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Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call "mega‐seats." We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of "winning"), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.

Los sistemas electorales que dominan el panorama del Derecho Comparado van, con distintas modulaciones y caracteres, del sistema mayoritario al sistema proporcional. En este tiempo, es necesario adecuar los sistemas electorales, de acuerdo con las peculiaridades y singularidades de cada sociedad, a las reales preferencias de los electores. Los sistemas electorales deben diseñarse en función de la expresión de la voluntad popular del pueblo, no de los intereses de las oligarquías o direcciones de los partidos exclusivamente. ; The election systems that dominate the Comparative Law scene range, with different modulations and characteristics, from the majority system to the proportional system. At this time, it is necessary to adapt election systems, according to the peculiarities and specificities of each society, to real preferences of voters. Election systems should be designed in step with the expression of popular will and not with the interests of oligarchies or with the directions of the parties solely

As the author states, Inequity is a constant in political life, but its salience in political discourse rise and recedes. The article surveys and explores trends and factors around the world, which pertain to democratic values and economic inequalities, as studies indicate and suggest. The author then examines the process and prospects for reducing and/or reversing economic inequalities, keeping in mind the current financial crisis, and other barriers regarding redistributionist ideals. The article also discusses the idea and speculation behind reversing democracy and the new populist wave in Latin America, and Central and Southeastern Europe. The author finds that there is a strong association between economic development and democratic consolidation regarding the trajectories will have positive effects on regime legitimacy, before discussing democracy's self-defense mechanisms and the poor, i.e. via the current situations in Venezuela and Thailand. Though the author does conclude the ironic twist on reversing inequality may pose a bigger threat to democracy's durability than to economic inequality itself. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract: Inequalities seem ubiquitous, despite the spread of electoral democracy and what were, until recently, positive rates of economic growth. These seemingly mismatched trends should not surprise us. The advance of democracy entails a decrease in political inequality but does not guarantee decreases in inequalities of other sorts. Economic (and other) inequalities have historically followed their own dynamic, independent of whether electoral democracy exists. The same generalization holds for electoral democracy and poverty. Collective action challenges mean that rising economic inequalities will not be easily reversed. This may harm the quality of contemporary democracies, but is unlikely to cause massive collapse.

Examines whether a flawed electoral process justifies extra-constitutional measures in context of Dec. 16, 2001 presidential elections, in which Marc Ravalomanana took the lead over incumbent Didier Ratsiraka and the vote count, resulting in a crisis and led to a violent five-month conflict. Summaries in German and French.