Conclusion and Reflection: Time for an Electoral Commission for Ireland
In: Irish political studies: yearbook of the Political Studies Association of Ireland, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 641-646
ISSN: 1743-9078
In: Irish political studies: yearbook of the Political Studies Association of Ireland, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 641-646
ISSN: 1743-9078
Khabele Matlosa: Evolution of electoral governance in South Africa : prelude to the post-Apartheid era 10. - Mcebisi Ndletyana: The making of the Independent Electoral Commission, 1993-1997 26. - Mashupye Maserumule: Pre-poll preparations 75. - Brown Bavusile Maaba: Free at last! 102. - Khela Shubane: Inaugural local elections : an imperfect start 122. - Xolela Mangcu: Local government : the last frontier towards democratisation 145. - Brutus Malada: Voter education in post-Apartheid South Africa 161. - Nompumelelo Runji: Widening access and enabling franchise 179. - Michael Milazi: Evolution of South Africa's electoral jurisprudence 205. - Claude Kabemba: International engagements 227
World Affairs Online
When and how do third-party actors—most prominently electoral commissions, courts, and observers—contribute to the integrity of the electoral process? We approach these questions by studying how third-party actors shape politicians' incentives to comply with the outcomes of elections. Third parties are most beneficial in close elections, when the threat of a post-election confrontation alone fails to ensure self-enforcing compliance with election outcomes. Our analysis highlights that third parties do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential, that it is third parties with a moderate pro-incumbent bias that will be acceptable to not only the opposition but also the incumbent, and that incumbents adopt politically consequential third-party institutions when they fear that their narrow victory might result in a costly post-election confrontation. Extensions of our model address the role of repression and urban bias, examine the differences between commissions, courts, and observers, and clarify not only the potential but also the limits to institutional solutions to the problem of electoral compliance in new and transitioning democracies.
BASE
When and how do third-party actors—most prominently electoral commissions, courts, and observers—contribute to the integrity of the electoral process? We approach these questions by studying how third-party actors shape politicians' incentives to comply with the outcomes of elections. Third parties are most beneficial in close elections, when the threat of a post-election confrontation alone fails to ensure self-enforcing compliance with election outcomes. Our analysis highlights that third parties do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential, that it is third parties with a moderate pro-incumbent bias that will be acceptable to not only the opposition but also the incumbent, and that incumbents adopt politically consequential third-party institutions when they fear that their narrow victory might result in a costly post-election confrontation. Extensions of our model address the role of repression and urban bias, examine the differences between commissions, courts, and observers, and clarify not only the potential but also the limits to institutional solutions to the problem of electoral compliance in new and transitioning democracies.
BASE
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 77, Heft 2, S. 407-420
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 77, Heft 2, S. 407-420
ISSN: 1468-2508
The article studies the origins of the party-list electoral system in the 1987 Philippine Constitution through a review of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and interviews with the 1986 constitutional commissioners. It seeks to help clarify the current debate on the purpose and meaning of the party-list electoral system that elects 20% of members of the House of Representatives by reviewing the transcripts of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and by interviewing the principal authors of the party-list provisions in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Through the presentation of the original positions of the constitutional commissioners, the study seeks to better recount, recover, and review the founding vision of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that is buried in the accretion of the enabling law for the party list, Supreme Court decisions, Commission on Elections (Comelec) resolutions, petitions of political party and sectoral groups, and commentaries that have competed to interpret the constitutional provisions on the party list in the past 28 years of existence of the 1987 Constitution.Keywords: Party-list electoral system, 1986 Constitutional Commission, 1987 Philippine Constitution, proportional representation, House of Representatives In
BASE
Australia has a proud history of being an international leader in electoral administration, and Australian electoral commissions continue to have a professional, non-partisan approach to the management of elections. Yet their independence is constrained by the electoral laws they need to administer, and parliamentary committees charged with the oversight of the conduct of elections do so with a clear partisan bias. Elections are all about winners, but who decides who the winners will be? Voters definitely have a big say, but it is the electoral system that determines how votes translate into seats in parliament. Any changes to the electoral system require the support of those in power, and it is important to question who benefits from electoral reforms. It is not surprising that partisanship plays a role and that governing parties usually benefit, although that is not always the case. This book assesses Australian electoral reforms of the past 30 years using personal interview data and parliamentary debates, to provide a picture of the reform process as well as the outcomes. These issues, such as who gets to vote, the use of postal voting, party registration and vote weighting, have a profound impact on who wins elections. The book also examines Australia's electoral administration, testing for professionalism, independence and integrity.
BASE
The Albanian electoral legislation generally reflects the requirments and recommendation of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission (EC). The comparative analysis highlights the need for intervention in this legislation, in particular in matters relating to: (i) creating favorable conditions for exercising the right to vote for voters residing abroad, (ii) the equality of vote power and equal chances for subjects and candidates part of the electoral race, (iii) gender representation, (iv) facilities for voters with disabilites, (v) establishment ofreliable and impartial election bodies, (vi) decision-making by qualified majority or consensus of the election commissions, (vii) establishing an effective complaints system, (viii) increased opportunities for the involvement of the judicial system, District Courts and Constitutional Court in election issues. DOI:10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n2p77
BASE
Abstract: The General Election Commission (KPU) is national, permanent, and independent general election organizers. General election, which is held to elect members DPR, DPRD, DPD, the president and vice president, is a means of implementing the rule of the people who carried out directly, generally, freely, confidentially, honestly and fairly in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD) 1945. Within the Islamic political jurisprudence's perspective, the duties and authorities of the General Election Commission in selecting the candidate for president and vice president participants are not contrary to the principles or the Islamic teachings. They also more emphasize to consultation and transparency in justice in doing the job. Otherwise, KPU can also be equated with ahlul halli wal aqdi institution. This institutions has the authority to decide and accommodate the aspirations of the people and institutions that have duty to determine a leader. Keywords: Electoral commission, president, Islamic political jurisprudence.
