Disertacija sarži uvod, četiri poglavlja i zaključak. U prvom poglavlju pod naslovom "Nastanak i delovanje Organizacije ujedinjenih nacija" izložen je početak pojave ideje Međunarodne organizacije kao i istorijski razvoj ovog koncepta do svetske porodice u današnje vreme, koju čine 193 države. Takođe, dotaknuta je serija izjava kao i međunarodne konferencije koje su dovele do formiranja Organizacije ujedinjenih nacija, formulisanja njenih ciljeva i principa, kao i načina i uslova učlanjenja u tu organizaciju. Detaljnije su proučavane uloge Generalne skupštine i Saveta bezbednosti zbog njihove važnosti. U drugom poglavlju, pod naslovom "Razlozi koji ukazuju na potrebe reforme Organizacije ujedinjenih nacija", objašnjeni su sledeći razlozi neophodnosti reforme ove organizacije: 1. skretanje Ujedinjenih nacija s puta; 2. kontradiktornosti sistema Ujedinjenih nacija; 3. nedostaci Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija; 4. nedostaci u mehanizmu donošenja odluka; 5. svetske promene; 6. mistifikacija u misijama Ujedinjenih nacija; 7. moćna središta; 8. raskorak između misije i raspoloživih sredstava; 9. korupcija. U trećem poglavlju, pod naslovom "Organizacija ujedinjenih nacija između povelje i dominantne sile" objašnjen je odnos Sjedinjenih Američkih Država sa Organizacijom ujedinjenih nacija kroz sledeću grupu tačaka i tema: 1. siže američkih promena od izolacije do internacionalizma; 2. politika SAD u Ujedinjenim nacijama tokom hladnog rata; 3. stav SAD o ulozi UN u oblasti čuvanja mira, ekonomske saradnje i ljudskih prava; 4. stav SAD prema UN u periodu pre raspada Sovjetskog Saveza; 5. SAD i UN posle hladnog rata; 6. američki stav prema UN posle završetka hladnog rata 7. administracija Džordža Buša i Ujedinjene nacije (opšti stav prema međunarodnoj organizaciji, političko viđenje SAD pre i posle događaja 11. septembra 2001. godine); 8. američki interesi i reforma Ujedinjenih nacija (reforme UN i realizacija američkih interesa, američko viđenje reformi); 9. predsednik Barak Obama i njegova metodologija za promene i odnos sa UN. U četvrtom poglavlju, pod naslovom "Reforme Organizacije ujedinjenih nacija" definisan je problem ove studije kroz grupu tačaka i pitanja i istraživane su međunarodne promene koje je svet doživeo kao glavni faktor za izvršenje procesa reforme koje su potrebne Ujedinjenim nacijama. ; The dissertation consists of an introduction, four chapters and the conclusion. The first chapter:"The Emergence and the Function of the United Nations", deals with the emergence of the idea of international system , and how this idea developed historically till it reached nowadays to international family consisting of 193 states of various continents and cultures . These states are joined in an institutional frame founded on optional and contractual pillars, which is the United Nations. In addition, it deals with the chain of declarations and conferences that led to the foundation of this organization. Moreover, it focuses on the purposes, principles and membership of the United Nations, as well as the General Assembly and Security Council due to their important role in the United Nations system. The second chapter: "The Reasons for the Reform of the United Nations", deals with the necessity reasons for reform; due to the United Nations is in urgent need of it. The intended reform is to do whatever necessary to raise its efficiency and performance. Therefore, it is possible to determine the objective reasons of this reform in the following titles, and they are: 1. The deviation of United Nations from its course that it was founded for; 2. The inherent contradictions of United Nations system since its foundation, 3. The deficiencies and imbalances in the United Nations Charter; 4.The imbalance in decision –making structures and mechanisms; 5. International Changes; 6.The vagueness of tasks entrusted to the United Nations; 7. Extreme Centralism; 8. The big gap between the intended tasks to be achieved and the available resources; 9. Corruption. The third chapter: "The United Nations between the Charter and the Dominant Power", focuses on the relation between the USA with the United Nations. This is a necessary item for the research due to the current international conditions and challenges facing humanity such as local and regional conflicts, health, natural catastrophes, etc. which fall under the scope of the United Nations. The dominant role the US plays in the international arena singles out its special impact on the performance of this organization. This role has gone through many changes in recent history depending on the geopolitics of the world namely after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the advent of the short-lived unipolarity up to the beginning of emergence of multipolarity. Every stage marked nuances in the US policy towards the United Nations. In fact, the US approach to international affairs developed in big leaps from isolationism to its involvement in WWII and the establishment of the United Nations.
The phenomena of secret diplomacy and spheres of influence are closely related. History of international relations testify that the most common areas of interest are established through secret diplomacy. Nothing in this sense isn't changed even in the modern world. When you establish a balance of power between the great powers, then you must agree about access on the division of influence spheres. These arrangements are kept at a diplomatic level with the absence of the public. This agreements are secretly signed and its waiting for decades and centuries, and with many of that public will never be aware of. Spheres of influence (zone of interest) are usually created by a secret agreement between two or more major powers through secret diplomacy, and always at the expense of third countries (nation). It can be said that the struggle for spheres of influence was basically the cause of many, including world wars and after World War II continued the USA and the SSSR. History of the Balkan region and relations among people who inhabit it, clearly shows that he was for centuries the scene of clashes geopolitical interests of global power centers. At the present moment Balkan geopolitical scene is area for dominance of the great powers. At some point it will become the space establishment of interested spheres. That will happen through secret diplomacy.
