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In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 21, Heft 1, S. 17-28
ISSN: 1549-9219
We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars & coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity & increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant & terrorism is reduced. 3 Figures, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: International journal of political economy: a journal of translations, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 28-49
ISSN: 0891-1916
In: Voprosy ėkonomiki: ežemesjačnyj žurnal, Heft 4, S. 106-130
People often wonder why economists analyse models whose assumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a lot from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of offering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyse modelsthat are 'theoretical cases′, which help understand economic problems by drawinganalogies between the model and the problem. Thus, economic models, empiricaldata, experimental results and other sources of knowledge are all on equal footing, that is, they all provide cases to which a given problem can be compared. We offer complexity arguments that explain why case-based reasoning may sometimes be the method of choice and why economists prefer simple cases.
In: East Europe: a monthly review of East European affairs, Band 16, S. 13-16
ISSN: 0012-8430
In: Contributions in economics and economic history 99
In: Problems of communism, Band 9, S. 16-24
ISSN: 0032-941X
In: CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS, pp. 46-73, S. Bracking, ed., Palgrave, 2007
SSRN
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 69, S. 80-84
ISSN: 0011-3530
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 21, Heft 1, S. 17-28
ISSN: 1549-9219
We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars and coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity and increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant and terrorism is reduced.
In: Mirovaja ėkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija: MĖMO, Heft 1, S. 98-106
In: The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, S. 171-224