Suchergebnisse

Comparative studies of electoral institutions have marginalized or ignored a fundamental characteristic of electoral systems called malapportionment. This paper presents a brief introduction to the issue of malapportionment from the theoretical (and comparative) perspective suggested earlier by Samuels and Snyder and then applies it -- along with the issue of the value of a vote -- to the Municipal Council of the Capital City of Prague electoral system, especially in the context of the October 2010 elections and previous changes to the electoral system. The analysis of malapportionment and the value of a vote shows that the new electoral rules present some problems with respect to the "one vote, one value" principle but, on the other hand, that these rules conform with, and are comparable to electoral systems used worldwide. This conclusion supports the Czech Constitutional Court's decision not to annul the 2010 Municipal Council elections. Adapted from the source document.

The collapse of the Italian "partitocrazia" in the early 1990s was followed by the emergence of a completely new party system. All but one of the relevant parties from the previous regime were affected by corruption scandals & had to struggle for survival. This situation created opportunities for the originally protest parties (LN), for transformed parties (AN, PDS) & for new political actors (FI). Forced by the logic of the mixed electoral system, these parties quickly started to form pre-election coalitions that were intended to guarantee political relevance for the small parties & to secure electoral victory for the bigger parties. The center of the political continuum has consequently been deserted in the last three elections. Any political actor situated between the two principal coalitions would be mercilessly squeezed or absorbed by them. Therefore, the Italian party system has gradually become a bipolar one. This means that the system has turned into a competitive one & has opened a possibility for alternation. Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article focuses on the classification of the cabinets in power during the era of the independent Czech Republic. The question we ask is whether we can generally identify any prevailing type of cabinet. Our conclusion is that there were mostly minimal winning coalitions based on the cooperation of ideologically distant political parties or minority cabinets. None of these versions provided government stability. Another aim of the text is to analyze the influence of party & electoral systems on governance. In this respect we tried to answer the question, what would contribute to the smoother formation of Czech governments & their increased stability? The crucial negative factor we identified in the sphere of the party system is the existence of a radical party with minimal coalition potential -- the Communist Party of Bohemia & Moravia. In our opinion, however, this fact can be changed by regular coalition cooperation with the Czech Social Democratic Party. We believe that as far as electoral system modifications are concerned, a positive factor could be represented by a reform that would introduce the mandate premium awarded to the winning coalition or party & at the same time a single electoral district. This would strengthen the position of the election winner & ensure greater homogeneity of governments. It would also eliminate the disproportion between the real electoral support of small parties & their significantly lower number of mandates won. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with concepts of the empirical threshold of representation as proposed by Rein Taagepera & the real threshold as proposed by Tomas Lebeda. Both empirical & real thresholds are operational methods of the actual threshold. The empirical threshold indicates the actual share of the vote which a party needs to have a fifty-fifty chance of gaining a seat. The real threshold indicates the minimal actual share of the vote which a party needs to gain representation. The author of the paper argues that real thresholds serve as an illustration of a hypothetical rather than a real situation & they do not always occur between the upper & the lower thresholds. The second part of the paper analyzes the original & the current electoral systems for the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament. While under the current electoral system a party with 6.15 per cent of the vote has a fifty-fifty chance of winning a seat within a district, the share was 4.36 per cent of the vote within the original electoral system. On the other hand, the national empirical threshold is lower under the current electoral system. This is caused by relatively large districts of the original system which are more hospitable to small parties at the district level, but not necessarily from the national perspective. Adapted from the source document.

This article focuses on proving some of the earlier published hypotheses that criticized the possibility applying the electoral bonus (bonus seats) to elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic. The results of the Czech parliamentary elections held at the very end of May 2010 provide some empirical data for this analysis and help to prove that the mechanism of the electoral bonus is not useful in the Czech political system. The main reasons for this claim are the hypotheses that the electoral bonus should not reinforce the position of the government coalition and that it erodes the will of the people, whose votes in fact count towards the bonus seat(s) of another party (namely that party which receives the electoral bonus). Adapted from the source document.