The article looks into the changes in the party and the social structure of the first House of the Croatian parliament (Sabor) in the transitional period. A total of twenty-six political parties have had seats in the Parliament; sixteen of them secured their place in it through a prior support of the electoral body, while ten of them secured their parliamentary status solely through individual lists. The author shows that the party fragmentation has occurred due to the process of parliamentary parties' factioning and the transfer of delegates from the parliamentary into the non-parliamentary parties. The degree of the party fragmentation in the Sabor is considered moderate and not disruptive for the functioning of the Parliament. This is due to the continued and stupendous mandate dominance of the majority party and to the fact that the party fragmentation has primarily involved the opposition parties. An analysis of the social/demographic characteristics of the representatives has shown that the Sabor is dominated by male, college-educated, forty-eight years old Croats with a bit more than four years of parliamentary experience. The educational structure of the Sabor does not differ much from other European parliaments, but the number of senior representatives is somewhat higher than in other European countries, while the share of women is the standards. It has been suggested that the most effective strategy the Croatian parliamentary political parties could employ regarding the gender and age representation are internally determined quotas for women and young people on their candidates' lists for elections. This would indirectly influence the social structure sof the Croatian parliament. (SOI : PM: S. 174)
Kako osmisliti i operativno organizovati sećanja levice u delatnom, a ne u muzejskom pravcu? Šta znači otvoreno se suočiti sa kulturom poraza levice? Razmotrene su dimenzije poraza levice, priroda linearnog i kontingentnog vremena, različita proživljavanja poraza kod fašizma i liberalizma i dijalektika nade i razočarenja. Ukazano je da treba odbaciti jezik psihoanalize (čežnja, nostalgija, žalost, melanholija) i teleološku viziju neoliberalnog pobednika, pa levicu i desnicu shvatiti u novim dimenzijama vremena, unutar novog odnosa Kairosa i Hronosa u digitalnom dobu. Treba se samorefleksivno osvrnuti na greške levice, a naročito na greške iz kojih se može učiti. Treba teorijski probuditi ambiciju. Višeslojnom sećanju levice škodi dominacija jedne vrste sećanja, potrebna je samokontrola i ravnoteža pamćenja nestale socijalne države i vlastitog nasilja. ; How could we rethink and organize memories of the Left in an operational and active way? How could one openly confront the Left-Wing culture of defeat? The paper considers some dimensions of the Left-Wing defeat after 1989, the nature of the linear and the contingent time, various defeat experiences of fascism and liberalism and the dialectic of hope and disappointment. One should reject the language of psychoanalysis (longing, nostalgia, sorrow, melancholy) and the teleological vision of the neoliberal winner. The Left Wing and Right Wing should be understood in new dimensions of time within a new relationship between Cairos and Chronos in the digital age. The Left needs self-reflective review of its own mistakes, if it wants to learn lessons for the future. Theory can awake practical ambition. A desirable multilayered Left-Wing memory has been damaged by dominance of one type of memory. The Left needs self-control and a balanced memory of both badly missing socialist welfare state and its own violence.
Cilj rada je kritička ananliza konceptualizacije motivacije za obrazovanjem u političkim dokumentima Evropske unije. Na primeru serije objavljenih Komunikacija Evropske komisije u poslednje dve decenije sagledavaju se ključne karakteristike konceptualizacije motivacije za visokim obrazovanjem. S obzirom na to da Evropska komisija nema legislativna ovlašćenja nad sistemima obrazovanja država članica, ona svoj uticaj može ostvariti pomoću organizovanih političkih inicijativa i iznošenjem svog mišljenja. Komunikacije Evropske komisije predstavljaju značajan vid javnog promovisanja mišljenja, vizija i vrednosti EU u politici visokog obrazovanja. Analizom sadržaja sedam objavljenih Komunikacija u periodu od 2003. do 2018. godine može se zaključiti da obrazovna politika Evropske unije tematizuje problem motivacije za visokoškolskim obrazovanjem prevashodno instrumentalno, kao deo ekonomske agende razvoja društva. Prećutno se podrazumeva dominacija spoljašnje motivacije u sistemu visokog obrazovanja. Visoko obrazovanje se shvata kao usluga, student kao korisnik obrazovnih usluga, a problem individualne motivacije za obrazovanjem konceptualizuje se kao investiranje u ljudski kapital. Sa stanovišta obrazovnih institucija, motivacija za obrazovanjem se razmatra kao problem ponude obrazovnih usluga i usklađivanja sa aktuelnim i budućim potrebama tržišta rada. Vrednost visokog obrazovanja u celini razmatra se iz ekonomske perspektive. Pedagoške implikacije svođenja složenog procesa motivacije za obrazovanjem u okviru celokupnog sistema visokog obrazovanja na instrumentalne spoljašnje podsticaje može se opisati kao redukcionizam, odnosno zanemarivanje mnogostrukih motiva i vrednosti koji visoko obrazovanje čine socijalno poželjnim i individualno potrebnim. ; The aim of this paper is a critical analysis of conceptualization of motivation for education in the European Union political documents. The key characteristics of conceptualization of motivation for higher education are deliberated on the example of a collection of published European Commission Communications in the past two decades. Given that the European Commission has no legislative powers over education systems of the member states, it exerts its influence through instruments of organized policy initiatives and expression of its opinions. European Commission Communications represent an important form of public promotion of EU opinions, visions, and values in higher education policy. By analysing the content of seven published Communications in the period from 2003 to 2018, it can be concluded that in the European Union educational policy, the problem of motivation for higher education is perceived primarily instrumentally, as a part of economic agenda of society development. Dominance of external motivation in the higher education system is tacitly assumed. Higher education is understood as service, the student as user of educational services, and the problem of individual motivation for education is conceptualized as investment in human capital. From the point of view of educational institutions, motivation for education is perceived as the problem of offering educational services and harmonization with current and future needs of the labour market. The value of higher education as a whole is considered from economic perspective. Pedagogical implications of reducing a complex process of motivation for education in the entire higher education system to instrumental external incentives, can be described as reductionism, i.e. neglect of multiple motives and values that make higher education socially desirable and individually necessary. ; Knjiga rezimea, 25. Međunarodna naučna konferencija "Pedagoška istraživanja i školska praksa" ; Book of abstracts / 25th International Scientific Conference "Educational Research and School Practice"
This article analyses the weaknesses of contemporary democratic orders which stem from the use of modern manipulation techniques employed by those who manage to win the trust for making the government in democratic elections. Contemporary democracies are under the threat of populist promises which are most often unrealistic. The combination of populism and democracy is usually a product of the powerlessness of political elites, i.e. political parties, in states to solve citizenry's most important problems – to increase the growth and development of the economic system, to introduce the rule of law, and to rehabilitate political institutions so they could rationally and efficiently function within the political system. Contemporary democracies are not equally developed, nor do they have equal chances for developing. The facts demonstrate how in many societies and states – formally oriented towards establishing a democratic governance and towards starting the democratisation of societal and political life – democracy gets misused and diminished to democratic phraseology with the help of populism, while in the institutional aspect being diminished to creating a façade of democratic institutions. It has been demonstrated that the patterns of dominance follow and are characteristic for democratic governances to a larger or smaller degree. The essence of democratic governance are politically responsible decisions, rather than mass participation in making political decisions which are not realistic, while being dangerous in terms of their consequences. Democracy means making good decisions for the benefit and good of all citizens, while hierarchy must not be challenged when it is necessary that institutions function in a rational and efficient way. Introducing equality where professionalism, competence and accountability are needed is devastating for the functioning of institutions, therefore for the functioning of democracy as well. Democracy can be tricked with the help of authorities'populism, as was the case with Nazi Germany. After Nazis took power, not all institutions of the Weimar Republic were dismantled nor challenged, nor was the Weimar Constitution changed. However – parallel to state authorities, Constitution and laws – dozens of new orders and laws were enacted, creating an illusion that nothing is changed in German state. What Nazis did was developing a new mechanism, party mechanism, parallel to the state mechanism. The two functioned next to each other. Such patterns lead to the parallelism of power and democracy, which usually led to the totalitarianisation of democracy. In contemporary states – especially those in the process of democratic transition – such parallelism shows how party leaders do not forfeit party leadership once they get elected to state offices. In that way democracies become submissive and captured by political parties, especially their leaderships and leaders. The relation of freedom and democracy has also been analysed. Experiences show that democracy is founded more successfully in places where people managed to gain their liberties, rather than in those places where democracy is yet to provide liberties to citizens. Dangers for democracy tied with the abuse of democratic conditions are being discusses in the last part of the article. Each condition necessary for the functioning of a democratic order can be simulated through manipulative ways. A special danger for contemporary democracies comes from circumstances in which those who come to power do everything so that society and state are riled by anti-political principles: indifference, fear and trepidation, and powerlessness. Anti-political principles jeopardise democratic order, and those who use them demolish democracy. Democracy is facing constant challenges and temptations for scraping democracy in the name of democracy.
