South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, President Hughes, 12 January 2022 Whether an application to register as a political party was properly rejected.
Like many other transitional democracies, South Africa has chosen to run its two national postapartheid elections by an independent electoral commission, not by the existing government. Although the results were widely considered legitimate, the perception of legitimacy was due in large part to the public's low expectations. To keep the public confidence, and to avoid the sorts of large-scale breakdowns in the electoral process that might undermine it, the current Electoral Commission must embrace major reforms. One of the Electoral Commission's most pressing problems is the fact that opposition parties believe it is strongly biased in favor of the ruling political party, the African National Congress. The Electoral Commission also has failed to devolve meaningful power to provincial officials, increasing the risk that it will botch the details of election management. The author proposes several measures to help resolve these concerns.
The current state of the office of the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana can be couched as a bleeding pillar in Ghana's electoral democracy pending crisis. In spite of the numerous reform measures undertaken by the EC to improve the quality delivery of its constitutional mandate, communication deficit and the increasing monetization of parliamentary and presidential contestation poses a serious threat to broader participation and competition in Ghana's future electoral fortune. Thus, the objective of the paper was to interrogate the issues of communication inefficiencies and monetization of political contestations by the Electoral Commission of Ghana and proffer pragmatic solutions that can be taken into consideration in years ahead due to the past and recent experiences of neighbouring countries within the sub-region. The study employed the qualitative research methodology to elicit responses from 12 experts in the field of elections. Apart from the primary data generated from the field, secondary sources were consulted to situate the discussion in the existing debate in the literature. The findings of the study revealed that monetization of the political contest has negative implications for a competitive political contest--disqualification of citizens with capable minds from contesting in a multi-party democracy) whilst communication deficit was found to be deepening public distrust in the Electoral Commission of Ghana. The study, therefore, recommended among others the creation of a three-man office solely responsible for managing the commission's website and other electronic outlets, and the immediate activation and implementation of the provision in the 2020 Strategic Plan of the Electoral Commission which has remained dormant after 2016 elections.
The structure of election administration is a crucial component of the democratic project of any state. In Nigeria, it is widely acknowledged that the structural character of the country's election management body –the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has over the years become the focal points at which elections are compromised. With insights from interviews and focused group discussion; conducted amongst INEC commissioners, staff and representatives of political parties within the period: 2009-2011, this paper is a graphic analysis of how the structure of INEC complicates the election administration process and democratic sustainability in Nigeria.
Over the past two decades, Southern African countries have entrenched the use of elections as the only means and medium for electing governments and representative institutions in governance. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) are central to the delivery and quality of elections. These institutions are mandated to manage most or all aspects of the electoral process. Informed by diverse factors – the design, mandate, extent of powers and even the number of institutions responsible for electoral matters vary in each country. This study is a collaborative effort between the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), the Open Society Foundation's Africa Regional Office (AfRO) and the Electoral Commissions Forum of the Southern African Development Community (ECF-SADC). For each of the 12 countries, the research covered: Comparative analysis of the legal frameworks the EMBs operate under and of the historical and political contexts they function within; Comparative study of the institutional nature of the EMBs; Assessment of the powers vested in the EMBs in the conduct and management of electoral processes and their role in the drafting of electoral laws, managing electoral operations, certifying and proclaiming electoral results, ensuring that electoral results are credible, and in resolving electoral conflicts; and Comparative assessment of the independence of the EMBs with particular reference to funding and their relationships with the executive, political parties, parliament and the judiciary (electoral justice mechanisms). Findings and recommendations from this pan-African initiative are expected to increase information and knowledge on the strengths, weaknesses and workings of EMBs in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate peer learning among African election managers, as well as informing policy-makers, legislators, governments and civil society on a progressive reform agenda to strengthen inclusive electoral processes and democratic practice.