BASE
The article is devoted to the problem of the participation in the election of candidateswho are members of the superior electoral commissions with deliberative vote, inrelation to the Commission organizing elections.The author focuses on the need to improve the electoral legislation regulating thesuspension of powers of the member of the higher election Commission with deliberativevote, for the period of his participation in the elections as a candidate or early releasefrom their duties. ; Статья посвящена проблеме участия в выборах кандидатов, являющихся члена-ми вышестоящих избирательных комиссий с правом решающего голоса по отноше-нию к комиссиям, организующим выборы.Автором акцентируется внимание на необходимость совершенствования избира-тельного законодательства, регулирующего вопросы приостановления полномочийчлена вышестоящей избирательной комиссии с правом решающего голоса, на периодего участия в выборах в качестве кандидата или досрочного освобождения от соот-ветствующих обязанностей.
BASE
At a time when parliamentary committees continue to highlight concerns with New Zealand's four-agency approach to electoral administration, it is relevant to consider Australia's experience in electoral management. Reform advocates in New Zealand often refer to the Australian Electoral Commission as a possible model for replacing the four-agency approach. However, there is a need to ensure that any such body retains an independent position. Since the 1980s, a major shift has occurred in Australia - away from electoral 'offices' which were contained within government departments - to independent statutory commissions. While a single agency is the standard approach in all nine Australian jurisdictions (one federal, six states and two territories), there are many differences in their formation and operation. This article provides insight into the degrees of independence the nine commissions actually provide, with an emphasis on appointments, budgeting, and relationships between commissioners, ministers and parliaments. The paper draws on personal interviews with the nine current full-time commissioners, and ministers and members of parliament, as well as analysis of legislative reforms and the use of parliamentary oversight committees.
BASE
At a time when parliamentary committees continue to highlight concerns with New Zealand's four-agency approach to electoral administration, it is relevant to consider Australia's experience in electoral management. Reform advocates in New Zealand often refer to the Australian Electoral Commission as a possible model for replacing the four-agency approach. However, there is a need to ensure that any such body retains an independent position. Since the 1980s, a major shift has occurred in Australia - away from electoral 'offices' which were contained within government departments - to independent statutory commissions. While a single agency is the standard approach in all nine Australian jurisdictions (one federal, six states and two territories), there are many differences in their formation and operation. This article provides insight into the degrees of independence the nine commissions actually provide, with an emphasis on appointments, budgeting, and relationships between commissioners, ministers and parliaments. The paper draws on personal interviews with the nine current full-time commissioners, and ministers and members of parliament, as well as analysis of legislative reforms and the use of parliamentary oversight committees.
BASE
Abstract: This study highlights the Islamic political jurisprudence's against violations of the general election campaign. The violations of the campaign com Islamic political jurisprudence's perspective mitted by the perpetrators to elect the members of DPR and DPD is something that is familiar to the public. It means that there have so often a violation of the campaign during the legislative election campaign. Although the campaign's provisions in Law No. 8 year 2012 on General Election has been set on the prohibition of the campaign and the implementation of a safe election campaign. The campaigners look like clossing their eyes on the rules of the campaign. So that, it is quite difficult to be followed up by the authorities and the perpetrators are so easy to perform the prohibited action. Based on the Islamic political jurisprudence's perspective, the election campaign violations committed by the perpetrators have some negative effects that harm and disturb the public order. So that the perpetrators can be sentenced by an educative punishment for a criminal offense that has not been determined by the shari'ah. Keywords: Abuse, campaign, general election, Islamic political jurisprudence.
BASE
The origins of the distinguishing features of the Australian Electoral Commission can be found in nineteenth-century South Australia, when that colony led the world in electoral administration. It was the first jurisdiction to develop a professional, permanent, independent election management body, with salaried electoral officials, and to pursue continuous, State-initiated enrolment. South Australia evolved this way because, to extend path dependence terminology, it was 'locked out' of inefficient British practices. After Federation in 1901, the new Australian Electoral Office, largely based on the South Australian model, continued the tradition. One unique and defining feature was the strong, permanent role of divisional returning officers -'Electoral Kings', in the words of the first Australian Chief Electoral Officer. The 'Kings' were an integral component of much that was good about Australia's way of running elections. However, this structure is no longer the most appropriate for an organisation such as the AEC. It has long outlived its usefulness and is holding the Commission back. And, perhaps ironically for an organisation with a long record of resistance to political interference, it is House of Representatives politicians, of all major parties, who are restraining the AEC from adopting sensible arrangements. The AEC is now, in path dependence terms, 'locked in' to inefficient practices.
BASE