deologically speaking, the initiators of founding all the political parties in Serbia were young intellectuals educated abroad. The ideology of political liberalism was brought to Serbia by young knowledgeable people educated in the West: Milovan Janković, Jevrem Grujić, Vladimir Jovanovic, Stojan Bošković, Filip Hristić, Đorđe Cenić and many more who published and initiated liberal-democratic ideas during the Peter Assembly in 1848. Only with St Andrea Assembly in 1858 did the Serbian Civil rebirth begin. During this assembly two political groups finally divided: the liberals and the conservatives. The most important attainment of the St Andrea Assembly in 1858 was the Act of National Assembly. This act initiated the introduction of the representative system in Serbia. In political history, the period from 1858 to 1869 represents the birth of the representative system in Serbia. The introduction of the representative system in Serbia by the Constitution of 1869 created the necessary political preconditions for organizing modern political parties. Regular political elections and participation of the Parliament in the legislative process resulted in a easier binding of the like-minded politicans with their political liders to whom it was important to strenghten their bonds with their electors. The fact that the constitutional elections took place every three years and that the Assembly took place every year led to the strenghening of the political parties in the state, since more thriving layers of society started entering the National Assembly, the delegates who infuenced the political life. After the Constitution of 1869 was enforced, the liberals are gathered under Jovan Ristić, and later the young oppositional conservatives are gathered. In the same time a third political party emerged, the supporters and followers of Svetozar Marković. The organized political parties did not emerge immediately after the Regent's Constitution although it guaranteed a selection of political rights and freedom necessary for the emergence of the political parties, such as voting right, the freedom of speech and the freedom of press. This poses a question why did it never happen? The answer is to be looked into the intention of the Regency and later Regent Milan to unable the education of the political parties. In a situation when the Regency was closer to conservative than liberal ideas, it was hard to discuss organized political parties. The non-existence of political discipline as well as well political programs adversely affected the emergence of modern political parties. 277 Assembly Elections of October 1874 had a great impact on the history of political parties in Serbia. After the elections, a few political parties emerged in the Assembly: St Andrea Liberals under Jevrem Grujić, Libears under Ristić, Conservatives under Jovan Marinović, the beginnings of Young Conservatives and People's Party of the future Radicals. The organizing of political parties was sped up by young intellectuals gathered round the paper "Videlo" and connected with the People's party in the National Assembly. The beginning of 1881 saw the emergence of modern organized political parties in Serbia: People's Radical Part, Progressive Party and Liberal Party. Until that period delegates in the National Assembly mainly performed individually, and after 1881 they perform in accordance with political program, respecting political discipline. In view of organization and the functioning, the radicals went further, because they realized that organization is of utter importance for successful functioning and development of political parties. Pera Todorovic was given most credit for organizing the Radical Party. His organization contributed a round of hierarchical organizational units starting with local committees in every small town, counties, and to the Main Committee as the supreme organ of the party. Speaking about organization of the other two political parties it could be said that they too emerged with statues similar to the radical one. However, they never occupied such number of members as the Radical Party. The main characteristic of the political life in Serbia during the 80s of the 19th century consisted of bitter fights between the Radical and the Progressive Party in which King Milan Obrenovic sided with the Progressive Party. He was the reason why the radicals, although during the period 1882-1883 in majority, they never succeeded to come to power nor for the years to come. Dedicated to unable radicalism in Serbia, Milan showed even greater resistance toward the liberal reforms and greater affection toward emergence of personal regime. After the Timok Rebellion many radical leaders were convicted for many years, and the political leader Nikola Pasic was in emigration. Among the radicals, involving even those in the custody, slowly awareness was raised that the accord with the crown was necessary. Treaty with the radicals was initiated by King Milan so as to reinforce his personal strength, decreased in the war with Bulgaria. Although hungry for power, the radicals denounced the king's offer in Nis at the beginning of 1886. Radical leaders signed a treaty with liberals instead of progressives in 1887. The King did not have many possibilities, either to give radicals power and concede defeat or to draw back. Radical-liberal coalitional government gave great attention to the constitutional problem solving. Due to the fact that the first coalitional government was short-lived, it did not solve any problems. Similar situation happened with the first homogenous radical government that did not succeed anything more than its program, due to the fact that it was smothered by the King Milan's party. The Constitutional reform of 1888 had a big impact on political and constitutional life of Serbia. The multiannual struggle of the People's Radical Party was crowned by passing the constitution by the principle of majority. 278 The position of the Radical Party is changed from the ground, because it came to power and made its own cadre consisting of young intellectuals. Oversight over the whole work of the radical government from 1889 to 1892 shows that the radicals on the one hand showed great effort to introduce the constitution into the political life of Serbia, and on the other to limit the ruler's power. However, it is important not to forget the fact that the parliamentary regime on whom so many radicals insisted was more and more changing into a totalitarian one-party system. The parliamentary system that enabled the absolute power of the Radical Party in all state institutions was short-lived. King Alexander had an immense wish to stop as soon as possible with all the new-laid things that were introduced by the parliamentary system and that is the reason he was constantly fighting with the political parties and very frequently insisted on coup. In 1894 he suspended the 1888 Constitution and reenacted the 1869 one. After that, a regime based on self-will came to power, which lasted until 1901, year when King Alexander passed a new constitution. Political life in time of self-willed regime of king Alexander was very tough, because the ruler denounced the parties with the basic idea: "to renounce with parliamentarism if we wish to arrange this state properly". The last Obrenovic tried to denounce the existence of the Constitution, the government and the National Assembly by conducting various experiments. His "neutral" governments, which consisted of unforced political personnel, were under his impact. The whole political system turned round one political person, the king, which succeeded in dividing and manipulating the political parties. Neutralizing the People's Radical Party dominance could not have lasted any longer, due to the fact that it was impossible that the party with the biggest support be in opposition any longer. The king's wedding to Draga Masin represents a turning point in political life of Serbia. The shackles of the self-willed regime started to diminish, because the king wanted "to please the parties and the nation, so that they would accept the queen." The king's compromise with the strongest party in the country did not achieve results, due to the fact that among them existed huge differences in view of "state conceptions". The radicals advocated for parliamentary monarchy in which the power would belong to the most popular party, whereas the crown advocated the constitutional monarchy in which the ruler would be a puppet in enforcing the power of the National Assembly. Co-operational politics between the king and the radicals were short-lived, since it turned out that the representatives of the two opposite state conceptions were incapable of reaching an agreement. Shorty, the king realized that the treaty with the radicals was impossible to be kept and decided to return to previous politics, as before signed by the treaty in 1901. The renewed return to the self-willed regime sped up the preparations of the conspirators that in the night of May 28th/June 10th/ May 29th June 11th staged a coup.
