Egalitarianism
In: New problems of philosophy
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In: New problems of philosophy
'Pragmatist Egalitarianism' argues that a deep impasse plagues philosophical egalitarianism. It sets forth a conception of equality rooted in American pragmatist thought - specifically William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty - that successfully mediates that impasse
In: Bloomsbury Ethics
In: Bloomsbury Ethics Ser.
FC -- Half title -- Bloomsbury Ethics -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- 1 Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What is luck egalitarianism? -- 1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism? -- 1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin -- 1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson -- 1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen -- 1.7 Other distributive views -- 1.8 Summary -- 2 Why equality? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Formal equality -- 2.3 Equality of human beings -- 2.4 Williams on the idea of equality -- 2.5 Rawls on range properties -- 2.6 Respect and opaqueness -- 2.7 A different proposal -- 2.8 Summary -- 3 Luck -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Different kinds of luck -- 3.3 Thin luck -- 3.4 Thick luck -- 3.5 Independent notions of luck -- 3.6 How much luck is there? -- 3.7 Constitutive luck -- 3.8 Option luck versus brute luck -- 3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality -- 3.10 Bad luck versus good luck -- 3.11 Summary -- 4 Equality of what? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Welfare -- 4.3 The specification objection -- 4.4 The disability objection -- 4.5 The offensive preference objection -- 4.6 The expensive and snobbish tastes objections -- 4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection -- 4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view -- 4.9 Sen's capability metric -- 4.10 Summary -- 5 Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Some distinctions -- 5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality -- 5.4 The levelling down objection -- 5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.7 Egalitarian responses -- 5.8 Summary -- 6 The scope of luck egalitarianism -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Whole lives -- 6.3 Generations.
This is a new interpretation and analysis of John Rawls's leading theory of distributive justice, which also considers the responding egalitarian theories of scholars such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, John Roemer, and Amartya Sen. Rawls's theory, Kaufman argues, sets out a normative ideal of justice that incorporates an account of the structure and character of relations that are appropriate for members of society viewed as free and equal moral beings. Forging an approach distinct amongst contemporary theories of equality, Rawls offers an alternative to egalitarian justice methodologies that aim primarily to compensate victims for undeserved bad luck. For Rawls, the values that ground the most plausible account of egalitarianism are real equality of economic opportunity combined with the guarantee of a fair distribution of social goods. Kaufman's analysis will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of political theory and political philosophy, particularly those working on justice, and on the work of John Rawls.
Achieving social equality has been an important aim of modern democratic societies. Yet the process has engendered debate about the nature of equality and the consequences of its application. Why is equality valuable? What kind of equality should be aimed for? When is inequality justified? Should a principle of equality apply globally? The book assesses and links the different dimensions of equality and asks whether recent writing on the topic has the philosophical substance and political force traditionally associated with egalitarian thought.
Over the last twenty years, many political philosophers have rejected the idea that justice is fundamentally about distribution. Rather, justice is about social relations, and the so-called distributive paradigm should be replaced by a new relational paradigm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to describe, refine, and assess these thoughts and to propose a comprehensive form of egalitarianism which includes central elements from both relational and distributive paradigms. He shows why many of the challenges that luck egalitarianism faces reappear, once we try to specify relational egalitarianism more fully. His discussion advances understanding of the nature of the relational ideal, and introduces new conceptual tools for understanding it and for exploring the important question of why it is desirable in the first place to relate as equals. Even severe critics of the distributive understanding of justice will find that this book casts important new light on the ideal to which they subscribe.
In: Cambridge studies in Islamic civilization
In: Palgrave pivot
This text explores the place to locate the cut between those inequalities for which it is fair to hold one responsible, and those for which it is not. The argument traces a thread of intellectual history, identifying a rejection of strong property rights which we inherit from Locke, and find in contemporary defenders of entitlements such as Nozick. Robert C. Robinson is Lecturer in the School of Professional Studies at the City University of New York, USA
Using the methods of reasoned history and comparative statistics, this work arrives at an assessment of egalitarianism. It traces the rise of egalitarianism from the Renaissance and Reformation onwards. A complementary approach is provided by a wide survey of actual distributions of income and wealth
How should we decide which inequalities between people are justified, and which are unjustified? One answer is that such inequalities are only justified where there is a corresponding variation in responsible action or choice on the part of the persons concerned. This view, which has become known as 'luck egalitarianism', has come to occupy a central place in recent debates about distributive justice. This book is the first full length treatment of this significant development in contemporary political philosophy. Each of its three parts addresses a key question concerning the theory. Which version of luck egalitarian comes closest to realizing luck egalitarian objectives? Does luck egalitarianism succeed as a view of egalitarian justice? And is it sound as an account of distributive justice in general? The book provides a distinctive answer to each of these questions, along the way engaging with the leading theorists identified in the literature as luck egalitarians, such as Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, and Ronald Dworkin, as well as the most influential critics, including Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, Samuel Scheffler, and Jonathan Wolff. Key Features Presents a critical survey of already classic debates about responsibility, equality and justice Provides a sustained engagement with luck egalitarianism's critics Stakes a distinctive position on the key questions regarding luck egalitarianism