A theory of direct legislation
In: Law and society
In: Law and society
Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings
Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings.
In: Bulletin Nr 1. Information Department, Socialist Party of America
In: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy publication
World Affairs Online
In: Routledge Revivals
Part, Part I: The Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: The Law of FDI -- chapter 1 Introduction -- chapter 2 FDI Theories and the Role of the State -- chapter 3 The Current Regulatory Framework for FDI -- chapter 4 Methodology -- part, Part II: Strategies for a Global Investment Agreement: The Key Players -- chapter 5 The OECD Countries and the OECD Agenda -- chapter 6 Developing Countries -- chapter 7 Consumer, Labour, Environmental and Business Groups -- chapter 8 International Organisations -- part, Part III: Evaluation: Towards Regulated Openness -- chapter 9 Evaluation of the Strategies -- chapter 10 Regulated Openness -- chapter 11 Conclusion.
In: Discussion paper 13-038
In: Public finance and corporate taxation
This paper exploits the introduction of the right of referenda at the local level in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. In the first part of the paper, we establish the relationship between referenda activity and fiscal performance by using a new dataset containing information on all 2500 voter initiatives between 1995 to 2011. This selection on observables approach, however, suffers from obvious endogeneity problems in this application. The main part of the paper exploits population dependent discontinuities in the signature and quorum requirements of referenda to implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD). To safeguard against co-treatments that might affect fiscal outcomes simultaneously at the same thresholds, we validate our results by extending the RDD approach to a difference-in-discontinuity (DiD) design. By studying direct legislation in an archetypical cooperative federation as Germany, our paper extends the literature to a novel institutional setting. The results indicate that in our setting - and in contrast to most of the evidence from Switzerland and the US.