Pitanje mogućnosti formiranja ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji u kontekstu postsocijalistiĉke transformacije društva i procesa evrointegracija, predstavlja predmet bavljenja ove doktorske disertacije. Rad se sastoji iz tri veće celine i poglavlja u kome su izneta zakljuĉna razmatranja. U prvom delu rada, razvijeni su uporedno-istorijski, kontekstualni, konceptualni i metodološki okvir istraţivanja, kao polazne osnove za dalje analize. Kako bi mogle biti obuhvaćene sve relevantne dimenzije kompleksnog fenomena ekološkog pokreta i sloţena mreţa ĉinilaca koji utiĉu na njegov nastanak i razvoj, u istraţivanju su kombinovano korišćene razliĉite metodološke tehnike: anketno ispitivanje stavova i praksi na reprezentativnom uzorku graĊana Srbije (N=1952) i predstavnika lokalnih samouprava (N=232), polustrukturisani intervjui sa predstavnicima nevladinih organizacija (N=44), kao i dve studije sluĉaja zajednica sa izraţenim ekološkim problemima - Panĉeva i Bora. Drugi deo rada je posvećen opisu i analizi pojedinaĉnih elemenata ekološkog pokreta: ekoloških aktivista, ekoloških grupa / organizacija, ekoloških mreţa, kolektivnog identiteta i ekoloških konflikata. Na osnovu detaljne analize karakteristika osnovnih elemenata pokreta, u zakljuĉnom poglavlju drugog dela rada daje se odgovor na pitanje: da li u Srbiji postoji ekološki pokret? Osnovni istraţivaĉki nalaz je da u Srbiji nije došlo do formiranja klasiĉnog participativnog tipa ekološkog pokreta, kakav je prisutan u zemljama Zapada. TakoĊe, nema ni naznaka znaĉajnijeg prisustva elemenata transakcionog ekološkog aktivizma (pokreta), ĉiji je prisustvo zabeleţeno u zemljama Centralne Evrope. Umesto toga, svedoci smo razvoja specifiĉnog modela ekološkog kolektivnog delanja koji smo nazvali "ekološkim trećim sektorom". Naime, za razliku od participativnog i transakcionog delanja, koji imaju naglašeno politiĉku dimenziju, aktivnosti organizacija u okviru trećeg sektora su preteţno "apolitiĉne" po karakteru, usmerene na pruţanje usluga u oblastima iz kojih se, u sklopu neoliberalnih reformi, drţava povukla. Pored nerazvijenosti konfliktne (politiĉke) dimenzije, ekološki treći sektor odlikuje i atomizovano delanje profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija, koje samo izuzetno (pod spoljnim pritiscima ili podsticajima) uspostavljaju fiziĉke veze (mreţe) meĊu sobom, dok se na planu kolektivnog identiteta razvija samo kognitivna dimenzija (formalno prihvatanje odreĊenih ekoloških vrednosti i naĉela koja ĉine sastavni deo ekološkog diskursa dominantnog na Zapadu). GraĊani, po pravilu, nisu ukljuĉeni u rad ovih organizacija, izuzev kao korisnici usluga. U trećem delu rada se razmatraju razlozi usled kojih ne dolazi do razvoja participativnog i/ili transakcionog ekološkog pokreta (aktivizma). Za potrebe objašnjenja nastanka specifiĉne hibridne forme ekološkog trećeg sektora, kreiran je sintetiĉki eksplanatorni model koji kombinuje elemente razvijene u okviru razliĉitih teorijskih pristupa fenomenu društvenih pokreta. Eksplanatorna shema je formulisana na sledeći naĉin: za pokretanje kolektivnog delanja i nastanak ekološkog pokreta neophodno da prethodno budu ispunjeni sledeći uslovi: potrebno je da postoji izvesno socijalno-konstruisano nezadovoljstvo (problem) kod većeg broja pojedinaca / profesionalnih zastupniĉkih organizacija (socijalno-konstruktivistiĉka reinterpretacija klasiĉnih pristupa); zatim, grupa pojedinaca koja oseća dati problem / zalaţe se za njegovo rešavanje, mora posedovati odreĊene resurse za pokretanje i odrţavanje 5 kolektivne akcije (pristup teorije mobilizacije resursa); šire okruţenje treba da bude relativno povoljno kako bi nagovestilo mogućnost pozitivnog ishoda aktivnosti koja se ţeli realizovati (pristup strukture politiĉkih mogućnosti), a vrednosni okvir na takav naĉin podešen da usmerava na delanje predstavnike profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija i / ili neposredno ugroţenu populaciju (nezadovoljne) i (eventualno) širi krug podrţavalaca (pristup Novih društvenih pokreta). Na proces formiranja ekološkog pokreta, kroz ĉetiri neposredna faktora (socijalna-konstrukcija ekoloških rizika, dostupnost i karakteristike resursa, struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti, vrednosni sistem),indirektno deluju širi društveni procesi - postsocijalistiĉka transformacija i evropeizacija srpskog društva, kao i ĉinioci duţeg trajanja ((pred)socijalistiĉko nasleĊe). Testiranje postavljenih eksplikativnih hipoteza je pokazalo da ni jedan od uslova neophodnih za formiranje ekološkog pokreta, nije delimiĉno ili u potpunosti zadovoljen. Postojeći ekološki problemi su dominantno odreĊeni u kategorijama niskog rizika i male vaţnosti u odnosu na druga društvena pitanja, usled ĉega je i njihov podsticajni kapacitet za kolektivnu (re)akciju bitno sniţen. Pored toga, vladajuće shvatanje prema kome u ekološkoj modernizaciji leţi rešenje za gotovo sve ekološke probleme, pokazuje se kao ĉinilac koji nepovoljno utiĉe na graĊanski aktivizam, jer upućuje na pasivno išĉekivanje uvoĊenja obećanih mehanizama odrţivog razvoja. Većini graĊana na raspolaganju stoji vrlo ograniĉena koliĉina resursa, usled ĉega, u velikom broju sluĉajeva, oni odustaju od uĉešća u ekološkim akcijama. Ekološke organizacije, takoĊe, imaju poteškoća da obezbede neophodne resurse za rad, a dodatni problem predstavlja i naĉin njihove mobilizacije, usled kojeg gube samostalnost postajući zavisne od stranih izvora finansiranja. Kao posledica, ekološko delanje je atomizovano, a rivalitet i konflikti unutar ekološkog civilnog sektora, naglašeni; ekološke mreţe se teško formiraju i odrţavaju, kolektivni identitet je slab (nad njim prevagu odnose partikularni interesi), a kritiĉko delovanje ekoloških organizacija, nerazvijeno. Struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti se, uprkos postojanju relativno povoljnog zakonskog okvira, pokazuje zatvorenom prema uĉešću graĊana u donošenju odluka. GraĊani percipiraju predstavnike vlasti kao neprijemĉive za njihove potrebe, što se nepovoljno odraţava na njihovu spremnost da se organizuju i pokušaju da nametnu svoje zahteve. S druge strane, ekološke organizacije su iskljuĉene iz procesa odluĉivanja i svedene na ulogu asistenata u podizanju kapaciteta drţave za sprovoĊenje programa u oblasti zaštite ţivotne sredine. Konfliktno delanje organizacija je ograniĉeno, s jedne strane, time što ne dobijaju podršku moćnih aktera (meĊunarodne ekološke organizacije, strani donatori), a sa druge, finansijskim uslovljavanjem od strane drţavnih struktura. Karakteristike kulturološkog konteksta se, takoĊe, pokazuju nepovoljnim za razvoj ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji. Dominacija materijalistiĉkog sistema vrednosti i s njim povezano visoko vrednovanje ekonomskog razvoja, koje u senci ostavlja ekološke probleme, negativno utiĉe na ekološko aktiviranje graĊana. Ipak, uprkos preteţno materijalistiĉkoj vrednosnoj orijentaciji, graĊanima su vrlo bliske vrednosti Nove ekološke paradigme. MeĊutim, od naĉelnog prihvatanja vrednosti karakteristiĉnih za ovu paradigmu do aktivnog delanja, u kontekstu materijalne oskudice, put je dug i vrlo neizvestan. Zakljuĉno poglavlje je posvećeno