Suchergebnisse

Considering the year of 1933 as the beginning of the Portuguese Salazar regimen, the repressive and oppressive "Estado Novo" (New State) by the Portuguese Republic Constitution, there is a main research element: the fundamental rights recognized (art. 8º). This paper aims to study and debate the Salazar Rights Discourse, that in a first stage had been supported by the Catholic Church that in a funambulism strategy, changed fascist political, economic and social discourse to a speech adjusted to the scope of the state and governance aims. In a comparative context, it ́s our objective study the Brazilian Constitution from 1934 that instituted the Getúlio Vargas Dictatorship. It ́s curious, or simply a strategic coincidence, the fascist dictatorship, institutionalized as "Estado Novo" (New State), as it was in Portugal. In 1974 with the "Carnation" Revolution and the political regimen change to a Democracy, legally started with the Portuguese Republic Constitution in 1976, recognizing the Human Rights (Universal Declaration from 1948) and the Fundamental ones, but the political and social Discourse of Human Rights was object of intervention, but it was need several years to the effective recognizing of the Fundamental and Human Rights to the Portuguese citizens. Although the Portugal entrance to Economic European Community (today European Union), it ́s important to study the historical "line", and the actuality of the Discourses and Human Rights by the violations and the need of intervention, as well as the education for the promotion of a juridical and judicial system able to protect the victims of all violations, and to p revent the abuses. Concerning the Brazil context, with the popular movements, the "Diretas Já" (Direct now), the power was given to the military and civil, during the Second Re-democratization. It was only with the Constitution of 1988 was guaranteed and increased the social rights, the delimited indigenous land was guaranteed, the unique system of health as the oldest and rural reforms, as it was the end of the censorship to the art and the public information. Globally, this article aims to study the main points of the approaches and the distances of these states that are identified as "brothers".

Este artículo investiga qué tipo de cambios institucionales tienen un mayor impacto en el crecimiento económico de largo plazo: las reformas de carácter tecnocrático orientadas a la economía o la democratización. Con este objetivo, para el caso de España, examinamos el Plan de Estabilización de 1959 y la Transición a la democracia (en torno a 1979) como fuentes de variación para las 50 provincias españolas en el período 1950-2016. Nuestro enfoque consiste en estudiar los impactos mediante la estimación de los escenarios contrafactuales utilizando el método de control sintético. Nuestros resultados muestran que las dos estrategias tienen un impacto positivo sobre el crecimiento económico subnacional. Una comparación directa entre ambas apunta a que el efecto del Plan de Estabilización pudo ser cuatro veces mayor que el de la Transición. El efecto medio del Plan sobre el crecimiento es aproximadamente un 40 % mayor que en el escenario contrafactual y parece ser permanente. Los efectos estimados se mantienen frente a diferentes pruebas de placebo y otros contrastes adicionales de robustez. En cuanto al análisis de las medidas específicas del Plan de 1959, parece que las políticas de carácter interno generaron un impacto más positivo y de mayor alcance que las externas, dependientes del acceso al FMI. ; We examine the contribution of economic and institutional transitions as two potential sources of subnational economic growth in Spain. To this end, we exploit the economic reforms of the 1959 Stabilization Plan (as an example of technocratic, economy-oriented reform) and the democratic transition in 1979 in Spain as the sources of variation for a sample of 50 Spanish provinces in the period 1950-2016. Our approach is to examine the impacts by estimating the missing counterfactual scenarios using the synthetic control method. Our results unveil a positive effect for both economic and institutional transitions on subnational economic growth. A direct comparison of both transitions suggests that the effect of economic liberalization is four-fold higher than the effect of political liberalization. The average growth effect of the economic liberalization is around 40% higher relative to the counterfactual scenario and it appears to be permanent. The estimated effects are robust to the variety of placebo tests and additional robustness checks. This article also deepens the analysis of the effects of the 1959 plan and finds that the policies that generated the most positive impact were those of an "internal" nature, compared to the external ones, dependent on access to the IMF (also positive, but of lesser impact).

This article compares patterns of participatory behavior in politics among immigrants and ethnic minorities in the United States. Differences in rates of participation in a range of political activities from system-directed acts, such as voting and contacting officials, to more direct forms of participation, such as protesting, are analyzed for Whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans, as well as by generation of immigration within groups. The extent to which standard socioeconomic status models of participatory behavior explain variation in political activity across ethnic and racial groups is assessed. In so doing, the article challenges the normative interpretation of the results from these standard models that more participation among minorities and new entrants to the United States is desirable.

