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Disasters that produce an overwhelming number of casualties demand that healthcare resources be rationed. Given the gravity of these decisions, it is imperative that they be guided by acceptable principles of distributive justice. Utilitarianism governs current disaster triage protocols because the efficient use of resources prevents the greatest amount of disability and mortality in the population. However, this conflicts with maximin egalitarianism, which demands that the most severely injured patients be prioritized even if it is not an efficient use of resources. Utilitarian triage also conflicts with the egalitarian principle of equal chances, which states that all people should be given an opportunity to be given treatment since all persons value their lives equally. Utilitarianism protects the needs of the entire population, and so demands that an individual patient's right to autonomy and a fiduciary relationship with their physician must be sacrificed. Like other policies in a democratic society, the legitimacy of disaster triage protocols comes from support by the majority. For this reason, choosing the values that guide disaster triage requires open and transparent communal disaster planning that reflects the values of all members of society. Rather than prioritizing one principle over another, it is likely that the most just approach to allocating resources in disaster triage may be to apply a mixture of distributive justice principles.

Today's discourse on struggling rural communities insists they are "dying" or "forgotten." Many point to globalization and automation as the culprits that made livelihoods in agriculture, natural resource extraction, and manufacturing obsolete, fueling social problems such as the opioid crisis. This narrative fails to offer a path forward; the status quo is no one's fault, and this "natural" rural death inspires mourning rather than resuscitation. This Article offers a more illuminating account of the rural story, told through the lens of distributive justice principles. The Article argues that rural communities have not just "died." They were sacrificed. Specifically, distributive justice theories question the morality of public measures that disadvantage discrete groups in the name of aggregate welfare. A critique of legal frameworks shaping rural livelihoods for the past several decades shows that policymakers consistently decided to trade rural welfare for some perceived societal benefit, violating distributive justice norms. In agriculture, policies favoring consolidated agribusiness hollowed out once-multidimensional farm communities. In the extractive sector, lackluster oversight enabled the environmental and economic devastation of fossil fuel communities. In manufacturing, trade adjustment programs' inadequate mitigation of international competition facilitated whole towns' dismantlement. Decisionmakers pointed to "the greater good" as their rationale. But benefits for rural communities that would offset these burdens and render their sacrifice "just" prove elusive. This alternate narrative reveals the rural story as not morally neutral, but one infused with value judgments that determined winners and losers, raising questions of what a fairer allocation of benefits and burdens should be.

The challenge of contemporary health care distribution is to structure a framework for normative decision making whereby the goal of distributive justice is achieved equitably for as many citizens as possible. Establishing fair procedures for the distribution of health care resources is a crucial goal for contemporary society to set and, hopefully, to achieve. It is only by and through deliberate debate within a democracy that assumptions, for example, about aging, the value of life for the aged and intergenerational responsibilities of assisting them in their care can be set, tested or - as the case may be - rejected. No matter within what policy forum this debate occurs - local, state, or national - a fundamental balancing test will, of necessity, be employed; one that weighs, in an equitable and reasonable manner, individual needs with larger societal standards of economic efficiency. By seeking to integrate moral and ethical reasoning with quantitative or economic formulations of needs and resources, the opportunities for a stronger and more contemporary standard of distributive justice will be both enhanced and stabilized. The ultimate moral issue seen in this debate is not - rather surprisingly - whether too much or too little treatment is offered; but rather how to seek an optimum level of reasonable or appropriate treatment based on the medical condition of each patient. Failing to meet resolutely the inherent difficulty of allocative decisions here foredooms the total decisionmaking process to a continued state of lethargy where inaction becomes the tragic hallmark of the distribution of health care for the elderly.

ABSTRACT: How should the aid financial burden be distributed across donor governments? This article discusses the "distributive justice" of the current aid-financing pattern, and advocates a progressive modality in which citizens from donor countries with higher living standards contribute proportionally more than citizens from countries with lower living standards. For this purpose, we conceive public foreign aid as a tax mechanism for redistributing income on a worldwide scale. The progressivity analysis for 45 bilateral donors (28 DAC countries and 17 non-DAC donors) using concentration curves and Suits indexes between 2000 and 2012 shows that the current distribution of the aid burden is insufficiently progressive (mainly due to the limited contributions of the richer donors). Finally, we argue that a progressive exaction scheme will improve the distributive justice of the aid system.