rezimiranju i diskusiji empirijskih nalaza, kao i razmatranju širih implikacija nerazvijenosti ekološkog pokreta na zaštitu ţivotne sredine u Srbiji. ; he environmental movement in Serbia, in the context of post-socialist transformation and the EU integration process. The paper consists of three major parts and the concluding chapter. In the first part a comparative - historical, contextual, conceptual and methodological framework of the research is developed, as a starting point for the further analyses. In order to capture all relevant dimensions of the complex phenomenon of environmental movement and the composite set of factors that influence its emergence and development, the study is using a combination of different methodological techniques: a survey of attitudes and practices based on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N = 1952) and local government representatives (N = 232), in parallel with the semi-structured interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations (N = 44), and the two case studies of communities with serious environmental problems – the municipalities of Pancevo and Bor. The second part contains the description and analysis of individual elements of the environmental movement: environmental activists, environmental groups / organizations, environmental networks, collective identity and environmental conflicts. Based on a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the key elements of environmental movement, the concluding chapter of this part of the paper offers an answer to the question - is there an environmental movement in Serbia? The main research finding is that participatory type of environmental movement that is typical for the Western countries has not been formed in Serbia. There are even no indications of the existence of significant elements of transactional environmental activism (movement), that is present in the countries of Central Europe. Instead, we are witnessing the development of a distinct model of collective environmental action that we have named "the third environmental sector". Different from the participative and transactional activism which have an emphasized political dimension, the nature of the activities of the third sector organizations is mostly "non-political", aimed at providing services in those areas that the state has withdrew from, in the context of neo-liberal reforms. In addition to the underdeveloped conflict/political dimension, the environmental third sector is characterized by atomized actions of professional environmental organizations, which establish physical connections (networks) among themselves only as an exception (under external pressures or incentives), while at the level of collective identity only the cognitive dimension is being developed (the formal acceptance of the environmental values and principles which form an integral part of the environmental discourse dominant in the West). Citizens, as a rule, are not included in the work of these organizations, except as users of services. In the third part, the reasons for the absence of the participatory and / or transactional environmental movement (activism) are discussed. In order to explain the emergence of the specific hybrid form of the environmental third sector, a synthetic explanatory model was established, combining elements developed within different social movement theories. The explanatory scheme has been formulated as follows: for the launch of collective action and the emergence of the environmental movement certain conditions are necessary to be met - a certain level of socially-constructed 8 dissatisfaction (problem) needs to be generated in large numbers of individuals / professional advocacy organizations (social constructivist reinterpretation of classical approaches); then, a group of individuals who perceive the problem / advocates for its solution must possess appropriate resources to initiate and sustain a collective action (the Resource Mobilization Theory approach); the wider context should be relatively favorable as to suggest the possibility of a positive outcome of the action (the Political Opportunities Structure approach); the value framework should be set up in such a way to initiate the action of professional environmental organizations and / or the directly affected population, and possibly also of a wider circle of supporters (the New Social Movements approach). Through the four direct factors (social – construction of environmental risks, the availability and characteristics of resources, the structure of political opportunities, the value system), the process of development of the environmental movement is indirectly affected by wider-scale social processes – the post-socialist transformation and Europeanization of Serbian society, as well as by the factors of longer duration ((pre-) socialist heritage).The testing of the set of explicative hypotheses showed that the necessary pre-conditions for the formation of the environmental movement in Serbia have neither been fully, nor even partially met. In comparison with other issues, the existing environmental problems are dominantly defined in the terms of low-risk and low-importance, due to which their capacities to induce collective (re)action are significantly reduced. In addition, the prevailing concept of environmental modernization, presented as a solution to almost all environmental problems, proves to be a factor that adversely affects civic activism, as it leads to passive anticipation of the promised introduction of mechanisms for sustainable development. Since the majority of citizens have access only to very limited resources, they, in many cases, tend to give up their participation in environmental actions. Environmental organizations also face difficulties in obtaining necessary resources for their operation. An additional problem lies in the way resources are being mobilized: becoming increasingly dependent on foreign funding, organizations tend to lose their autonomy. As a result, the environmental action is atomized and rivalries and conflicts within the environmental civil society accentuated; environmental networks are difficult to establish and maintain and the collective identity is weak (due to domination of particular interests); the conflictual dimension of environmental organizations remains undeveloped. Despite the relatively favorable legal framework, the structure of political opportunities seems closed to the participation of citizens in the decision-making process. Citizens perceive government representatives as unresponsive to their needs, which negatively affects their readiness to act in an organized way and to attempt to impose their demands. On the other hand, environmental organizations are excluded from the decision-making process and reduced to the assisting role in the capacity building of the state bodies for the implementation of programs in the field of environmental protection. Conflicting action of such organizations is limited, on the one hand by the lack of support from powerful actors (international environmental organizations, international donors), and on the other - by the financial preconditions imposed by the state authorities. The characteristics of the cultural context also appear to be unfavorable for the development of the environmental movement in Serbia. The dominance of the materialistic value system and the related high priority attributed to the economic 9 growth, leaves the environmental problems on the margins, thus negatively affecting the environmental activation of citizens. However, despite the predominantly materialistic value orientation, the values of the New environmental paradigm are very familiar to the citizens. Still, in the context of material insecurity, the road from the general acceptance of such values to active action towards reaching them, is long and very uncertain. The concluding chapter is devoted to summarizing and discussing the empirical findings, as well as to considerations of implications of the under-developed environmental movement to the overall state of environmental protection in Serbia.