In defiance of accounts which see the European Union (EU) as structurally incompatible with democracy, the Lisbon Treaty set out the general right and specific means for citizens to participate in EU decision-making. Whilst the Treaty codified long-established practices of representative democracy and of dialogue with civil society organizations, it also notably introduced a new measure, the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI), commencing in 2012. The ECI has limited formal powers, with no ability to mandate political institutions. It is promoted by the European Commission as an agenda-setting and participatory democracy measure, rather than one of direct democracy. Nonetheless, it has an elevated status within one of the current European Commission's ten strategic priorities and is remarkable in a number of ways. First, it differs from the European Commission's established partnerships and dialogue with organized interests by focusing on direct forms of wider citizen participation. Second, it is the world's first transnational citizens' initiative, with aspirations to help build an EU-wide public sphere. These aspirations were assessed in a 2017 review of the measure, proposing the introduction of a number of reforms aimed at tackling limited impact to date. This article evaluates the impact of the ECI in its first 5 years and then discusses the proposed reforms in terms of their potential to increase public deliberation. It develops and appraises evaluative criteria that help to assess whether institutionalizing contention, even in ways highly critical of EU institutions, might enhance public deliberation and bring the EU closer to its citizens.

When the commitment to liberal rights conflicts with the commitment to democratic procedures, which side ought to prevail? Whereas rights foundationalists hold that rights trump procedures and democratic positivists hold that procedures trump rights, theorists of co-originality affirm both rights and procedures as coeval, equally valid commitments within a liberal democracy. But the notion of co-originality itself can be interpreted in two different ways: either in a rationalist form (as the idea that rights and procedures can be reconciled, so that those rights which limit democratic majorities are understood as being required by the very meaning of democracy itself) or in a paradoxicalist form (as the idea that rights and procedures do inescapably conflict, with neither side having primacy, but such conflicts are understood as conducive to salutary democratic goods like diversity and ongoing activism). Taking Corey Brettschneider and Chantal Mouffe as key exponents of the rationalist and paradoxicalist forms of co-originality, respectively, this article examines how these two renderings of co-originality ought to be understood in relation to each other. After elaborating the implicit critique each account makes of the other, my ultimate point is that one should understand Brettschneider and Mouffe's alternate forms of co-originality as themselves being co-original. On the one hand, I demonstrate how Brettschneider's rationalism and Mouffe's paradoxicalism remain in permanent tension, with each side opposed to – yet nonetheless unable to dispense with – the other. On the other hand, I show how their two divergent notions of co-originality, when viewed not in abstract terms as rival political epistemologies but as practical guides for how actual citizens ought to operate within liberal democracies, can work in tandem with each other without necessarily involving direct conflict.

Indonesia's democracy system was built on the basis and the strength of Pancasila, which did not favor the excessive desires of individual negotiations (liberalism) neither absolute state domination, non-liberalism, namely direct and indirect democracy that was once practiced. Those forms have their own weaknesses, but this paper will only highlight the positive side of the open democratic system, sincerely the democratic system of this nation is Pancasila democracy which refers to those two major forces of democracy. The implementation of Pancasila's democracy in the Legislative Election can be shown in Law Number 7 of 2017 on the General Elections 2019 in Indonesia. The history of the implementation of elections in Indonesia revealed a variety of dynamics indicated by several changes in the constitutional law which were used as the basis for the implementation of elections. The publication of the Election Law is the elaboration of the provisions of Article 22E of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. This means that the principles of democracy contained within 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, must become the main foundations in designing norms in Law Number 7 of 2017 on the General Elections 2019, as happened, it turns out that the parliamentary threshold regulation within the Constitutional Law are ineffective in implementing this democracy.

Over recent decades, many countries have gained experience with referendums, citizens' forums, citizens' juries, collaborative governance, participatory budgeting, and other models in which citizens have a more direct say. Citizen participation is usually considered a valuable element of democratic citizenship and democratic decision-making. Many theorists claim that citizen participation has positive effects on the quality of democracy. This article examines the probability of these claims for a large number of cases in different Western countries. Four types of democratic innovation are distinguished and evaluated according to the extent to which they realize positive effects on democracy. The findings show that citizen involvement has a number of positive effects on democracy: it increases issue knowledge, civic skills, and public engagement, and it contributes to the support for decisions among the participants. The analysis also makes it clear that the contribution of participation to democracy differs according to type of democratic innovations; deliberative forums and surveys appear to be better at promoting the exchange of arguments, whereas referendums and participatory policy making projects are better at giving citizens influence on policy making and involving more people. But, as I try to argue, since these positive effects are perceptible only to those taking part and the number of participants is often small or particular groups are underrepresented, the benefits to individual democratic citizenship are far more conclusive than the benefits to democracy as a whole. Points for practitioners This article distinguishes four types of democratic innovation and, for each type, examines the effects of citizen participation on the quality of democracy. It offers a systematic analysis of the contribution of participation to elements of democracy, such as influence on decision-making, inclusion, skills and virtues, deliberation, and legitimacy. The analysis points to a number of positive effects on democracy, but the findings also show that the contribution of participation to democracy differs according to the type of democratic innovations.