This article tries to analyze the evolution of the Norwegian political and party systems which are considered to be exponents of the so-called Nordic model of political system. Besides describing attributes and trends of the political and party systems in Norway, the author deals with the election to the Stortinget held in September 2005. This electoral contest has brought new elements into the Norwegian political system, e. g. a new form of government composition and possibly new patterns of party competition (restructuring competing party-blocs, reinforcing cooperation between left-wing political parties). Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with issues of conceptualization of regional parties & regional party arrangements. Regional parties could be defined briefly as independent formations with regional identity, region-based legitimacy & region-based electoral resources. The territorial aspect of their identity & of their modus operandi is the crucial one in this respect. Regional parties must not be mistaken for regional branches of state-wide or supra-regional parties, which are not fully autonomous, independent units. Similarly, it is necessary to distinguish between regional party systems & regional party subsystems. The basic difference between them consists in the presence or absence of relevant regional party or parties. The paper argues that new suitable conceptual frameworks are needed to develop a sophisticated explanation of various combinations of the systemic properties of regional parties & of their patterned interactions within regional as well as state-wide party arrangements. A multi-level approach should be fostered which would enable to assess thoroughly the differing opportunity structures & the nature of territorial-political operational space of regional parties. This might result in the making of complex models of territorial & party-political pluralisms. 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with the complex issue of (ethno)regional parties conceptualisation. Notions and schematics elaborated and promoted by Lieven de Winter, Klaus von Beyme, Donald L. Horowitz, Francisco Letamendía, Huri Türsan, Ferdinand Müller–Rommel Derek Urwin, John T. Ishiyama etc. are briefly discussed. Ethno–regional parties can be conceived of as political parties whose electoral and legitimation potential is primarily based on identitary mobilisation of an ethno–territorial community of sub–national (sub–state) nature. However, ethnic and territorial aspects may assume different relevance within the different approaches to the study of ethno–regional parties. It should be emphasized, that regional parties are not necessarily ethnic parties – and vice versa. Regional parties could be defined as formations with region–based electorate and mobilisation resources, or as formations representing sub–national (regional) interest communities exercising party functions to the full extent in a regionally defined operating space. Ethno–regional (ethno–regionalist) parties may thus be defined as a sort of regional (regionalist) parties. Finally, some issues of classification and typology of regional party arrangements are assessed. A lot of work is still to be done in this field. More attention should be paid to the heterogeneous nature of compounded territorial–political arrangements, which allows for the coexistence of different types of actors – political parties on the national (nation–wide) and regional level, as well as for simultaneous existence of diverse party and political scenes. To make a comprehensive typology of regional party (sub)systems is not an easy task at all. This is due to the persisting lack of suitable conceptual frameworks and to the fact that an effective reconciliation of the approach to nation–forming identitary and regionalist mobilisations used by regional parties with the traditional platform applied in research into European party systems has proved very difficult. ; The paper deals ...

Election laws regulate the number of deputies who are elected in individual electoral districts, and set them in relation to the population, respectively to the number of voters participating in elections in individual regions. Elected deputies could thus be regarded as political representatives of citizens living in electoral districts. However, under systems of proportional representation, current deputies represent the ideology of the party to which they belong rather than the region. Nevertheless, it makes sense to study the spatial distribution of the places of origin and residence of members of parliament and their changes over time, because it suggests much about the political system and the system of representative democracy in the country. The spatial distribution of places of residence of candidates and elected members indicates not only the territorial proportionality and geographic representativeness, but also the shifting centers of political power. The analysis clearly confirms the gradual decentralization and regionalization of political power in the country, which stands in contrast to the centralization of power in the economy, this latter trend apparent from the concentration of economic management and decision-making in the largest cities, especially in Prague.