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This article compares and assesses four freely available cross-sectional time-series data sets in terms of their information on ballot structure, district structure, and formula of the electoral system in use for lower house and, if relevant, upper house and presidential elections. The authors find that the choice of data source matters for conclusions drawn on the consequences of electoral systems for both party systems and corruption, but that no source can be given prominence over the other on methodological grounds. Students of electoral systems must thus, in the future, make their results sensitive to the choice of data source. Adapted from the source document.

Scholars have suggested that electoral systems should be designed to promote (1) fair representation of parties, (2) good governmental performance &/or (3) adequate local representation. These three criteria pertain to three different kinds of accountability-the accountability of parties to their supporters; the accountability of governments to their citizens; & the accountability of MPs to their supporters-which cannot be simultaneously maximized. In this essay, I discuss each criterion in the abstract & with specific reference to the current Chilean electoral system & proposals to reform it. References. Adapted from the source document.

The article provides a systematic test of the consequences of electoral rules for the format of party systems and the frequency of single-party majority cabinets. The test is based on Lijphart's 1994 dataset (extended to 1 November 2002), but excludes some of his cases and introduces an additional indicator of number of parties. Thanks to these changes in research design, the variance explained by multivariate regression is much higher than Lijphart's results, especially in respect of elective parties. However, the post-1990 data reflect a decline in the predictive power of the main independent variable (`effective' threshold). In explaining this decline, the author argues that account should be taken of a previously neglected factor, i.e. the growing destructuration of Western parties and party systems since the late 1980s. Indeed, entering an indicator of such a process into regressions (total net volatility) compensates for all the threshold's lost explanatory power, thus suggesting that structural consolidation is a crucial condition for the operation of electoral systems.

This article compares and assesses four freely available cross-sectional time-series data sets in terms of their information on ballot structure, district structure, and formula of the electoral system in use for lower house and, if relevant, upper house and presidential elections. The authors find that the choice of data source matters for conclusions drawn on the consequences of electoral systems for both party systems and corruption, but that no source can be given prominence over the other on methodological grounds. Students of electoral systems must thus, in the future, make their results sensitive to the choice of data source.

Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system—voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy—we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.

This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.