AbstractThe main research question posed in the article is whether the mixed electoral systems are separate third class of electoral systems? Although, they were primarily designed as a tool for implementing completely contradictory objectives of the majoritarian and proportional representation, as a consequence, they created fully new quality, which cannot be reduced to the sum of effects being produced by their components. Reasons for this include, among others, their genesis and political purpose (the desire to combine the best features and characteristics of the majoritarian and proportional systems into one system), mechanics (multi-formula and multiple-tiered seat allocation mechanism), multiplicity of variants and detailed technical solutions (presence or lack of mandate transfer and/or of vote transfer between majoritarian and proportional subsystems). The distinctiveness of mixed electoral systems is, however, determined primarily by self-relevant political consequences generated within strategies of nominating party candidates (the number of candidates listed within single-mandate constituencies of the majority part has a positive effect on the party's results in proportional subsystem), electorate voting behaviors (the psychological effect is acting on voters toward honest and not strategic voting), the level of disproportionality of election results (the mixed system are in general less proportional than traditional systems of proportional representation, however, they are more proportional than the majoritarian voting systems) and the degree of party dispersion (the mixed systems are usually correlated with three-body format of the party system).
Scholars have suggested that electoral systems should be designed to promote (1) fair representation of parties, (2) good governmental performance &/or (3) adequate local representation. These three criteria pertain to three different kinds of accountability-the accountability of parties to their supporters; the accountability of governments to their citizens; & the accountability of MPs to their supporters-which cannot be simultaneously maximized. In this essay, I discuss each criterion in the abstract & with specific reference to the current Chilean electoral system & proposals to reform it. References. Adapted from the source document.
THE PAPER EXAMINES EXISTING CLASSIFICATIONS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, DISCUSSES THEIR MERITS AND LIMITS, AND PROPOSES A MORE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION. IT SHOWS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXTRACT FROM THE DEFINITION OF AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM THREE BASIC DIMENSIONS: THE BALLOT STRUCTURE, THE CONSTITUENCY STRUCTURE, AND THE FORMULA. IT ALSO SHOWS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH THREE COMPONENTS OF THE BALLOT STRUCTURE: THE OBJECT OF THE VOTE, THE NUMBER OF VOTES AND THE TYPE OF VOTE, AND TWO COMPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUENCY STRUCTURE: ITS NATURE AND ITS MAGNITUDE. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CLASSIFICATION PROPOSED HERE IS SUPERIOR TO EXISTING ONES. IT CLARIFIES AND REFINES EXISTING DISTINCTIONS. IT ENABLES ONE TO IDENTIFY THE BASIC DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS THE LOGICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THEM. FINALLY, IT HAS THE PROPERTY OF APPLYING THE SAME CRITERIA TO ALL SYSTEMS.
Examines existing classifications of electoral systems, discusses their merits and limits, and proposes a more appropriate classification. Shows that it is possible to extract from the definition of an electoral system 3 basic dimensions, to distinguish 3 components of the ballot structure, and 2 components of the constituency structure. (Abstract amended)