I want to argue today that direct democracy is undesirable and unconstitutional. I want to argue to you that the Supreme Court should find that the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative is unconstitutional, and strike it down. So I want to make two points. First, I am going to argue that direct democracy is undesirable. This is a normative argument; it's not an argument about constitutional doctrine. Second, I want to argue that direct democracy is unconstitutional, and make a series of different arguments as to why.
Public choice theory provides arguments to explain why protectionism is prevalent all over the world. In this paper it is argued that even when citizens have the possibility to decide on trade barriers in direct democracy, tariffs are maintained or even increased. This result is traced to the process of drafting the proposal, the individual decision to participate in the vote and the efforts to become informed properly about the alternatives put to the vote. As first an empirical investigation is made to test the theoretical hypotheses about protectionism in direct democracy by using data for referendums in Switzerland. ; Die ökonomische Theorie der Politik ermöglicht zu erklären, wie sich protektionistische Interessen im politischen Entscheidungsprozess einer reprasentativen Demokratie durchsetzen. Auch in einem System der direkten Demokratie, in dem die Bürger im Rahmen von Volksabstimmungen mitentscheiden können, kann die inländische Handelspolitik zugunsten von spezifischen Interessen beeinflusst werden. Möglichkeiten hierzu bestehen auf drei Ebenen des politischen Entscheidungsprozesses: im Vorbereitungsprozess der Gesetzes- bzw. Abstimmungsvorlage; bei der individuellen Entscheidung, sich an der Abstimmung zu beteiligen; und bei der Entscheidung der Abstimmenden, sich fur oder gegen die Vorlage auszusprechen. Die Bestimmungsgründe, die in der direkten Demokratie zu zunehmender Protektion und der Wahl spezifischer protektionistischer Instrumente fiihren, werden diskutiert und erstmals anhand von Referenden in der Schweiz empirisch überprüft.
In general, mechanisms of direct democracy in Japan are not well established. At the national level, the National Referendum Law for the Change of the Constitution only recently came into effect on 18 May 2010, three years after its enactment. Before then there were no procedures laid out for a referendum on a constitutional amendment. At the local level, there are more options for direct citizen participation, however the result of a vote is not legally binding. This working paper aims to describe the different mechanisms of direct democracy in Japan, at the national as well as local level, to present their legal basis and frequency of use and to discuss developments since the late 1990s primarily at the local level.
Do citizens legislate different tax policies than parliaments? We provide quasi-experimental evidence for causal effects of direct democracy. Town meetings (popular assemblies) replace local councils in small German municipalities below a specific population threshold. Difference-in-differences, RD and event study estimates consistently show that direct democracy comes with sizable but selective tax cuts. Property tax rates, which apply to all residents, decrease by some 10 to 15% under direct democracy. We do not find that business tax rates change. Direct democracy allows citizens to design tax policies more individually than voting for a high-tax or low-tax party in elections.
This paper investigates on the demographic, economic, political and cultural determinants of direct democracy in 87 countries using an index of direct democracy. The test is interesting since there are important variations across these countries in the referendum and initiative use. We apply a number of estimation techniques. We find that per capita income, education and a larger share of Catholic population are positive determinants, whereas ethnic fractionalization is depending on the estimation technique. Political rights and stability also work as prerequisites to direct democracy. Direct democracy seems independent from the institutional structure.
The purpose of the Guidebook to Direct Democracy is to offer scholars and practitioners a reference book which accurately defines the concept of direct democracy as well as its main tools. knowing how direct democracy procedures work helps the reader to understand how to analyze their relationship to representative government.
This paper discusses several problems of direct popular decisions. In the first part, we consider problems related to the functioning of direct democracy. As a political system it only makes sense if there exists a continuous process and not if only occasional single questions are brought to a referendum. Then, the relation between direct democracy and the rule of unanimity is discussed, a subject of special relevance to the European Union, before we consider the role of quorums. In the second part, some areas are considered in which conflicts might arise. Results of initiatives might be incompatible with individual human rights or might endanger fiscal sustainability, and referenda might impede economic reforms. All these problems, however, do not justify a general rejection of direct popular rights. Thus, we conclude by listing several points that should be observed to safeguard the well-functioning of direct democracy.
This paper discusses several problems of direct popular decisions. In the first part, we consid- er problems related to the functioning of direct democracy. As a political system it only makes sense if there exists a continuous process and not if only occasional single questions are brought to a referendum. Then, the relation between direct democracy and the rule of unanim- ity is discussed, a subject of special relevance to the European Union, before we consider the role of quorums. In the second part, some areas are considered in which conflicts might arise. Results of initiatives might be incompatible with individual human rights or might endanger fiscal sustainability, and referenda might impede economic reforms. All these problems, how- ever, do not justify a general re jection of direct popular rights . Thus, we conclude by listing several points that should be observed to safeguard the well-functioning of direct democracy.
Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct de m ocracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second part, we demonstrate that reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights. This is not only the case because people value political outcomes higher but they derive utility from the politcal process itself.