AbstractThe 1990s in Brazil were a time of institutional advances in the areas of housing and urban rights following the signing of the new constitution in 1988 that incorporated the principles of the social function of cities and property, recognition of the right to ownership of informal urban squatters and the direct participation of citizens in urban policy decision processes. These propositions are the pillars of the urban reform agenda which, since the creation of the Ministry of Cities by the Lula government, has come under the federal executive branch. This article evaluates the limitations and opportunities involved in implementing this agenda on the basis of two policies proposed by the ministry — the National Cities Council and the campaign for Participatory Master Plans — focusing the analysis on government organization in the area of urban development in its relationship with the political system and the characteristics of Brazilian democracy.Résumé Au Brésil, les années 1990 ont été marquées par des progrès institutionnels en matière de logement et de droits urbains, dans le sillage de la Constitution de 1988 qui intègre les principes d'une fonction sociale de la ville et de la propriété urbaine, ainsi que la reconnaissance du droit à la propriété pour les squatters urbains et la participation directe des citoyens aux processus d'élaboration des politiques urbaines. Ce sont également les piliers du programme de réforme urbaine qui relève de l'exécutif fédéral depuis la création d'un ministère des Villes par le gouvernement Lula. Pour évaluer les limites et potentiels liés à la mise en place de ce programme, cet article s'appuie sur deux politiques publiques proposées par le ministère, le Conseil national des villes et la campagne en faveur des Plans directeurs participatifs, en analysant plus particulièrement l'organisation gouvernementale en matière d'urbanisme par rapport au système politique et aux caractéristiques de la démocratie brésilienne.

Explores how democratic government should work; policy-based explanations, expectations, and results, what people believe the two major political paries espouse, and consequences of dissatisfaction.

Recent research finds an association between nonviolent protests and democratic transitions. However, existing scholarship either does not specify the pathways through which nonviolent protests bring about democratization or conduct systematic empirical analyses demonstrating that the specified pathways are operative. This article proposes four pathways through which nonviolent anti-regime protests encourage democratic transitions, emphasizing their ability to directly conquer or indirectly coerce such transitions. Most simply, they can conquer democratic reforms by directly overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democracies. They can also coerce democratic reforms through three additional pathways. Nonviolent anti-regime protests can coerce incumbent elites into democratic reforms by threatening the survival of authoritarian regimes. They also increase the likelihood of elite splits, which promote negotiated democratic reforms. Finally, they encourage leadership change within the existing authoritarian regime. Following leadership change, nonviolent movements remain mobilized and are able to coerce democratic concessions from the regime's new leaders. Our within-regime analyses provide robust empirical support for each pathway. We show that nonviolent anti-regime protests conquer democratic reforms by ousting autocratic regimes and replacing them with democracies. Nonviolent anti-regime protests also coerce elites into democratic reforms by threatening regime and leader survival. These findings highlight the importance of protest goals and tactics and also that nonviolent anti-regime protests have both direct and indirect effects on democratization.

We attempt to integrate the literatures on authoritarian regime types and democratic forms of government. We propose a theoretical framework of five dimensions of executive appointment and dismissal that can be applied in both more democratic and more authoritarian regimes: the hereditary, military, ruling party, direct election, and confidence dimensions, respectively. Relying on the Varieties of Democracy data, we provide measures of these five dimensions for 3,937 individual heads of state and 2,874 heads of government from 192 countries across the globe from 1789 to the present. After presenting descriptive evidence of their prevalence, variation, and relationship to extant regime typologies, a set of exploratory probes gauge the extent to which the five dimensions can predict levels of repression, corruption, and executive survival, controlling for aspects of democracy. This leads to generation of a set of original hypotheses that we hope can serve as building blocks for explanatory theory. We conclude by discussing some limitations of these novel data.

We attempt to integrate the literatures on authoritarian regime types and democratic forms of government. We propose a theoretical framework of five dimensions of executive appointment and dismissal that can be applied in both more democratic and more authoritarian regimes: the hereditary, military, ruling party, direct election, and confidence dimensions, respectively. Relying on the Varieties of Democracy data, we provide measures of these five dimensions for 3,937 individual heads of state and 2,874 heads of government from 192 countries across the globe from 1789 to the present. After presenting descriptive evidence of their prevalence, variation, and relationship to extant regime typologies, a set of exploratory probes gauge the extent to which the five dimensions can predict levels of repression, corruption, and executive survival, controlling for aspects of democracy. This leads to generation of a set of original hypotheses that we hope can serve as building blocks for explanatory theory. We conclude by discussing some limitations of these novel data.

Presents contributions to a conference discussion, the "End of Politics," in the Federal Republic of Germany organized by the Research Group on New Social Movements. Gerd Mielke reviews post-German reunification political developments, highlighting the opportunities offered by cooperation between Social Democrats & Greens on social justice, economic, & environmental issues. Gerd Habermann considers political reform in the context of economic globalization & in relation to the Swiss political system, advocating increased direct democracy. Jupp Legrand argues that the thesis of political stagnation is largely false, but agrees with the proposition that politics must be strengthened relative to the market, which lacks international responsibility & a vision of the future, to ensure wise planning. Sabine Seeliger discusses possibilities for subpolitical & subeconomic action & questions the legitimacy of current transnational political & economic decisionmakers. Thomas Leif examines intransigence regarding political reform & suggests paths to increased political innovation, including media education & developing new political-process control systems. Florian Langenscheidt calls for increased political risk taking, openness to technology, & educational reform to improve German economic competitiveness. E. Blackwell