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Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ; Belief systems after converse / Donald R. Kinder -- Democracy with attitudes / Larry M. Bartels -- The political psychology of party identification / Herbert F. Weisberg and Steve H. Greene -- Process matters: cognitive models of candidate evaluation / Marco Steenbergen and Milton Lodge -- Policy issues and electoral democracy / Stuart Elaine Macdonald, Geroge Rabinowitz and Holly Brasher -- Elections and the dynamics of ideological representation / Michael B. MacKuen . [et al.] -- The heavenly public: what would a fully informed citizenry be like? / Robert C. Luskin -- The nature of belief in a mass public / Michael W. Traugot --- Electoral democracy during policts as usual, and unusual / John Aldrich -- Coming to grips with V.O. Key's concept of latent opinion / John Zaller. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The democratic civil peace hypothesis has generated considerable debate in conflict research. This debate has centered on three general claims: democracies have lower risk of civil conflict; autocracies have as low a risk of civil conflict as democracies; and hybrid regimes have the highest risk of civil conflict. This study reassesses the relationship between regime type and civil conflict by employing the newly constructed Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED). This measure enables us both to distinguish between levels of electoral democracy and distinct regime types. In contrasts to previous studies, our global statistical analysis shows that hybrid regimes do not have the highest risk of civil conflict. Rather, full autocracies are the most conflict prone, while full electoral democracies are least likely to experience civil conflict.

We evaluate the short- to medium-run effects on unionization and employers' and workers' trust in unions, of an important reform of French employment relations in 2008. This reform made the conditions for union recognition more liberal and democratic after 2008 in private firms with 11 employees or more. The law gave equal chances to all unions to be recognized for bargaining, putting an end to the quasi-monopoly given to five historical unions until then. The law also introduced votes and minimal electoral requirements to obtain union recognition. These new regulations only became fully effective at the first firms' work councils elections happening after January 1st, 2009. Those elections occur within each firm according to a pre-defined frequency - usually every four years -, so that election dates only depend on former election dates, and can be considered as quasi-random with respect to the application date of the new law, at least in firms that are old enough. The identification thus relies on a regression discontinuity design in which the running variable is the firms' work councils election date: we compare in early 2011 firms that had those elections just before or just after January 1st, 2009. We find that the democratic rules introduced in 2008 quickly improved employers' satisfaction and trust towards unions by around 45% of a standard deviation. Union coverage and membership at the establishment level also increased strongly due to the reform and work stoppages became more likely. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of electoral democracy in French firms managed to improve workers' participation in unions and their ability to voice concerns while also improving employers' opinions of unions.

We evaluate the short- to medium-run effects on unionization and employers' and workers' trust in unions, of an important reform of French employment relations in 2008. This reform made the conditions for union recognition more liberal and democratic after 2008 in private firms with 11 employees or more. The law gave equal chances to all unions to be recognized for bargaining, putting an end to the quasi-monopoly given to five historical unions until then. The law also introduced votes and minimal electoral requirements to obtain union recognition. These new regulations only became fully effective at the first firms' work councils elections happening after January 1st, 2009. Those elections occur within each firm according to a pre-defined frequency - usually every four years -, so that election dates only depend on former election dates, and can be considered as quasi-random with respect to the application date of the new law, at least in firms that are old enough. The identification thus relies on a regression discontinuity design in which the running variable is the firms' work councils election date: we compare in early 2011 firms that had those elections just before or just after January 1st, 2009. We find that the democratic rules introduced in 2008 quickly improved employers' satisfaction and trust towards unions by around 45% of a standard deviation. Union coverage and membership at the establishment level also increased strongly due to the reform and work stoppages became more likely. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of electoral democracy in French firms managed to improve workers' participation in unions and their ability to voice concerns while also improving employers' opinions of unions.