This chapter introduces the idea of distributive justice. It identifies several different views of what characterizes distributive justice, as opposed to other types of justice and to non-justice-based moral demands. The preconditions of distributive justice, its primary subject and its object, and its normative significance are discussed. The chapter then suggests that bringing the diversity of usages of the concept of distributive justice into view helps cast light on some of the many contemporary debates about distributive justice and its limits. This chapter also introduces and outlines the different topics covered by the different sections and chapters of the book. ; This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme (Grant Agreement Number: 648610).

Over the past decades, transport researchers and policymakers have devoted increasing attention to questions about justice and equity. Nonetheless, there is still little engagement with theories in political philosophy to frame what justice means in the context of transport policies. This paper reviews key theories of justice (utilitarianism, libertarianism, intuitionism, Rawls' egalitarianism, and Capability Approaches), and critically evaluates the insights they generate when applied to transport. Based on a dialogue between Rawlsian and Capability Approaches, we propose that distributive justice concerns over transport disadvantage and social exclusion should focus primarily on accessibility as a human capability. This means that, in policy evaluation, a detailed analysis of distributional effects of transport policies should consider minimum standards of accessibility to key destinations and the extent of which these policies respect individuals' rights and prioritize disadvantaged groups, reduce inequalities of opportunities and mitigate transport externalities. A full account of justice in transportation requires a more complete understanding of accessibility than traditional approaches have been able to deliver to date.

Tax reform is coming, and it will be an important part of any plan to avert national fiscal disaster. The President's Fiscal Commission recently presented a proposal for comprehensive tax reform that will form the basis for serious legislative discussion. At the center of that proposal is elimination of "tax expenditures," which are provisions in the tax law that operate like direct government spending. They include the charitable deduction, the home mortgage interest deduction, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, the child credit, the earned income credit, education credits and deductions, the tax preference for retirement savings accounts like IRAs and 401(k) plans, and dozens of others. This article argues that elimination of tax expenditures is a flawed approach to tax reform. Tax expenditures are not an undifferentiated mass, but reflect a wide variety of federal policies, each of which requires independent evaluation. Before policymakers can decide whether to abolish tax expenditures, they need to know a lot more than the tax expenditure budgets currently reveal about what tax expenditures do, who benefits from them, and how much revenue could be raised by their repeal. They also need to decisively identify which provisions are tax expenditures, a perennial source of disagreement. This article argues that proposals to repeal tax expenditures reflect a normative preference for efficiency over equity, the traditional twin goals of tax policy, squandering the tax law's unique role in economic justice.

principles, by which the distribution of goods is judged fair or unfair, areincompatible or complementary. The European Values Survey carried out in1999 shows clearly the priorities of the Europeans on this matter. The firstone concerns the guarantee that 'basic needs are met for all', then comes'recognizing people on their merits', and finally 'eliminating big inequalities inincome'. The consensus on this hierarchy is not altered by national, demographical,social, economical, ideological or political divisions. These differentdivisions do indeed influence opinions on distributive justice, but, with veryfew exceptions, they are not sufficient to upset this order of priorities. Thus,the usual criteria of distributive justice do not define competing spheres. ; De nombreuses études sur la justice distributive montrent que les individus jugent que des biens sont répartis de manière juste ou injuste principalement à partir de trois critères: la garantie des besoins de base pour tous, la reconnaissance des mérites de chacun et la réduction des inégalités (notamment de revenus). Un des problèmes importants qui en résulte consiste à savoir si ces critères sont incompatiblesou si, au contraire, ils sont complémentaires et peuvent être combinés. Or, de cela, la théorie ne peut décider seule; il est au contraire nécessaire de s'enquérir ce qu'en pensent les citoyens eux-mêmes.De ce point de vue, l'Enquête européenne sur les valeurs, effectuée en 1999, fait clairement apparaître les priorités des Européens en matière de justice distributive. La première d'entre elles est sans conteste la garantie des besoins de base pour tous; ensuite, mais seulement en deuxième position, la reconnaissance des mérites de chacun; et enfin, en dernier lieu, l'élimination des grandes inégalités de revenus. Qui plus est, le consensus sur cette hiérarchie n'est pas sensible aux clivages nationaux, démographiques, sociaux, économiques, idéologiques ou politiques. Si ces différents clivages influencent incontestablement les opinions en matière de justice distributive, ils ne suffisent pas, à de rares exceptions près, à bouleverser cet ordre des priorités. Les critères usuels de justice distributive ne définissent donc pas des sphères hétérogènes, incompatibles ou concurrentes.

