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The Electoral Systems
In: The Australian Form of Government, S. 89-114
Electoral Systems
In: Public administration: the journal of the Australian regional groups of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, Band 6, Heft 8, S. 418-432
ISSN: 1467-8500
Electoral Systems
In: Comparative Politics: Explaining Democratic Systems, S. 93-119
Mixed Electoral Systems: A Hybrid or a New Family of Electoral Systems?
In: World political science, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 87-106
ISSN: 2363-4782, 1935-6226
AbstractThe main research question posed in the article is whether the mixed electoral systems are separate third class of electoral systems? Although, they were primarily designed as a tool for implementing completely contradictory objectives of the majoritarian and proportional representation, as a consequence, they created fully new quality, which cannot be reduced to the sum of effects being produced by their components. Reasons for this include, among others, their genesis and political purpose (the desire to combine the best features and characteristics of the majoritarian and proportional systems into one system), mechanics (multi-formula and multiple-tiered seat allocation mechanism), multiplicity of variants and detailed technical solutions (presence or lack of mandate transfer and/or of vote transfer between majoritarian and proportional subsystems). The distinctiveness of mixed electoral systems is, however, determined primarily by self-relevant political consequences generated within strategies of nominating party candidates (the number of candidates listed within single-mandate constituencies of the majority part has a positive effect on the party's results in proportional subsystem), electorate voting behaviors (the psychological effect is acting on voters toward honest and not strategic voting), the level of disproportionality of election results (the mixed system are in general less proportional than traditional systems of proportional representation, however, they are more proportional than the majoritarian voting systems) and the degree of party dispersion (the mixed systems are usually correlated with three-body format of the party system).
Measuring Electoral Systems
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 434-448
ISSN: 1938-274X
This article compares and assesses four freely available cross-sectional time-series data sets in terms of their information on ballot structure, district structure, and formula of the electoral system in use for lower house and, if relevant, upper house and presidential elections. The authors find that the choice of data source matters for conclusions drawn on the consequences of electoral systems for both party systems and corruption, but that no source can be given prominence over the other on methodological grounds. Students of electoral systems must thus, in the future, make their results sensitive to the choice of data source. Adapted from the source document.
Evaluating Electoral Systems
In: Revista de ciencia política, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 212-215
ISSN: 0716-1417
Scholars have suggested that electoral systems should be designed to promote (1) fair representation of parties, (2) good governmental performance &/or (3) adequate local representation. These three criteria pertain to three different kinds of accountability-the accountability of parties to their supporters; the accountability of governments to their citizens; & the accountability of MPs to their supporters-which cannot be simultaneously maximized. In this essay, I discuss each criterion in the abstract & with specific reference to the current Chilean electoral system & proposals to reform it. References. Adapted from the source document.
Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 40, Heft 12, S. 1533-1556
ISSN: 1552-3829
This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.
Electoral systems and immigration
Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction.
BASE
Electoral Systems, Party Systems: Lijphart and Beyond
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 13, Heft 6, S. 721-740
ISSN: 1460-3683
The article provides a systematic test of the consequences of electoral rules for the format of party systems and the frequency of single-party majority cabinets. The test is based on Lijphart's 1994 dataset (extended to 1 November 2002), but excludes some of his cases and introduces an additional indicator of number of parties. Thanks to these changes in research design, the variance explained by multivariate regression is much higher than Lijphart's results, especially in respect of elective parties. However, the post-1990 data reflect a decline in the predictive power of the main independent variable (`effective' threshold). In explaining this decline, the author argues that account should be taken of a previously neglected factor, i.e. the growing destructuration of Western parties and party systems since the late 1980s. Indeed, entering an indicator of such a process into regressions (total net volatility) compensates for all the threshold's lost explanatory power, thus suggesting that structural consolidation is a crucial condition for the operation of electoral systems.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 99-110
ISSN: 0304-4130
THE PAPER EXAMINES EXISTING CLASSIFICATIONS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, DISCUSSES THEIR MERITS AND LIMITS, AND PROPOSES A MORE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION. IT SHOWS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXTRACT FROM THE DEFINITION OF AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM THREE BASIC DIMENSIONS: THE BALLOT STRUCTURE, THE CONSTITUENCY STRUCTURE, AND THE FORMULA. IT ALSO SHOWS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH THREE COMPONENTS OF THE BALLOT STRUCTURE: THE OBJECT OF THE VOTE, THE NUMBER OF VOTES AND THE TYPE OF VOTE, AND TWO COMPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUENCY STRUCTURE: ITS NATURE AND ITS MAGNITUDE. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CLASSIFICATION PROPOSED HERE IS SUPERIOR TO EXISTING ONES. IT CLARIFIES AND REFINES EXISTING DISTINCTIONS. IT ENABLES ONE TO IDENTIFY THE BASIC DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS THE LOGICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THEM. FINALLY, IT HAS THE PROPERTY OF APPLYING THE SAME CRITERIA TO ALL SYSTEMS.
The Theory of Electoral Systems
In: The Western political quarterly: official journal of Western Political Science Association, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 752
ISSN: 0043-4078
The classification of electoral systems
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 16, Heft Jan 88
ISSN: 0304-4130
Examines existing classifications of electoral systems, discusses their merits and limits, and proposes a more appropriate classification. Shows that it is possible to extract from the definition of an electoral system 3 basic dimensions, to distinguish 3 components of the ballot structure, and 2 components of the constituency structure. (Abstract amended)