У теорији постоји сагласност да тероризам представља политички мотивисано насиље и да у том смислу представља један од облика насилне политичке борбе. Специфична разлика тероризма у односу на друге облике политичког насиља је примарна усмереност ка стварању, одржавању и експлоатацији страха ради застрашивања противника и јачања подршке међу присталицама. Суштинска одступања од теоријских и правних критеријума при одређивању тероризма постоје у пракси Савета безбедности. Општа оцена деловања Савета безбедности приликом доношења резолуција о тероризму јесте да прати владајући политички дискурс у коме су најпре државе биле одговорне за тероризам, да би потом "слабе", "неодговорне" и "репресивне" државе биле одговорне за омогућавање деловања међународних терористичких организација на својој територији. Савет безбедности усвајао је резолуције у којима је терористичке акте одређивао спрам природе акта, али и спрам извршиоца чиме су сви акти претходно одређене терористичке организације квалификовани као терористички акти. Истраживањем је утврђено и да је приликом усвајања појединих резолуција политичка сврсисходност утицала да се истоврсна понашања не квалификују увек као терористички акти. На основу изведених закључака утврђено је да сложеност борбе против тероризма представља последицу првенства политичке сврсисходности при квалификовању акта насиља као терористичког акта, а не због тешкоћа у дефинисању тероризма. Промене у концепцији тероризма у резолуцијама Савета безбедности и њихова усклађеност са владајућим јавним дискурсом одвијају се истовремено са настојањем САД и других западних држава да преобликују међународну заједницу и успоставе нови светски поредак. У таквим околностима тероризам почиње да егзистира као офанзивно политичко средство хибридног ратовања, при чему се негативна конотација тероризма експлоатише на два начина. Прво, тероризам постаје политичка оцена нечијег деловања без обзира на природу тако означене активности. Друго, тероризам се употребљава као насилно политичко средство које, у зависности од интереса онога ко цени одређено понашање, неће у свакој ситуацији бити означено као тероризам, већ понекад и као легитиман облик политичке акције. Офанзивни карактер одлуке истовремено води занемаривању научних критеријума у корист политичке сврсисходности при квалификацији неког понашања као терористичког акта. Доминација политичког критеријума при квалификовању терористичког акта утиче на инструментализацију тероризма и његово претварање у ефикасно средство хибридног ратовања. Садржај хибридног ратовања није последица неограниченог избора средстава односно оружја нити њихове софистицираности, већ способности безбедносног менаџмента да у свакој конкретној ситуацији независно од организационог нивоа примени такву комбинацију различитих, али међусобно компатибилних појединачних начина ратовања којом се остварује синергијски ефекат ради реализације претходно постављеног циља. Управо због тога тероризам као облик сложеног политичког насиља постаје предмет експлоатације у сврху хибридног ратовања. На основу резултата истраживања описана су три модела експлотације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања. Први модел експлоатације тероризма изведен је из политичке праксе САД да државе за које САД сматрају да користе тероризам као политичко средство ставе на Листу спонзора тероризма. Имајући у виду политички и сваки други утицај који САД имају, овакава пракса и њене последице формално или неформално су прихваћене широм света. Основне последице стављања на Листу спонзора тероризма су санкције, дискредитација у међународној јавности и легитимисање мера против таквих држава, док се у исто време таквом праксом врши притисак на државе које нису на Листи да ускладе своју политику са интересима великих сила. Други модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања манифестује се кроз организовање, финансирање, опремање, обуку и усмеравање сурогат снага против влада држава са којима није остварена компатибилност интереса, при чему су сурогат снаге представљене у јавном дискурсу као борци за слободу. Предмет експлоатације у Другом моделу јесте насиље које испуњава теоријске критеријуме да буде означено као тероризам, али је због политичке сврсисходности квалификовано као борба за слободу, отпор против угњетавања и сл. Експлоатација насиља у Другом моделу врши се у циљу промене носилаца политичке власти, стварање аутономних регија односно држава које би биле кооперативне са политиком државе која примењује Други модел или као део шире стратегије управљања безбедносним процесима. Трећи модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања подразумева организовање и управљање сурогат снагама које су квалификоване као терористичке организације или се врши инфилтрација појединаца у изворне и самосталне народне побуне ради преузимања руководећих места и управљања њиховим деловањем у складу са интересима државе која предузима Трећи модел. Предмет експлоатације у Трећем моделу јесте насиље које је квалификовано као тероризам, при чему је циљ експлоатације вишеструк: 1. Путем насиља и страха који настаје као последица вршења терористичких аката управља се безбедносном ситуацијом у држави која је мета агресије или у региону који је потребно политички и територијално контролисати, са или без физичког присуства оружаних снага државе која примењује Трећи модел; 2. Стварање страха код одређеног или унапред неодређеног броја држава од потенцијалних напада терористичких организација ради вршења латентног политичког притиска на државе да буде кооперативне, и 3. Стварање разлога за војну интервенцију ради присуства и политичке контроле одређене државе или региона. На основу претходно изнетих резултата истраживања изведен је закључак да први корак у спречавању експлоатације тероризма против наше државе представља отклањање или смањивање потенцијала за друштвене сукобе који настаје услед стварања или продубљивања друштвених противречности. Из тог разлога извршена је анализа нормативно – политичког и институционалног оквира у релевантним областима друштвеног живота. Истраживањем је утврђено да у Републици Србији постоји добар основ за ангажовање и интегрисање свих ресурса друштвене моћи на плану остваривања националне безбедности, али и да постоји потреба да се актуелни политички и безбедносни