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This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status quo parties in the party system. This relationship weakens, and eventually disappears, as politicians' emphasis on "office-seeking" motivations increases relative to their interest in public policy. We test these predictions with both aggregate electoral data in contemporary Europe and a data set on legislative volatility in Turkey, uncovering support for the argument that party system fragmentation should positively affect the likelihood of entry when policy-seeking motivations are relevant, but not otherwise.

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation used in comparative politics is the "Effective Number of Parties", designed in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of "relevant"parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sartori's definition of relevance, without requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construction. We thus advocate for the use of our "Effective Number of Relevant Parties"in future comparative research.

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation used in comparative politics is the "Effective Number of Parties", designed in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of "relevant"parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sartori's definition of relevance, without requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construction. We thus advocate for the use of our "Effective Number of Relevant Parties"in future comparative research.

Different scholars count `the number of parties' in different ways, partly because they examine different parts of the political process and for different reasons. Sartori's qualitative approach focused mainly on competition for government, but is now largely supplanted by the quantitative `effective number of parties' index, which deals with votes and seats. But some quantitative research requires us to look beyond votes and seats. For example, testing proportional and pluralitarian models of democracy requires us to count parties not just in terms of votes and seats but also in terms of legislative and cabinet power. I estimate party shares of legislative and cabinet power to test democratic norms at British and German elections and parliaments. So, the effective number of parties index needs to be, and can be, extended beyond votes and seats alone.

ABSTRACTAttempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually been based on one of two seemingly incompatible approaches: (1) the 'institutional' approach (e.g., Duverger's Law and Hypothesis) focuses on the nature of the electoral system and also on the number of seats per district; (2) the 'ideological' approach stresses the nature and extent of social cleavages. This article attempts a synthesis by showing that election system and cleavage type interact to affect the number of parties, with the former factor determined in part by the latter. Our most striking finding, however, is that the effective number of parties tends to be obtained by adding 'one' to the number of issue dimensions. Within this broader framework, Duverger's Law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension, and Duverger's Hypothesis is replaced by a much more quantitative prediction as to the effective number of parties.

Attempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually been based on one of two seemingly incompatible approaches: (1) the 'institutional' approach (e.g., Duverger's Law and Hypothesis) focuses on the nature of the electoral system and also on the number of seats per district; (2) the 'ideological' approach stresses the nature and extent of social cleavages. This article attempts a synthesis by showing that election system and cleavage type interact to affect the number of parties, with the former factor determined in part by the latter. Our most striking finding, however, is that the effective number of parties tends to be obtained by adding 'one' to the number of issue dimensions. Within this broader framework, Duverger's Law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension, and Duverger's Hypothesis is replaced by a much more quantitative prediction as to the effective number of parties. Copyright © 1985, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

Attempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually relied on one of two apparently incompatible approaches: the institutional approach, exemplified by M. Duverger's law & hypothesis ("The Influence of Electoral Systems on Political Life," International Social Science Bulletin, 1951, 3, 314-352), which focuses on the nature of the electoral system & the number of seats per district; & the ideological approach, which focuses on the nature & extent of social cleavages. A synthesis of these two approaches is attempted. It is argued that electoral system & cleavage type interact to affect number of parties, with the electoral system determined in part by cleavage type. Empirical testing of this approach for 22 postwar democratic polities over the years 1945-1980 supports this formulation & also a more specific model in which the number of parties minus the number of issues equals one. Within this framework, Duverger's law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 32 References. Modified HA