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In an exploration of the ways that electoral institutions influence party systems, & the extent to which electoral laws mediate the influence of ethnic heterogeneity, data from earlier studies by Douglas Rae (1967) & Arend Lijphart (1990) are reanalyzed to reconsider the role of one institutional parameter -- district magnitude. It is concluded that district magnitude is not merely an important determinant of the number of parties that compete in a political system, but can offset the tendency of parties to multiply in ethnically heterogeneous societies. 5 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

ABSTRACTFollowing Duverger, low district magnitude (low number of seats per electoral district) produces a mechanical effect, the underrepresentation of small parties, and a psychological effect, discouraging voters from voting for small parties. The two effects usually occur together and cannot be tested separately. However, in Venezuela an experimental 'control' is provided by the requirement that voters simultaneously cast a vote for the same party in each of three legislative tiers (Senate, Chamber of Deputies, and State Assembly), each with a different district magnitude. Hence the psychological effect can exert itself on only one tier. In the other tiers exceptionally high or low deviations from proportional representation are observed. The separate effects of district magnitude are analysed by their consequences on the number of electoral parties and the deviation from proportional representation.

Based on conference paper. Whether the election of women to the Irish Dáil varies across the country's three, four, and five-seat constituencies; uses data from three elections held in 1981 and 1982.

AbstractPrevious literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.

This article makes a fresh start in the attempt to explain the number of parties in party systems. It develops a simultaneous equations model to differentiate between the psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude on party-system fragmentation. Both effects are statistically significant and approximately equal. However, neither effect is very large in comparison to underlying patterns of politicization, which are argued to be reflections of the number of political cleavages in society. These cleavages predispose each party system to converge toward a country-specific effective number of parties within 5 elections, regardless of the initial level of fragmentation, barring outside disturbances. Major devaluations may act as such disturbances, but the evidence so far is inconclusive. The analysis is based on new data from 62 elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, supplemented by 30+ additional elections in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay for the exploration of economic impacts.

WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, A NUMBER OF SCHOLARS HAVE CONSIDERED THE EFFECT OF DISTRICT MAGNITUDE ON FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES. A CONTROVERSY EXISTS AS TO WHETHER WOMEN ARE BETTER REPRESENTED IN SYSTEMS WITH MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS THAN IN THOSE WITH SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS ONLY. THIS PAPER PRESENTS THE THEORETICAL REASONS WHY MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS SHOULD GIVE WOMEN AN ADVANTAGE, REVIEWS THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, PROPOSES SEVERAL HYPOTHESES THAT WOULD RECONCILE THE INCONSISTENT RESULTS IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, AND THEN TESTS THOSE HYPOTHESES IN TWO STATES OVER A 22-YEAR PERIOD. THE RESULTS PROVIDE STRONG CONFIRMATION OF THE EFFECT OF DISTRICT MAGNITUDE AND CAST SERIOUS DOUBT ON THOSE STUDIES THAT SHOW LITTLE EFFECT.