Egalitarianism
In: Long, Ryan (2016). Egalitarianism. In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
In: Long, Ryan (2016). Egalitarianism. In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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In: How to Make Opportunity Equal, S. 44-54
In: New problems of philosophy
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Relational Egalitarianism" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Luck Egalitarianism
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 269-276
ISSN: 1747-7093
Pragmatist Egalitarianism argues that a deep impasse plagues philosophical egalitarianism. It sets forth a conception of equality rooted in American pragmatist thought--specifically William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty--that successfully mediates that impasse.
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Working paper
In: Bloomsbury Ethics
In: Bloomsbury Ethics Ser.
FC -- Half title -- Bloomsbury Ethics -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- 1 Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What is luck egalitarianism? -- 1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism? -- 1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin -- 1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson -- 1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen -- 1.7 Other distributive views -- 1.8 Summary -- 2 Why equality? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Formal equality -- 2.3 Equality of human beings -- 2.4 Williams on the idea of equality -- 2.5 Rawls on range properties -- 2.6 Respect and opaqueness -- 2.7 A different proposal -- 2.8 Summary -- 3 Luck -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Different kinds of luck -- 3.3 Thin luck -- 3.4 Thick luck -- 3.5 Independent notions of luck -- 3.6 How much luck is there? -- 3.7 Constitutive luck -- 3.8 Option luck versus brute luck -- 3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality -- 3.10 Bad luck versus good luck -- 3.11 Summary -- 4 Equality of what? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Welfare -- 4.3 The specification objection -- 4.4 The disability objection -- 4.5 The offensive preference objection -- 4.6 The expensive and snobbish tastes objections -- 4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection -- 4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view -- 4.9 Sen's capability metric -- 4.10 Summary -- 5 Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Some distinctions -- 5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality -- 5.4 The levelling down objection -- 5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.7 Egalitarian responses -- 5.8 Summary -- 6 The scope of luck egalitarianism -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Whole lives -- 6.3 Generations.
In: Theoria: a journal of social and political theory, Band 61, Heft 140
ISSN: 1558-5816
In: Behavioural public policy: BPP, S. 1-6
ISSN: 2398-0648
Abstract
In this paper, I reflect on the implications that ultimatum and dictator game experiments might have for public policy and for the debates over egalitarianism. Experiments suggest that people are more inclined to redistribute when outcomes are influenced by luck than effort. This can create difficulties for public policy when people hold contrasting views over whether luck or effort determine outcomes. The results also appear to play into forms of luck egalitarianism. However, they may also be consistent with an alternative understanding of egalitarianism as the impulse to have rules that treat people equally.
In: Social Theory & Practice, Band 18, S. 259-288
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This is a new interpretation and analysis of John Rawls's leading theory of distributive justice, which also considers the responding egalitarian theories of scholars such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, John Roemer, and Amartya Sen. Rawls's theory, Kaufman argues, sets out a normative ideal of justice that incorporates an account of the structure and character of relations that are appropriate for members of society viewed as free and equal moral beings. Forging an approach distinct amongst contemporary theories of equality, Rawls offers an alternative to egalitarian justice methodologies that aim primarily to compensate victims for undeserved bad luck. For Rawls, the values that ground the most plausible account of egalitarianism are real equality of economic opportunity combined with the guarantee of a fair distribution of social goods. Kaufman's analysis will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of political theory and political philosophy, particularly those working on justice, and on the work of John Rawls.
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 663-679
ISSN: 1467-9248
In this article I consider the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. I argue that not only is there no incompatibility, but that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. To make out my case I discuss the three main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. Opponents of egalitarianism contend that egalitarian goals can only be achieved with losses in autonomy; in particular, losses through infringements on the civil liberties of individual citizens, losses in the scope individuals have to exercise and exploit their own talents and losses in control over the income and wealth to which individuals are entitled as a result of the exercise of their talents. The first of these contentions is dealt with quite briefly but the second and third go to the heart of the matter and accordingly are given fuller discussion. None of the three can be convincingly made out because it is precisely where there are significant inequalities in income and wealth that significant differences exist in the scope individuals have to fulfil their life-plans and thus to exercise their individual autonomy.