We evaluate the short- to medium-run effects on unionization and employers' and workers' trust in unions, of an important reform of French employment relations in 2008. This reform made the conditions for union recognition more liberal and democratic after 2008 in private firms with 11 employees or more. The law gave equal chances to all unions to be recognized for bargaining, putting an end to the quasi-monopoly given to five historical unions until then. The law also introduced votes and minimal electoral requirements to obtain union recognition. These new regulations only became fully effective at the first firms' work councils elections happening after January 1st, 2009. Those elections occur within each firm according to a pre-defined frequency - usually every four years -, so that election dates only depend on former election dates, and can be considered as quasi-random with respect to the application date of the new law, at least in firms that are old enough. The identification thus relies on a regression discontinuity design in which the running variable is the firms' work councils election date: we compare in early 2011 firms that had those elections just before or just after January 1st, 2009. We find that the democratic rules introduced in 2008 quickly improved employers' satisfaction and trust towards unions by around 45% of a standard deviation. Union coverage and membership at the establishment level also increased strongly due to the reform and work stoppages became more likely. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of electoral democracy in French firms managed to improve workers' participation in unions and their ability to voice concerns while also improving employers' opinions of unions.

We evaluate the short- to medium-run effects on unionization and employers' and workers' trust in unions, of an important reform of French employment relations in 2008. This reform made the conditions for union recognition more liberal and democratic after 2008 in private firms with 11 employees or more. The law gave equal chances to all unions to be recognized for bargaining, putting an end to the quasi-monopoly given to five historical unions until then. The law also introduced votes and minimal electoral requirements to obtain union recognition. These new regulations only became fully effective at the first firms' work councils elections happening after January 1st, 2009. Those elections occur within each firm according to a pre-defined frequency - usually every four years -, so that election dates only depend on former election dates, and can be considered as quasi-random with respect to the application date of the new law, at least in firms that are old enough. The identification thus relies on a regression discontinuity design in which the running variable is the firms' work councils election date: we compare in early 2011 firms that had those elections just before or just after January 1st, 2009. We find that the democratic rules introduced in 2008 quickly improved employers' satisfaction and trust towards unions by around 45% of a standard deviation. Union coverage and membership at the establishment level also increased strongly due to the reform and work stoppages became more likely. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of electoral democracy in French firms managed to improve workers' participation in unions and their ability to voice concerns while also improving employers' opinions of unions.

We evaluate the short- to medium-run effects on unionization and employers' and workers' trust in unions, of an important reform of French employment relations in 2008. This reform made the conditions for union recognition more liberal and democratic after 2008 in private firms with 11 employees or more. The law gave equal chances to all unions to be recognized for bargaining, putting an end to the quasi-monopoly given to five historical unions until then. The law also introduced votes and minimal electoral requirements to obtain union recognition. These new regulations only became fully effective at the first firms' work councils elections happening after January 1st, 2009. Those elections occur within each firm according to a pre-defined frequency - usually every four years -, so that election dates only depend on former election dates, and can be considered as quasi-random with respect to the application date of the new law, at least in firms that are old enough. The identification thus relies on a regression discontinuity design in which the running variable is the firms' work councils election date: we compare in early 2011 firms that had those elections just before or just after January 1st, 2009. We find that the democratic rules introduced in 2008 quickly improved employers' satisfaction and trust towards unions by around 45% of a standard deviation. Union coverage and membership at the establishment level also increased strongly due to the reform and work stoppages became more likely. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of electoral democracy in French firms managed to improve workers' participation in unions and their ability to voice concerns while also improving employers' opinions of unions.

We show that an institutional change designed expressly to heighten competition for the provision of union services can have a substantial effect on unionization and employment relations. We study a French reform of 2008 that introduced mandatory elections for representation of workers at firm, industry and national levels, putting an end to the oligopoly held until then by five historically established unions. Exploiting random variation in the reform's date of application in different private sector workplaces, we find that the reform increased union membership by around 8 percentage points and employers' trust in unions by 45 percent of a standard deviation. The reform also increased workers' trust in unions and the frequency of labor conflicts in manufacturing. Taken together, the results suggest that regular free elections can be an effective way to foster participation in unions and workers' ability to voice concerns, while at the same time making unions more legitimate bargaining partners for employers.