principles, by which the distribution of goods is judged fair or unfair, areincompatible or complementary. The European Values Survey carried out in1999 shows clearly the priorities of the Europeans on this matter. The firstone concerns the guarantee that 'basic needs are met for all', then comes'recognizing people on their merits', and finally 'eliminating big inequalities inincome'. The consensus on this hierarchy is not altered by national, demographical,social, economical, ideological or political divisions. These differentdivisions do indeed influence opinions on distributive justice, but, with veryfew exceptions, they are not sufficient to upset this order of priorities. Thus,the usual criteria of distributive justice do not define competing spheres. ; De nombreuses études sur la justice distributive montrent que les individus jugent que des biens sont répartis de manière juste ou injuste principalement à partir de trois critères: la garantie des besoins de base pour tous, la reconnaissance des mérites de chacun et la réduction des inégalités (notamment de revenus). Un des problèmes importants qui en résulte consiste à savoir si ces critères sont incompatiblesou si, au contraire, ils sont complémentaires et peuvent être combinés. Or, de cela, la théorie ne peut décider seule; il est au contraire nécessaire de s'enquérir ce qu'en pensent les citoyens eux-mêmes.De ce point de vue, l'Enquête européenne sur les valeurs, effectuée en 1999, fait clairement apparaître les priorités des Européens en matière de justice distributive. La première d'entre elles est sans conteste la garantie des besoins de base pour tous; ensuite, mais seulement en deuxième position, la reconnaissance des mérites de chacun; et enfin, en dernier lieu, l'élimination des grandes inégalités de revenus. Qui plus est, le consensus sur cette hiérarchie n'est pas sensible aux clivages nationaux, démographiques, sociaux, économiques, idéologiques ou politiques. Si ces différents clivages influencent incontestablement les opinions en matière de ...

Wong Fan. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-106). ; Abstracts in English and Chinese. ; Abstracts --- p.i ; Preface --- p.iii ; Acknowledgements --- p.viii ; Chapter 1. --- Walzer's Theory of Distributive Justice --- p.1 ; Walzer's philosophical Approach --- p.1 ; Distribution and Social Meanings of Goods --- p.2 ; "Monopoly, Domination, and Complex Equality" --- p.9 ; Relativist Theory of Justice and Democratic Socialism --- p.19 ; Chapter 2. --- On Equality --- p.23 ; Arneson on Walzer's Criticism of Simple Equality --- p.23 ; "Cohen's ""Voluntary Equality"" 一 A Defense Of Literal Equality" --- p.26 ; Arneson's Criticism on Walzer's Complex Equality --- p.33 ; Further Problems on Walzer's Complex Equality --- p.41 ; Chapter 3. --- Social Meanings of Goods --- p.45 ; Is Walzer's Theory Unnecessarily Restrictive? --- p.45 ; Social Meanings of Goods and Moral Considerations --- p.51 ; The Conflicting Social Meanings of A Good --- p.54 ; Other Problems --- p.61 ; Chapter 4. --- Shared Understandings And Moral Relativism --- p.65 ; Is Walzer A Conventionalist? --- p.65 ; Equal Citizenship And Democracy --- p.72 ; Walzer's Benign Relativism --- p.76 ; Chapter 5. --- Interpretation --- p.86 ; Walzer's Thesis of Interpretation --- p.86 ; Walzer and Marx --- p.93 ; Conclusion --- p.98 ; BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.102

This paper proposes a model that can be implemented to estimate the willingness to pay for distributive justice, defined as distribution according to desert. We derive a formula that allows one to recover the willingness to pay for distributive justice from fiscal data and the estimated coefficients of a probit regression. Using this formula and data from a 1998 Gallup Social Audit, we find that on average the monetary value of justice forUS households amounts to about one fifth of their disposable income. Moreover, we find evidence of markedly heterogeneous preferences for justice along the lines of race and education.

Despite the prominence of thresholds and limits in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of their role within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around threshold views in distributive justice. In this thesis, I develop an account of the conceptual structure of such views. Such an account helps understand and characterize threshold views, can subsume what may seem to be different debates about such views under one conceptual header, and can be used to further examine and develop patterns of justice that draw on thresholds. In light of this account, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism which sheds new light on the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and on the common objections to sufficientarianism. Moreover, I examine and defend limitarianism, which is the view that people should not have more than a certain amount of wealth. In particular, I argue in favour of limitarianism as a midlevel principle for guiding institutional design and individual actions and, furthermore, as a specification of what a just allocation of wealth requires under epistemic constraints.