Direct democracy, an addition to representative democracy allowing citizens to directly vote on substantive issues parliaments usually vote on, has an intuitive appeal in appearing to be the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself. Increased institutionalization and usage of direct democracy has heightened interest in the topic in political science. In the three papers which make up this dissertation I explore different aspects of the political effects of direct democracy with an aim to provide insights how it affects citizens' representation as well as their behavior and attitudes. In a first paper I test the claim that referendums are unrepresentative because turnout in referendums is usually lower than in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status. The analysis is made possible by a unique feature of Swiss post-referendum surveys which also asked non-voters about their opinion on the referendum's subject. Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes we show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time. On balance we find more representative than unrepresentative outcomes implying that direct democracy, at least in Switzerland, seems to improve representation. In a second paper I focus on citizens' attitudes towards and actual participation in referendums. Using data from the European Social Survey I find that voting, other forms of political activity and political interest are positively associated with support for direct democracy. Analyzing post-referendum surveys I find the same pattern to hold for actual participation in referendums. Hence, direct democracy, despite its widespread popularity, appears insuff� cient to bring the politically disengaged back into democratic politics. In a third and final paper, I investigate whether direct democracy increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy. After all, they give citizens participatory opportunities and promise to offer them more control over policy. Combining aggregate data on satisfaction with democracy from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2013 with data on all national referendums in the same period, I find no evidence for an (average) effect of referendums on democratic satisfaction. While an analysis of individual time-series suggests that referendums may have an effect under certain circumstances, significant positive estimates obtain for two countries, my empirical investigation of possible mechanisms remains inconclusive.
Since Slovakia's transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and the rule of law in 1992, the Slovak people are empowered to participate in the decision-making of the state by means of the popular initiative and the referendum. Although seven referendums have been held in the Slovak Republic so far, only one was considered valid. This paper aims to illustrate the reasons for this scarce success of popular votes and gives a brief insight into the significance of direct democracy in the Slovak Republic. To this purpose, it will set out the instruments of direct democracy provided in Slovakia and the experiences made therewith.
Uchwalenie Konstytucji Federalnej w 1848 roku było istotne dla kształtowania systemu politycznego Szwajcarii. Aktualna Konstytucja Federalna Konfederacji Szwajcarskiej została uchwalona w 1999 roku. Obecnie system tego kraju można określić mianem parlamentarno-komitetowego (system konwentu). Ze względu jednak na jego specyfikę, objawiającą się w głównie w dużej roli kantonów, określany jest także jako parlamentarno-kantonalny. Istotnym elementem systemu jest duża niezależność i samodzielność kantonów, a także gmin. Elementem determinującym kształt partii politycznych i podział socjopolityczny Szwajcarii jest przede wszystkim jej wielokulturowość. Zasadniczymi instrumentami demokratycznymi w tym państwie są: referendum, inicjatywa ludowa, zgromadzenie ludowe. Dysfunkcjonalne elementy szwajcarskiej demokracji bezpośredniej blokują efektywność procesu decyzyjnego w tym systemie politycznym. ; An important element shaping the political system of Switzerland was adopting the Federal Constitution in 1848. The current Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation was adopted in 1999. The current political system of this country can be referred to as directorial; however, because this specific system manifests itself mainly through the significant role of the cantons, it is also referred to as a 'parliamentary-cantonal' system. An important element of the system is the large degree of independence and self-reliance of the cantons and the communes. What determines the shape of the political parties and the socio-political division of Switzerland is the multiculturalism of the country. The fundamental democratic instruments in the country comprise: referenda; popular initiatives and popular assemblies. Dysfunctional qualities hinder the system, and even constitute a barrier for the effectiveness of the process of decision-making.
A variety of direct democratic instruments allow "policy-making at the ballot box" (Gerber, 1999, p. 3), with the citizens having the last word on policy adoption and change. Criteria for the classification of direct democracy devices include who initiates a popular vote, who has control over the content of the proposal, whether it addresses statutory or constitutional law, or whether the result is binding or not. Interest groups use two main direct democracy instruments to influence policy-making: the initiative to put a new policy issue on the political agenda and the referendum to veto a policy adopted by the legislature. This chapter scrutinizes the effects of these tools on the policy process, on policy outputs, and on interest group populations. It shows that citizen groups benefit more than business groups from the initiative and referendum.
Tobacco control advocates began to use ballot initiatives to enact tobacco control policies in the late 1970s. In response, the tobacco industry worked for over two decades to change laws governing initiative and referendum processes to prevent passage of tobacco control measures. In 1981, the tobacco industry's political lobbying arm, the Tobacco Institute, created a front group that presented itself as a neutral initiative research clearinghouse to affect changes in state initiative and referenda laws. In 1990, the Tobacco Institute began creating an in-house team, and worked with third party groups to try to change state initiative laws. While the industry ultimately abandoned both efforts when neither achieved immediate success, over time, the industry's goals have penetrated legitimate discourse on the I&R process in the United States and many specific ideas it advocated have garnered mainstream support. Direct democracy advocates, as well as public health advocates and policymakers, need to understand the tobacco industry's goals (which other industries adopted) of limiting the direct democracy process in order to ensure that any changes do not inadvertently increase the power of the special interests that direct democracy was developed to counterbalance.
In the structure of Brazilian Government, regarding both the executive as well as the executive powers, the increase in ways in which society can participate in decisions of public interest, stands out. Among the shared or participatory managerial policies implemented in Brazil, the following are noteworthy: the participatory budget, managerial councils, committees dealing with watersheds, thematic conferences, plebiscites, public meetings and referenda. However, if compared to the size of Brazil's territory and population, the experiences of participatory management are rare and have developed mainly in the southern and southeastern regions of the country. In most Brazilian municipalities, politics by patronage, authoritarian and populist, is the rule, linked to changes in the parties and to the electoral mandate (four years).