In most of developing countries such as Ghana electioneering process normally results in election fraud such as double registration and other forms of election drawbacks during registration of voters and casting of votes by eligible voters. In the just ended Ghanaian election, electronic biometric registration and verification system was introduced during the registration and verification of voters. It was observed on the elections day that some of the genuine registered voters were not recognised by the biometric machine. However, the CI 75 which is the document that gives the rules and regulations pertaining to the Ghana elections indicated that no verification by biometric machine of a voter no vote from the voter. This means that before a voter could be allowed to cast his / her vote the biometric machine was supposed to recognize him/her first. Surprisingly, some of the eligible voters were disfranchised from voting which is against the constitutional rights of every Ghanaian who had reached the age of eighteen at the time of the registration of voters. Furthermore, some citizens that are physically challenged with no fingers were also denied the opportunities of exercising their franchise because the system used for the registration made use of fingerprint only. A Multi-scan biometric system is proposed to assist citizens that are physically challenged to cast their votes as well as to eradicate the problem of eligible registered voters disfranchised by the current biometric system. This paper proposes a multi scan system that allows citizens to use different parts of their bodies to go through the registration and verification process instead of their fingerprints alone as in the case of Ghana electioneering process. The introduction of this proposed system for general elections is expected to create room for full participation of all eligible voters, eliminate multiple voting and also increase the confidence of the people in Ghana in the electioneering process.
Abstract This research was motivated by the problem faced of KPU Kerinci regency in carried out their duties and authority. It was characterized by the lack of neutrality of the committee organizer the implementation of the sub-district (PPK) and the voting committee (PPS), the lack of enthusiasm in the society and the number of people who choosw not registered in the voters list (DPT). This research aims: 1) To describe the socialization given by KPU Kerinci regency in the implementation of local election. 2) To describe the action taken by the KPU Kerinci regency in order the regent and vice-regent candidate act accordance with the rule that have been socialized. 3) To describe how to the sanction given by the Kerinci regency to candidate who violate the rule. This research was descriptive qualitative. The instruments used were interview, questionnaire and documentation. These result indicate that 83% of people stated that the Kerinci regency has been implement the socialization maximally. The action taken by the KPU Kerinci regency to candidate regent and vice-regent to act according to the rule was provide socialization to a pair of candidates on election rules. The sanction given by the KPU Kerinci regency in observed the regent candidate pairs and representative who violate the rule given in the form of administrative sanction.Keywords: Authority, KPU, Political Participation
Institutional strengthening of Electoral Commission is a model to increase voter participation in 2020 Medan Mayoral Elections. Purpose of activities in improving voter participation through; First, describe trend of voter participation in Medan. Second, explain the Readiness of the Medan Municipal Election Commission in 2020 Regional Head Elections. Third, explaining institutional strengthening of Electoral Commission in increasing voter participation in Medan. Method of implementation of activities through a panel discussion with Blended learning based on webinars, and face-to-face with Selection Committee of Medan District. Results of devotion show; First, trend voter participation in regional head elections tends to be low, so a social and cultural approach is needed in increasing participation in Medan. Second, readiness of Medan Municipal Election Commission in the 2020 regional elections is readiness of human resources, socialization, participation and adaptation of new normal life. Third, institutional strengthening of Electoral Commission in increasing voter participation should be done to Ad Hoc institutions such as District Election Committee, Voting Committee, Voter Data Update Officer and Voting Organizing Group to better understand duties, functions and protocols of health. In addition, new innovations in political socialization and political education through information technology media provide public awareness and increase voter participation
This report is an in-depth study of electoral commissions in six countries of West Africa – Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone – assessing their contribution in strengthening political participation in the region. As institutions that apply the rules governing elections, electoral management bodies (EMBs) have occupied, over the last two decades, the heart of discussion and practice on the critical question of effective citizen participation in the public affairs of their countries. The way in which they are established and the effectiveness of their operations have continued to preoccupy those who advocate for competitive elections, while reforms to the EMBs have taken centre stage in more general political reforms. Election Management Bodies in West Africa thus responds to the evident need for more knowledge about an institution that occupies a more and more important place in the political process in West Africa. Based on documentary research and detailed interviews in each country, the study provides a comparative analysis which highlights the similarities and differences in the structure and operations of each body, and attempts to establish the reasons for their comparative successes and failures.
