On economic inequality
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 2, Heft 6, S. 45
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 2, Heft 6, S. 45
In: Nuevas tendencias, Heft 103, S. 41-45
ISSN: 1139-8124
Questions like the extent of individual liberty, responsibility and need remain within philosophical conundrums. However, economists have taken a different approach by asking which aspects of inequality are measurable, and how philosophical theories can be applied to design more pragmatic public policies
In: T. Murphy and P. Twomey (eds.), Ireland's Evolving Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), pp.163–181
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of Economic Inequality, 2005
SSRN
In: Philosophy and public affairs, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 193-225
ISSN: 1088-4963
In: DePaul Law Review, Band 69, Heft 2
SSRN
In: Annual review of political science, Band 13, S. 489-516
ISSN: 1545-1577
After reviewing the current literature on the causes of economic in-equality, the article models the historical emergence of inequality as the result of a key technological change (i.e., the adoption of agriculture) that widened income differentials and led to the construction of state institutions, which shaped (depending on their particular nature, more or less authoritarian) the final distribution of economic assets within and across different societies. The article then explores the evolution of inequality in societies already endowed with state structures: A stream of biased technological shocks happens randomly and the "decisive" voter (who differs across political regimes) accepts or blocks them as a function of their effect on her net income. The decisive voter's response determines the overall distribution of income. The model is employed to give a coherent account of some broad historical trends in the evolution of income inequality. Adapted from the source document.
In: Social science quarterly, Band 96, Heft 5, S. 1314-1327
ISSN: 1540-6237
ObjectiveDespite substantial theorizing, the relationship between economic inequality and participation in nonviolent protests has not been satisfactorily examined empirically.MethodsUsing multilevel models of data from four waves of the European Social Survey, this article examines whether differences in inequality across countries and over time help explain people's engagement in peaceful protest.ResultsIt finds that greater inequality reduces protest participation for all those with incomes below the top quintile.ConclusionsThis result provides strong support for the relative power theory of political participation; the predictions of grievance and resource theories regarding inequality's effects on protest are not supported.
In: 32.1 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 1 (2016)
SSRN
In: Peace economics, peace science and public policy, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 599-610
ISSN: 1554-8597
AbstractThis brief note revisits the empirical relation between economic inequality and instances of democratization. We argue that economic inequality may be an explanatory factor only following macroeconomic downturns. Our point generalizes – empirical peace scientists examining the likelihood of major political events should consider the possibility that explanatory structural factors may have heterogeneous impacts across macroeconomic cycles.
In: Drupp, M.A., Meya, J.N., Baumgärtner, S. and M.F. Quaas (2017). Economic Inequality and the Value of Nature. University of Kiel Economics Working Paper 2017-08.
SSRN
Working paper
In: Social science quarterly, Band 100, Heft 3, S. 678-688
ISSN: 1540-6237
ObjectiveHow does economic inequality shape participation in political campaigns? Previous research has found that higher inequality makes people of all incomes less likely to participate in politics, consistent with relative power theory, which holds that greater inequality enables wealthier citizens to more fully reshape the political landscape to their own advantage. Campaign activities, however, demand more time and money than previously examined forms of participation and so might better conform to the predictions of resource theory, which focuses narrowly on the ramifications of inequality for individuals' resources.MethodsWe combine individual‐level data on donations, meeting attendance, and volunteer work for political campaigns with measures of state‐level income inequality to construct a series of multilevel models.ResultsThe analyses reveal that, where inequality is higher, campaign participation is lower among individuals of all incomes.ConclusionsPatterns of participation in even resource‐intensive campaign activities provide support for the relative power theory.
In: STATE AND MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT SCHOLAR NOTES, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 307-312
Economic inequality is a very acute research problem in the modern methodological trend of science. The discourse presented in the course of multiple studies forms judgments about inequality in the context of an uneven distribution of income within the economy. But when calculating the real incomes of consumers in the neoclassical tradition, the influence of transaction costs is neglected. Neoinstitutional economic theory, being a continuation of the neoclassical research paradigm, draws attention to the fact that economic exchange does not occur by itself, but occurs under the conditions of transaction costs. Considering the fact that transaction costs in the economy can be heterogeneous and unbalanced, that is, the burden of making an exchange may be different for different counterparties, a research hypothesis is formed for the article that transaction costs can be a regulator of economic inequality, restraining or dispersing it. The article aims to substantiate this hypothesis.