We introduce distributive justice into a simple model of growth and distribution. Two groups ('classes') of otherwise identical, capital-rich and capital-poor individuals ('capitalists') and ('workers') are in conflict over factor (labour-capital) shares. Capitalists' (workers') ideal labour share is low (high) – but always tempered by the recognition that everyone supplies one unit of labour inelastically and desires a wage; and that the labour share impacts growth negatively in our 'AK' production economy. Social conflict is defined as the difference between the ideal labour shares of the two classes. This conflict is resolved by the two positive and three normative criteria we consider. Thus, the macroeconomy (growth, factor shares, distribution), social conflict and the methods of its resolution are jointly determined in a complete socio-economic equilibrium. We believe both this approach and our rich set of results are novel. We consider two positive (probabilistic voting and Nash bargaining, encapsulating electoral politics and socio-political bargaining) and two normative (justice) criteria (utilitarian and Rawlsian) of conflict resolution. Greater impatience, intensified status comparisons and negative consumption externalities, greater wealth inequality and a decline in productivity exacerbate social conflict. Status comparisons and wealth inequality tend to raise the labour share under all positive and normative criteria. Finally, we propose and analyse a criterion of 'justice as minimal social friction'. Under the plausible assumption that the capitalists' overall socio-political influence (numerical strength aside) is at least as high as that of workers, all positive methods imply a smaller labour share and more inequality than all our three criteria of distributive justice. We offer a numerical illustration of the key points.

Denne Ph.d.-afhandling er et bidrag til diskussioner om personligt ansvar i relation til fordelingsretfærdighed i sundhed og sygdomsbehandling. Den er et bidrag til politisk filosofi i almindelighed, men i særdeleshed til luck egalitaristisk teori. Jeg besvarer følgende tre spørgsmål: 1) Hvilken rolle bør personligt ansvar spille i relation til fordelingsretfærdighed i sundhed og sygdomsbehandling? 2) Er individer selv ansvarlige for deres egen sundhedstilstand? Og 3) hvis individer selv er ansvarlige for deres egen sundhedstilstand, hvilke implikationer har dette så i forhold til deres omkostningsansvar? Afhandlingen består af fire artikler, men jeg tilbyder først en general introduktion, et afsnit om forskellige effektivitets-baserede grunde til at holde individer omkostningsansvarlige for adfærd, som leder til øget risiko for sygdomme, og et afsnit om den metode jeg anvender. I min første artikel anvender jeg de seneste diskussioner om ansvar i politisk filosofi på emner vedrørende social ulighed i sundhed, og adgang til sygdomsbehandling. Jeg argumenterer for, at fordelingsretfærdighed i sundhed og sygdomsbehandling bør være sensitiv til ansvar, men også, at individer, på det mest fundamentale niveau, aldrig er ansvarlige på en sådan måde, at appeller til individers eget ansvar kan retfærdiggøre ulighed. Dette forklarer hvorfor vi skal give lige adgang til sygdomsbehandling - også til individer som er syge, som følge af (blandt andet) valg af livsstil. Det forklarer også, hvorfor vi har retfærdighedsbaserede grunde til at reducere social ulighed i sundhed. I min anden artikel undersøger jeg, og (delvist) argumenterer imod, et forslag fremsat af Shlomi Segall, om at bytte ideen om ansvar ud med en ide om rimelig undgålighed i luck egalitaristisk teori. Jeg argumenterer også for, at størrelsen af sundhedsudgifter, som er relateret til rygning og fedme, er relevant i forhold til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt samfundet med rimelighed kan forvente, at individer undgår rygning og fedme. I min tredje artikel spørger jeg ...

In recent years, there has been a growing debate on the nature of Jurisprudence. Conventionally understood as the theory and philosophy of law, Jurisprudence in the modern era, has had to deal with issues manating from the more 'earthy' realms of political obligation and discourses on the 'nature of the state'. The great diversity of legal systems we see around the world, themselves pose a complex challenge when it comes to defining the 'province' of Jurisprudence. This paper seeks to examine certain basic questions like-What is the best legal system we can possibly hope for? Will these systems safeguard the basic rights of marginalized communities in conditions where there is an aggressive display of 'majoritarian will'? In order to answer these questions this paper will be looking at the contributions of various legal theorists, in particular those of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. Dworkin posits the idea of 'entrenching' certain rights, so that these rights are not undermined or destroyed through legislative prejudices. Rawls who in some senses represents the best traditions of the 'welfare liberals, elaborates on the idea of 'justice as fairness' and notions of distributive justice. The moot questions are —can these models be prescribed in the Indian context? Or is there a prospect of an indigenous theory which broadens the horizons of Jurisprudence?