Mexico provides significant insight into the modern challenges being faced by many electoral democracies as they strive to become liberal democracies. Based on the 2012 presidential election and subsequent contests, this paper analyzes two problems that have been remarkably enduring: illegal financing and vote buying. I document how deeply entrenched in the political culture they remain with recent corruption scandals in the states of Tabasco and Veracruz. The critical electoral reforms of 2014 are explained and assessed, concluding that they fall short of solving such problems. I propose that deeper measures strengthening the rule of law, especially at the subnational level, would be more effective. ; México como caso de estudio puede iluminar los retos modernos que enfrentan muchas democracias electorales en su esfuerzo por convertirse en democracias liberales. Basado en las elecciones federales de 2012 y en contiendas subsecuentes, este ensayo analiza dos problemas que han sido notoriamente duraderos: el financiamiento ilegal y la compra de votos. Mediante escándalos recientes en los Estados de Tabasco y Veracruz, documento cuan arraigados están estos dos problemas en la cultura política. El ensayo explica y evalúa las importantes reformas electorales de 2014, llegando a la conclusión de que son insuficientes para resolver dichos problemas. Sugiero que sería más efectivo implementar un paquete comprensivo de medidas que refuercen el estado de derecho, sobre todo a nivel subnacional.

Los sistemas electorales que dominan el panorama del Derecho Comparado van, con distintas modulaciones y caracteres, del sistema mayoritario al sistema proporcional. En este tiempo, es necesario adecuar los sistemas electorales, de acuerdo con las peculiaridades y singularidades de cada sociedad, a las reales preferencias de los electores. Los sistemas electorales deben diseñarse en función de la expresión de la voluntad popular del pueblo, no de los intereses de las oligarquías o direcciones de los partidos exclusivamente. ; The election systems that dominate the Comparative Law scene range, with different modulations and characteristics, from the majority system to the proportional system. At this time, it is necessary to adapt election systems, according to the peculiarities and specificities of each society, to real preferences of voters. Election systems should be designed in step with the expression of popular will and not with the interests of oligarchies or with the directions of the parties solely

Published: 28 April 2018 ; In an interdependent world, this sensation that not everyone who should be here is here, that our constituencies should be completed with other criteria of inclusion, that there may be some who have been illegitimately excluded from our group points to a triple inclusion―spatial, temporal and natural―that we should undertake: the inclusion of our neighbors, of our descendants and of the environment. None of these three "votes" enough. One of the principal challenges of contemporary democracies is how to reintroduce these subjects in our systems of representation and decision-making. If this hypothesis is correct, then we have a true democratic deficit and the habitual question about whether democracy is possible beyond the national state should be reformulated to ask instead whether democracy is possible without including those who are outside the national state, or more concretely, whether we can continue calling a political system a democracy if it does not internalize the interests of its contemporaries, does not anticipate the rights of future generations or does not recognize in some way the political subjectivity of nature.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ; International audience ; This chapter offers insights into the material assemblage of red sanders smuggling, extending to its recruitment and labour processes and the role of electoral democracy in determining hierarchies and structures of power. By following a number of smugglers/politicians' career trajectories, it explores how electoral politics and the red sanders mafia are entangled in relations of intreccio. It also reveals how the regulation of red sanders smuggling is deeply entrenched in the economic, cultural and political history of Rayala-seema. The latter is further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of Veerappan is used to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ; International audience ; This chapter offers insights into the material assemblage of red sanders smuggling, extending to its recruitment and labour processes and the role of electoral democracy in determining hierarchies and structures of power. By following a number of smugglers/politicians' career trajectories, it explores how electoral politics and the red sanders mafia are entangled in relations of intreccio. It also reveals how the regulation of red sanders smuggling is deeply entrenched in the economic, cultural and political history of Rayala-seema. The latter is further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of Veerappan is used to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ; International audience ; This chapter offers insights into the material assemblage of red sanders smuggling, extending to its recruitment and labour processes and the role of electoral democracy in determining hierarchies and structures of power. By following a number of smugglers/politicians' career trajectories, it explores how electoral politics and the red sanders mafia are entangled in relations of intreccio. It also reveals how the regulation of red sanders smuggling is deeply entrenched in the economic, cultural and political history of Rayala-seema. The latter is further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of Veerappan is used to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region.

This article focuses on political electoral campaigning in a given town in Cameroon. The intention is to bring about a deeper understanding of the nature of 'democracy' and its implications for political power sharing and accountability in a given locality in Africa. Based on extensive field research, interviews and participative observation the empirical data gathered are analysed with references to recent academic approaches on democratic developments in Africa. The article discusses concrete ways politicians use to convince potential voters to vote for their party in relation to theories of gift-giving and symbolic capital. ; Postprint version of published article. Original available at URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909610373914