closing political space for civil society groups. Based on a survey of more than 400 Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovenian interest organizations, we explore, in the context of backsliding, the conditions under which organized interests shift their lobbying activities to alternative, i.e., EU or regional levels. Our statistical analyses indicate that it is rather exclusive policy‐making in general than a lack of individual group access to domestic policy networks that motivate organizations to engage in multilevel lobbying. However, it appears that organizational self‐empowerment and inter‐group cooperation are the "name of the game." Even under the adverse conditions of democratic backsliding, organizations that are accumulating expertise, professionalizing their operations, and cooperating with other organizations not only can sustain access to (illiberal) national governments but also branch out their operations to the European and regional levels.

When the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries joined the European Union, it was expected that membership of the Union would result in the stabilization of democratic institutions and democracy in the region. However, in recent years the quality of democracy in two CEE countries – Hungary and Poland – seems to be falling backwards. If we look at the process of Eurozone accession of the CEE region, we see that is precisely these countries, and indeed some others, that are opposing membership of the Economic and Monetary Union. Is it only by chance that challenging the basic EU principles of democracy and rule of law and staying away from the Eurozone seem to relate to the same countries? This question will be addressed in the chapter by looking at longitudinal data obtained from Freedom House, V-Dem and the Economist Intelligence Unit on the quality of democracy in the region from the perspective of Eurozone membership. Ultimately, the conclusions that are drawn might be relevant not only for social scientists but for decision-makers as well.

AbstractThis Research Note explores the issue of politicisation of the public service against the backdrop of the emergence of populism. A common feature of populist governments is a lack of trust in the civil service and its willingness to implement the populist political project. An important consequence of marginalising the civil service and its expertise in policy making is detrimental to policymaking. Also, increasing politicisation, that is replacing career public servants with people loyal to the populist regime, drains the public service of organisational memory on how to deal with policy issues. However, liberal democracies in many countries, too, have experienced increasing politicisation over the past decade, albeit within the confines of liberal democratic rules and norms. This emerging, more politicised model of the civil service assumes that neutrality can be an impediment to effective governance and that public servants should be committed to the program of the government. The civil service would be expected to support the government of the day actively and energetically, and therefore there would be fewer barriers. Thus, while politicisation in different forms is a feature of both liberal and populist government, the consequences of politicisation are different in the two regimes.Points for practitioners
In liberal democracies, the civil service offers expertise to support politicians in the policy‐making process. Populist governments, emphasizing loyalty to the regime more than expertise, tend to increase the number of political appointees in the public service.
Most of the populist leaders elected are political outsiders and do not want to be constrained by what they consider to be entrenched and self‐serving elites.
The most pressing dangers for liberal democracy are when populist governments consider policies that would change political and social rights.
Liberal democratic government, too, have increased political control of the public service although without altering the rules and norms of democratic governance.

AbstractPrevious research suggests that linkage to the West can have a strong democratizing influence on transitioning states. Yet, Western linkage and leverage lost much of their democratizing force by the early twenty‐first century. Turkey's political trajectory over the last decade furnishes a representative case study of the waning power of the West as an anchor for democratization in high‐linkage countries. Despite Turkey's robust ties to the West, competitive authoritarianism has been further entrenched and signs of a drift toward full‐fledged authoritarianism emerged since the failed coup of July 2016. We argue that in a context where the European Union and the United States' willingness to support democracy declined considerably the AKP's distancing from the West in foreign policy and balancing the Western powers with its new economic and political relations with autocratic regimes have served to stifle the democratizing pressure of Western linkage by lowering the cost of autocratic behavior for the AKP government and facilitating Turkey's illiberal turn.