институционални оквир усклади са таквим могућностима. Као резултат истраживања предложене су три групе мера чија примена треба за резултат да има: отклањање и смањивање опасности од стварања потенцијала за друштвене сукобе; успостављање ефикасног и интегрисаног институционалног оквира за супротстављање политичком насиљу које евентуално проистекне из постојећих противречности и отклањање и смањивање штетних последица таквог политичког насиља. ; U teoriji postoji saglasnost da terorizam predstavlja politički motivisano nasilje i da u tom smislu predstavlja jedan od oblika nasilne političke borbe. Specifična razlika terorizma u odnosu na druge oblike političkog nasilja je primarna usmerenost ka stvaranju, održavanju i eksploataciji straha radi zastrašivanja protivnika i jačanja podrške među pristalicama. Suštinska odstupanja od teorijskih i pravnih kriterijuma pri određivanju terorizma postoje u praksi Saveta bezbednosti. Opšta ocena delovanja Saveta bezbednosti prilikom donošenja rezolucija o terorizmu jeste da prati vladajući politički diskurs u kome su najpre države bile odgovorne za terorizam, da bi potom "slabe", "neodgovorne" i "represivne" države bile odgovorne za omogućavanje delovanja međunarodnih terorističkih organizacija na svojoj teritoriji. Savet bezbednosti usvajao je rezolucije u kojima je terorističke akte određivao spram prirode akta, ali i spram izvršioca čime su svi akti prethodno određene terorističke organizacije kvalifikovani kao teroristički akti. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno i da je prilikom usvajanja pojedinih rezolucija politička svrsishodnost uticala da se istovrsna ponašanja ne kvalifikuju uvek kao teroristički akti. Na osnovu izvedenih zaključaka utvrđeno je da složenost borbe protiv terorizma predstavlja posledicu prvenstva političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikovanju akta nasilja kao terorističkog akta, a ne zbog teškoća u definisanju terorizma. Promene u koncepciji terorizma u rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti i njihova usklađenost sa vladajućim javnim diskursom odvijaju se istovremeno sa nastojanjem SAD i drugih zapadnih država da preoblikuju međunarodnu zajednicu i uspostave novi svetski poredak. U takvim okolnostima terorizam počinje da egzistira kao ofanzivno političko sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja, pri čemu se negativna konotacija terorizma eksploatiše na dva načina. Prvo, terorizam postaje politička ocena nečijeg delovanja bez obzira na prirodu tako označene aktivnosti. Drugo, terorizam se upotrebljava kao nasilno političko sredstvo koje, u zavisnosti od interesa onoga ko ceni određeno ponašanje, neće u svakoj situaciji biti označeno kao terorizam, već ponekad i kao legitiman oblik političke akcije. Ofanzivni karakter odluke istovremeno vodi zanemarivanju naučnih kriterijuma u korist političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikaciji nekog ponašanja kao terorističkog akta. Dominacija političkog kriterijuma pri kvalifikovanju terorističkog akta utiče na instrumentalizaciju terorizma i njegovo pretvaranje u efikasno sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja. Sadržaj hibridnog ratovanja nije posledica neograničenog izbora sredstava odnosno oružja niti njihove sofisticiranosti, već sposobnosti bezbednosnog menadžmenta da u svakoj konkretnoj situaciji nezavisno od organizacionog nivoa primeni takvu kombinaciju različitih, ali međusobno kompatibilnih pojedinačnih načina ratovanja kojom se ostvaruje sinergijski efekat radi realizacije prethodno postavljenog cilja. Upravo zbog toga terorizam kao oblik složenog političkog nasilja postaje predmet eksploatacije u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Na osnovu rezultata istraživanja opisana su tri modela eksplotacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Prvi model eksploatacije terorizma izveden je iz političke prakse SAD da države za koje SAD smatraju da koriste terorizam kao političko sredstvo stave na Listu sponzora terorizma. Imajući u vidu politički i svaki drugi uticaj koji SAD imaju, ovakava praksa i njene posledice formalno ili neformalno su prihvaćene širom sveta. Osnovne posledice stavljanja na Listu sponzora terorizma su sankcije, diskreditacija u međunarodnoj javnosti i legitimisanje mera protiv takvih država, dok se u isto vreme takvom praksom vrši pritisak na države koje nisu na Listi da usklade svoju politiku sa interesima velikih sila. Drugi model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja manifestuje se kroz organizovanje, finansiranje, opremanje, obuku i usmeravanje surogat snaga protiv vlada država sa kojima nije ostvarena kompatibilnost interesa, pri čemu su surogat snage predstavljene u javnom diskursu kao borci za slobodu. Predmet eksploatacije u Drugom modelu jeste nasilje koje ispunjava teorijske kriterijume da bude označeno kao terorizam, ali je zbog političke svrsishodnosti kvalifikovano kao borba za slobodu, otpor protiv ugnjetavanja i sl. Eksploatacija nasilja u Drugom modelu vrši se u cilju promene nosilaca političke vlasti, stvaranje autonomnih regija odnosno država koje bi bile kooperativne sa politikom države koja primenjuje Drugi model ili kao deo šire strategije upravljanja bezbednosnim procesima. Treći model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja podrazumeva organizovanje i upravljanje surogat snagama koje su kvalifikovane kao terorističke organizacije ili se vrši infiltracija pojedinaca u izvorne i samostalne narodne pobune radi preuzimanja rukovodećih mesta i upravljanja njihovim delovanjem u skladu sa interesima države koja preduzima Treći model. Predmet eksploatacije u Trećem modelu jeste nasilje koje je kvalifikovano kao terorizam, pri čemu je cilj eksploatacije višestruk: 1. Putem nasilja i straha koji nastaje kao posledica vršenja terorističkih akata upravlja se bezbednosnom situacijom u državi koja je meta agresije ili u regionu koji je potrebno politički i teritorijalno kontrolisati, sa ili bez fizičkog prisustva oružanih snaga države koja primenjuje Treći model; 2. Stvaranje straha kod određenog ili unapred neodređenog broja država od potencijalnih napada terorističkih organizacija radi vršenja latentnog političkog pritiska na države da bude kooperativne, i 3. Stvaranje razloga za vojnu intervenciju radi prisustva i političke kontrole određene države ili regiona. Na osnovu prethodno iznetih rezultata istraživanja izveden je zaključak da prvi korak u sprečavanju eksploatacije terorizma protiv naše države predstavlja otklanjanje ili smanjivanje potencijala za društvene sukobe koji nastaje usled stvaranja ili produbljivanja društvenih protivrečnosti. Iz tog razloga izvršena je analiza normativno – političkog i institucionalnog okvira u relevantnim oblastima društvenog života. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da u Republici Srbiji postoji dobar osnov za angažovanje i integrisanje svih resursa društvene moći na planu ostvarivanja nacionalne bezbednosti, ali i da postoji potreba da se aktuelni politički i bezbednosni institucionalni okvir uskladi sa takvim mogućnostima. Kao rezultat istraživanja predložene su tri grupe mera čija primena treba za rezultat da ima: otklanjanje i smanjivanje opasnosti od stvaranja potencijala za društvene sukobe; uspostavljanje efikasnog i integrisanog institucionalnog okvira za suprotstavljanje političkom nasilju koje eventualno proistekne iz postojećih protivrečnosti i otklanjanje i smanjivanje štetnih posledica takvog političkog nasilja. ; There is a consensus in security studies that terrorism is a politically motivated violence and, therefore, it represents one of the forms of violent political struggle. What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its primary focus on creating, maintaining and exploiting fear in order to intimidate opponents and strengthen support among allies. Fundamental deviations from theoretical and legal criteria in determination of terrorism are identified in the pratice of the Security Council. The general assessment of the Security Council's actions related to terrorism is that the Council has been following the prevailing political discourse in which, initially, states in their entirety were responsible for terrorism, and later the blame was put on "weak", "irresponsible" and "repressive" states for enabling international terrorist organizations to operate on their territories. The Security Council passed resolutions in which it classified terrorist acts according to the nature of the act but also to the nature of the perpetrator, which resulted in treating all acts of a previously designated terrorist organization as terrorist acts. The research also determined that during the adoption of certain resolutions, political expediency influenced the fact that similar behaviors do not always qualify as terrorist acts. Based on the previously derived conclusions, it could be said that the complexity of fight against terrorism is a consequence of the primacy of the political criterion in designation of an act of violence as a terrorist act, and not because of the difficulties in defining the notion of terrorism. Changes in the concept of terrorism in the Security Council Resolutions and their harmonization with the prevailing public discourse coincides with the efforts of the United States and other Western countries to reshape the international community and establish a new world order. In such circumstances, terrorism becomes an offensive political tool of hybrid warfare, with the negative connotation of terrorism being exploited in two ways. First, terrorism has become a political assessment of one's actions, regardless of the nature of the such activities. Second, terrorism has become a violent political tool which, depending on the interests of those in the position to evaluate certain behaviors, will not be labeled as terrorism in each situation, but rather as a legitimate form of political action at times. Offensive character of the decision leads to the neglect of scientific criteria in favor of political expediency in the process of terrorist act designation. Dominance of the political criterion in designation of a terrorist act influences the instrumentalisation of terrorism and its transformation into an effective means of hybrid warfare. Content of hybrid warfare is not a consequence of an unlimited variety of weapons used, nor their sophistication, but the ability of security management to apply such combinations of different, yet mutually compatible types of warfare in order to achieve a previously determined aim. These are reasons why terrorism, as a form of complex political violence, is exploited in hybrid warfare. Based on the results of the research, three models of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare are described. The First Model of exploitation is derived from the political practice of the United States to put countries on the U.S list of state sponsors of terrorism. In accordance with the political and any other influence that the United States has, this practice and its consequences are formally or informally accepted around the world. The main consequences of being placed on the List are sanctions, discredit on the international level and legitimization of measures against such states, while at the same time putting pressure on countries that are not on the List to harmonize their policies with the interests of great powers. The Second Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purpose of hybrid warfare consists of organizing, financing, equipping, training and directing surrogate forces against the governments of countries with whom compatibility of interests has not been achieved, where surrogate forces are presented in the public discourse as freedom fighters. The subject of exploitation in the Second Model is violence that meets the theoretical criteria to be designated as terrorism. However, due to its political expediency it is qualified as a fight for freedom, resistance against oppression etc. The exploitation of violence used in the second model is done with the intention of shifting political power in order to create autonomous regions or states that would be cooperative with the policy of the state that applies the Second Model or as a part of a broader strategy for managing security processes. The Third Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare implies organization and managing of surrogate forces that are qualified as terrorist organizations or infiltrating individuals into original and independent popular uprisings in order to take leadership positions and manage their actions in accordance with the interests of the state which apply the Third Model. The subject of exploitation in the Third Model is violence that is qualified as terrorism, with multiple goals: 1. Violence and fear that arises as a result of terrorist acts allows crisis management in the country targeted by aggression or in the region in need of political and territorial control, with or without the physical presence of the armed forces of the State applying the Third Model; 2. Creating fear of potential terrorist attacks in order to exert latent political pressure on states to be cooperative, and 3. Creating reasons for a military intervention which results in physical presence and political control of a certain state or region. Based on the previously presented research results, it may be concluded that the first step to prevent terrorist exploitation against our country should be to eliminate or reduce the potential for social conflicts driven by social contradictions. For this reason, an analysis of the normative - political and institutional framework in the relevant areas of social life was conducted. The research has determined that in the Republic of Serbia there is a good basis for engaging and integrating all resources of national power in terms of achieving national security. In addition, there is a need to harmonize the current political and institutional framework for national security with such possibilities. As a result of the research, three groups of measures have been proposed: elimination or reduction of the potential for social conflicts; establishment of an effective and integrated institutional framework for countering political violence that may arise from the aforementioned contradictions, and elimination and reduction of harmful consequences of such political violence.