We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars & coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity & increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant & terrorism is reduced. 3 Figures, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.
The remarkable success of Sweden over the past 15 years has come after decades of sluggish growth, during which Sweden managed to lose its substantial lead in per-capita income. This substantiates the view that welfare cost and high taxes reduce growth and endanger competitiveness. Since then, however, Sweden has engaged in a remarkable strategy of reforming the budget process, increasing the flexibility of its labour market and boosting investment in the future. Incentives have been changed to achieve greater flexibility and to adapt to changes resulting from globalisation.