Suchergebnisse

In late 1986 the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in New Zealand published its report. The Commission's recommendations were both radical and comprehensive. Amongst other things it proposed the introduction of a mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system, the abolition of the four Maori seats, a substantial increase in the number of MPs, the state funding of political parties, and various changes to the system of boundary redistribution and the administration of elections. This paper outlines the background to the establishment of the Royal Commission, briefly examines the Commission's principal findings, and considers the prospects for reform. (Internat. Polit. Science Assoc.)

Background and findings of the 1986 report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in New Zealand. Recommends a mixed member proportional electoral system, the abolition of the four Maori seats, a substantial increase in the number of MPs, the state funding of political parties, and various changes to the system of boundary redistribution and the administration of elections.

The New Zealand government set up a Royal Commission to consider the country's electoral system. It produced an unexpectedly radical Report, challenging some of the basic assumptions of the Westminster system under which New Zealand has been governed for 100 years. This article considers the wider implications of the Report. (IPSA, abridged/DÜI)

Recent efforts at estimating bias and responsiveness in electoral systems typically proceed by assigning observations to subsamples according to which party controlled the redistricting process. We show this traditional procedure to introduce selection bias into the resulting estimates of bias and responsiveness and present an alternative strategy for estimating these parameters. Using data from the state legislatures, and employing two different measures of partisan control of redistricting, we obtain results that modestly differ from those obtained with the traditional approach. Measures of control of redistricting utilizing information about the partisan intent of redistricting commissions and tribunals are exogenous to the seats-votes relationship.