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E. Digby Baltzell's most important thesis in his PHILADEL- PHIA GENTLEMEN is that the US is developing an Uc comparable in many ways to the aristocracies of the old world. Characterized by descent from old wealth, an Anglo-Saxon ethnic background, membership in the Episcopalian church, educ at a private boarding Sch & then at Princeton, Yale or Harvard U's, membership in the Somerset, Knickerbocker, or Philadelphia clubs-it is this class which also, in Philadelphia at least, controls the major sectors of the economy. By its combination of high SS & econ wealth it possesses tremendous community power. The creation of one Uc whose members share a common background & values also serves to create a class of power holders who can be disciplined for violation of the code by their status peers. Baltzell's one major deficiency is his failure to deal with the continued vitality of the value of egalitarianism in America & its effect on US Uc life. The constant tendency toward aristocracy has always been countered by egalitarianism & by large-scale SM. J. A. Fishman.

The 2 chief works of de Tocqueville: ON DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA & the ANCIENT REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION both start with the same question: the supreme ideal of society is egalitarianism; can it also include freedom? For de Tocqueville, democracy is before everything, a soc fact, an equality of conditions which implies the sovereignty of the people & their participation in public affairs within its framework, & which, in its econ aspect, tends toward the reduction of inequality. However, the democratic society is not necessarily a liberal one; de Tocqueville considers liberty to be the security of everyone under the protection of the law, to the extent that the citizens have themselves, contributed to the establishment of the laws, & to the extent to which they themselves are free. De Tocqueville's problem, therefore, is: Under what circumstances does a democratic society have the best opportunity for not becoming despotic? In examining 2 separate instances-the US & France-he replies by elaborating the viewpoint of Montesquieu, develops the principle of modern industrial & commercial societies, with their clear understanding of their own interests & their respect for the law; & at the same time, makes clear the relationship between soc types & types of Gov. The opportunities of democracy seem more possible for him in the US than in France, since there we can see a historic continuity, communal & regional liberty, religious beliefs lacking a participation in an established church, & indifference to general theories. A cent ago, de Tocqueville had clearly envisaged the coming of a democratic regime; the hostility & indifference which greeted his views came from 2 directions: the historians have extensively criticized the generalities in which his views are couched & the inadequacies of his documentation, & the sociol'ts, up to the break between totalitarianism & pluralistic democracy, have misunderstood the historical import of the problem which he has posed. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

On any list of the most penetrating and least deceived political theorists of the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville must be ranked high. Few others perceived the dangers both of egalitarianism and of racial thinking; of secular religions as well as of state churches; of historical determinism, as well as of those other explanations which equally well undermine responsibility by attributing everything to mere chance or to the appearance of exceptional individuals. Tocqueville insisted upon the obligation of free men to determine by empirical investigation just what are the genuine alternatives confronting them. By his own effort to perform this task, he made a classic contribution to the study of the relationships between social organization and political institutions.

The reaction against the New Deal of Roosevelt & Truman, the fear of increased power of the State, the hostility toward ai planned society, the present prosperity of the US--these factors have favored the rebirth of a conservative ideology. Conservative Americans are not, however, senseless & reactionary defenders of laissez faire & of isolationism. Their pessimistic view of human nature, their distrust of abstract solutions, & their respect for past experience push them toward a decentralized & hierarchical state. Can this conservative ideology, which has had considerable success in US intellectual circles & in the Republican group around President Eisenhower, become an effective pol'al force? Circumstances are favorable for such a development, but against it are the egalitarianism & the belief in human achievement that are deeply rooted in the conscience of the American masses. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

After nearly two decades of revolutionary rule in China, the break with the past which Communist direction has seemed to represent is increasingly being seen in a wider perspective. Few scholars would attempt to argue that the Communists have not brought a genuine revolution or that their ascendancy is merely the equivalent of a new dynasty. But as the character of the new order has become clearer with time and as an analysis both more detailed and less concerned with short-term matters has become possible, many scholars have been as much impressed by continuities with the pre-Communist past as by discontinuities. To take perhaps the clearest example, the current Chinese view of their relation to the rest of the world appears to represent little change from the traditional Sinocentric image. Ideological absolutism is also not new to China with Mao Tse-tung, nor is the conception of individual subsevience to public good, the unquestioned rightness of close social limits on individual actions. And contemporary China retains, for all its professed egalitarianism, a strongly elitist and hierarchial pattern.

