Liberal Governmentality and Urban Culture: Governing Differences and Diversity in the Policies of Helsinki and Sydney
In: Nordisk kulturpolitisk tidskrift: The Nordic journal of cultural policy, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 77-93
ISSN: 2000-8325
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In: Nordisk kulturpolitisk tidskrift: The Nordic journal of cultural policy, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 77-93
ISSN: 2000-8325
In: Politica: tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 75-95
ISSN: 0105-0710
This paper is a tentative approach towards a comparative analysis of the revolutionary process in Chile and Nicaragua. History and structural differences between the Chilean and the Nicaraguan social formations are scrutinized. A reflection on the Marxist-leninist notion of revolution and the concept of democracy is axial in both cases studies
World Affairs Online
In: Bhatti , Y , Dahlgaard , J O , Hansen , J H , Hansen , K M & Olsen , M M 2016 , ' Fra valgstedet til indkøbscenteret : Danskernes stigende brug af brevstemmer ' , Politik , bind 19 , nr. 2 , s. 94-115 .
It is becoming increasingly popular among Danes to use early voting. The article describes the changes that have been made in the electoral law to accommodate the use of early voting and describes the historical development in the use of early voting. In addition, we show that there is considerable variation in the use of early voting at the municipal level, and that it is especially the citizens of the island municipalities, rich municipalities and metropolitan municipalities that use early voting. In the third part of the analysis, we examine individual differences in the use of early voting with the help of a data set with over two million Danish voters in the municipal elections in 2013. We show that early voting is primarily used by the oldest citizens and citizens with a nontechnical education – two groups that traditionally have turned out at high rates. Finally, we analyze the characteristics that can help to predict which citizens use early voting. ; It is becoming increasingly popular among Danes to use early voting. The article describes the changes that have been made in the electoral law to accommodate the use of early voting and describes the historical development in the use of early voting. In addition, we show that there is considerable variation in the use of early voting at the municipal level, and that it is especially the citizens of the island municipalities, rich municipalities and metropolitan municipalities that use early voting. In the third part of the analysis, we examine individual differences in the use of early voting with the help of a data set with over two million Danish voters in the municipal elections in 2013. We show that early voting is primarily used by the oldest citizens and citizens with a non-technical education – two groups that traditionally have turned out at high rates. Finally, we analyze the characteristics that can help to predict which citizens use early voting.
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The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.
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In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 80, Heft 1
ISSN: 1891-1757
I denne artikkelen undersøker vi om olje- og gassproduksjonen har negativ innvirkning på Norges klimaomdømme. Dette gjør vi ved å kartlegge meldinger som ble lagt ut på Twitter i forbindelse med det 26. klimatoppmøtet (COP 26) i Glasgow. For å sette Norges omdømme i perspektiv, sammenlikner vi Twitter-meldingene om Norge og Sverige. Studien viser at det er liten forskjell mellom meldingene som omhandler Norge og Sverige når det gjelder negative holdninger. Vi finner imidlertid to trekk som er av interesse for forståelsen av Norges omdømme. For det første er meldingene tematisk ulike: De dominerende temaene i meldingene som nevner Sverige handler om å fremme overgangen til grønn energi og klimaaktivisme, mens de dominerende temaene i meldingene om Norge i hovedsak handler om klimafinansiering og behovet for utfasing av produksjon av fossilt brensel. For det andre er de negative meldingene om Sverige av mer generell karakter, knyttet til kritikk av alle lands manglende omstilling, mens de negative meldingene om Norge er spesifikk, knyttet til olje- og gassproduksjon.
Abstract in English:Norway's Climate Reputation on TwitterIn this article we explore whether oil and gas industry negatively affects Norway's climate reputation by analyzing tweets posted during the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow. To make our findings more reliable, we compare tweets about Norway with tweets about Sweden. The results of our study reveal that there is no significant difference in negative sentiment between tweets about Norway compared with tweets about Sweden. However, we find that tweets about the two states differ thematically. While dominant topics in tweets mentioning Sweden are about promotion of the green transition and climate activism, tweets about Norway are mostly about climate financing and the need to phase out fossil fuel production. Furthermore, negative tweets about Sweden are of a more general nature, similar to criticism of all countries not meeting their climate goals, while negative tweets about Norway are specific and related to fossil fuel industry.
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 77, Heft 3, S. 278-287
ISSN: 1891-1757
Det er en pågående debatt i akademia om hvorvidt og hvordan man kan benytte avskrekkingsteori i cyberdomenet. Avskrekking var originalt en teori utviklet for å unngå konvensjonell eller nukleær krig. I diskusjonen om cybersikkerhet har det blitt påpekt en rekke tekniske problemer med å overføre en teori fra den fysiske verden til cyberdomenet. Vi anerkjenner disse tekniske utfordringene ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet, men i denne artikkelen ønsker vi å belyse et annet aspekt ved avskrekking, nemlig samspillet mellom sosiale og tekniske faktorer ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet. I denne artikkelen vil vi diskutere hvordan avskrekking som strategi i cyberdomenet vil påvirkes av den spesifikke strategiske kulturen i et land. For å belyse argumentet vil vi benytte Kina som en casestudie. Motsetninger mellom kinesisk og «vestlig» strategisk kultur resulterer i konkrete forskjeller i hvordan Kina og vestlige land agerer i cyberdomenet. Ved å benytte fire komponenter av avskrekkingsteori (nektelse, gjengjeldelse, gjensidig avhengighet og normer) ønsker vi å vise hvordan en dyptgående innsikt i en stats sikkerhetspolitikk og strategiske kultur kan anvendes til å skreddersy en mer effektiv avskrekkingsstrategi og styrke evnen til å forhindre uønsket aktivitet.
Abstract in English
There is an ongoing debate in academia about if and how deterrence theory may be used in cyberspace. Deterrence was originally a theory developed for avoiding conventional and nuclear war. In the current discussion on cyber security, there has been pointed out a range of technical problems of transferring a theory about the physical world to cyberspace. We recognize these challenges of deterrence in cyberspace, but in this article we want to shed light on a different aspect of deterrence. That is the interplay between social and technical factors of deterrence in cyberspace. In this article we will discuss how deterrence as a strategy in cyberspace is influenced by the specific strategic culture of a country. We will use China as a case study to showcase our argument. Contrasts between Chinese and "Western" strategic culture results in concrete differences in how Chinese and Western countries act in cyberspace. By utilizing four components of deterrence theory (denial, punishment, entanglement and norms), we will show how an in-depth knowledge of a state's security policy and strategic culture may be used to tailor a more effective deterrence and enforce the capacity of hindering unwanted activity.
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.
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