Supreme Court of Victoria, Richards J, 14 October 2020. Whether a proposed payment from one political party to another, in line with a previous coalition agreement, was a political donation or gift under the Electoral Act 2002 (Vic).
ABSTRACT: The paper explores the implications of the alleged administrative infractions at Ghana's Electoral Commission. We combine qualitative and quantitative approaches to address the issue as follows. First, we employ machine learning techniques to express the sentiment of Ghanaians towards the Commission using Facebook comments from different public sources. Second, we use data from an online survey to examine the propensity of Ghanaians to vote in future elections. The sentiment analysis allowed for the comparison of favourable, unfavourable and neutral Facebook comments and showed that 40 percent of comments were unfavourable whereas the neutral and favourable accounted for 27 and 33 percent respectively. However, the quantitative analysis showed that those respondents who see the Commission as the reason for the previous peaceful elections have a significant and positive propensity to vote in 2020 elections. Similarly, those respondents who see magnanimity of the Ghanaian as the reason for the many peaceful polls are more likely to vote in 2020 elections. It is worth noting, however, that the redeeming of the image of the Commission is imperative as the impasse has dwindled public faith in the Commission significantly.
When and how do third-party actors—most prominently electoral commissions, courts, and observers—contribute to the integrity of the electoral process? We approach these questions by studying how third-party actors shape politicians' incentives to comply with the outcomes of elections. Third parties are most beneficial in close elections, when the threat of a post-election confrontation alone fails to ensure self-enforcing compliance with election outcomes. Our analysis highlights that third parties do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential, that it is third parties with a moderate pro-incumbent bias that will be acceptable to not only the opposition but also the incumbent, and that incumbents adopt politically consequential third-party institutions when they fear that their narrow victory might result in a costly post-election confrontation. Extensions of our model address the role of repression and urban bias, examine the differences between commissions, courts, and observers, and clarify not only the potential but also the limits to institutional solutions to the problem of electoral compliance in new and transitioning democracies.
When and how do third-party actors—most prominently electoral commissions, courts, and observers—contribute to the integrity of the electoral process? We approach these questions by studying how third-party actors shape politicians' incentives to comply with the outcomes of elections. Third parties are most beneficial in close elections, when the threat of a post-election confrontation alone fails to ensure self-enforcing compliance with election outcomes. Our analysis highlights that third parties do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential, that it is third parties with a moderate pro-incumbent bias that will be acceptable to not only the opposition but also the incumbent, and that incumbents adopt politically consequential third-party institutions when they fear that their narrow victory might result in a costly post-election confrontation. Extensions of our model address the role of repression and urban bias, examine the differences between commissions, courts, and observers, and clarify not only the potential but also the limits to institutional solutions to the problem of electoral compliance in new and transitioning democracies.
The thrust of this paper is the transitional process from paper ballot to electronic voting in the management of Nigeria elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Managing election in Nigeria has been faced with a hurricane of interests from politicians, electoral commission and also the public. This paper has attempted to take a theoretical discourse on why the transition process in adopting full electronic voting in Nigeria has been node-diving. This paper addressed the problem of credibility by officials of the INEC in declaring election results and will also examine the level of acceptance of the technology or Model initiated by INEC in the conduct of elections. The paper utilized secondary sources of data collection. The Technology innovation theory was used to explain the concept of transition. We further recommend that Paper-trail backup must accompany Electronic Voting Machines (EVM) in the conduct of elections; Government should ensure various institutions responsible for the success of EVM is properly funded; Governments and electoral management bodies in developing nations should improve computer literacy rate among citizens due to technophobia that exists within them. We further concluded that Nigeria as a country should ensure that movement through its transition process in the quest for credibility and transparency in the conduct of elections should be a creeping approach rather than a forceful one. Key Words: Independent Electoral Commission, manual voting, electronic voting machine, Technology innovation theory
Supreme Court of Queensland, Applegarth J 30 March 2020. Whether gifts from prohibited donors can be made to a third party circumventing the prohibition on prohibited donors to the campaigns of political parties and candidates in Queensland