Nat'l character must be distinguished from nat'l characteristics, & must be assessed over an adequate period of time. Also, the question must be faced as to whether pol'al instit's shape nat'l character more or less than they are shaped by it. The outstanding attributes of nat'l character discernible in recent cent's are particularism, atomism, orderliness, otherworldliness, restraint, a sense of mission, herrenvolkism, mysticism & humility, anthropocentricism, materialism, egalitarianism, traditionalism, logicism, empiricism, exp'alism, & resoluteness. But what of the future? It would appear that as we observe the passing of the bipolar pol'al world & are confronted with the vocal independence of the 3rd World, there will be an intensification of particularism, both within & among separate countries. Also, it appears that pol'al loyalties will be based increasingly on hate rather than love, which is another reason why we should try to develop an effective world gov. The state as a concept & a pol'al entity is fading. Gov's are becoming more ephemeral, but they are real & comprehensible, whether they take on the form of a republic, a one-man dictatorship, a one-party dictatorship, or a charismatic executive. HA.

National character must be distinguished from na tional characteristics, and must be assessed over an adequate period of time. Also, the question must be faced as to whether political institutions shape national character more or less than they are shaped by it. The outstanding attributes of national character discernible in recent centuries are particularism, atomism, orderliness, otherworldliness, restraint, a sense of mission, herrenvolkism, mysticism and humility, anthropocen tricism, materialism, egalitarianism, traditionalism, logicism, empiricism, experimentalism, and resoluteness. But what of the future? It would appear that as we observe the passng of the bipolar political world and are confronted with the vocal independence of the Third World, there will be an intensifica tion of particularism, both within and among separate coun tries. Also, it appears that political loyalties will be based in creasingly on hate rather than love, which is another reason why we should try to develop an effective world government. Also, the state as a concept and a political entity is fading. Governments are becoming more ephemeral, but they are real and comprehensible, whether they take on the form of a re public, a one-man dictatorship, a one-party dictatorship, or a charismatic executive.

A discussion of the changes which have been taking place since the start of the 20th cent in the status of French Canadian F's, examining the professional work of these F's, the part they play in pol, & the status of the mother in the modern fam. While F's worked only in cases of necessity in 1900, it is now regarded by all strata of French Canadian society as normal that F's should work at least until they marry. Yet, the % of French Canadian wives who work is well below the nat'l Md, despite the highly industrialized nature of the French Canadian province of Quebec. It would thus appear that the French Canadians 'consider the woman's job in the home & with the children of such importance as to counterbalance the advantages of a higher standard of living.' Though F's have had equal pol'al rights since 1940, 'they have not yet grasped the significance of the pol'al equality granted them, nor have they managed to exploit its full possibilities.' Moreover, though they have equal pol'al rights, they still rank as minors re legal rights. It is suggested that 'one result of these changes has been to upset the very delicate balance of power within the traditional fam pattern. The father's loss in official authority appears to be offset by his gain in real power, with the result that the egalitarianism of modern fam life may lead, in the long run, to weakening the position of the mother, who no longer dominates the shifting web of relations between the various members of the fam.' (See also SA 0715-A8860). I. Taviss.

The central sociol'al problem is to ascertain what sac patterns will maximize the protection of human rights. These rights are conceived as a specific part of the soc structure & examined, at the fam level, as a set of role obligations. The following areas in which human rights within the fam have been recently extended are summarized: mate choice, bride price or dowry, inter-caste & inter-class marriage, control by elders & other kin, inheritance, contraception, abortion, divorce, & egalitarianism within the fam. The trends noted are steps toward the securing of human rights. The authoritarian & the collaborative style of fam control are contrasted re relations to the macrostructure of society & pol'al control & individual psychol. Authoritarian control of the fam by the father is r'ed with such traits as these: deification of the parent, high evaluation of the father role, the child's passive adjustment to the present situation, the suppression of the child's aggression, suppression of sexual impulses in the child, & the fostering of dependency in the child. Collaborative or democratic att's of fathers r with egalitarian treatment of children, encouragement of their independence, & affection as a means of control. Adults who exhibit intolerance of others' rights are more likely than other adults to have grown up under authoritarian parental control & to continue that tradition with their own children. In the collaborative fam, given greater security in affection, & the right to have pleasure without guilt, the individual's tolerance of frustration is greater, & his need to attack others when things go wrong will be less. Thus, he is less likely to approve any denial of human rights to those who differ in pol'al or other beliefs. However the relations between personality variables & those of the larger soc structure are ambiguous. Although adults who are reared under ideal conditions would probably be more inclined to support human rights, it is not clear that traditional, patriarchal, even authoritarian, fam relations necessarily create authoritarian pol'al & soc structures. Nonetheless, the changes in the fam patterns over the past half cent, important in themselves, may also act as a catalyst that will eventually transform the massive flux of modern revolution into a clear movement toward greater human freedom. S. Schwartz.