Suchergebnisse

The Electoral Law in the modern States is the entity in charge of regulating the political activity and guaranteeing the individuals the respect to their political rights, in this sense, it is necessary to study the operation of this legal branch. In the present work the configuration of the Nicaraguan Electoral Law will be studied, the objectives were established, first to describe the general aspects of the Electoral Law in Nicaragua, also, the Electoral Crimes recognized by the electoral legislation will be identified and classified. The methodology used is qualitative, non-experimental design, under a documentary-bibliographic level. After the documentary review it was observed that the evolution of the Electoral Law in Nicaragua has been related to the recognition of the universal suffrage, likewise, it was identified that the Electoral Law oversees regulating and organizing everything related to the democratic processes, as well as, typifying the actions that are considered as Electoral Crimes. It is concluded that in Nicaragua the Electoral Law plays a leading role in the consolidation of the democratic processes, regarding the Electoral Offenses, it is established that although it is true that there is a recognition of the unlawful actions, there is no clear classification in relation to the misdemeanors and felonies. ; El Derecho Electoral en los Estados modernos es el ente encargado de normar la actividad política y garantizar a los individuos el respeto a sus derechos políticos, en este sentido, se hace necesario estudiar a profundidad el funcionamiento de esta rama jurídica. En el presente trabajo se estudiará la configuración del Derecho Electoral nicaragüense, se establecieron como objetivos describir los aspectos generales del Derecho Electoral en Nicaragua, por otro lado, se identificaron y clasificaron los Delitos Electorales reconocidos por la legislación electoral. La metodología utilizada es de tipo cualitativo, diseño no experimental, bajo un nivel documental-bibliográfico. Tras la revisión documental se observó que la evolución del Derecho Electoral en Nicaragua ha girado con relación al reconocimiento del sufragio universal, de igual forma, se identificó que la Ley Electoral es la encargada de regular y organizar todo lo relacionado a los procesos democráticos, así como, tipificar las acciones que son consideradas como Delitos. Se concluye que en Nicaragua el Derecho Electoral juega un rol protagónico en la consolidación de los procesos democráticos, en lo concerniente a los Delitos, se establece que si bien es cierto existe un reconocimiento de las acciones antijuridicas no existe una clasificación clara en relación con las faltas y delitos.

This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.

This note presents a new electoral studies research program that will examine party and voter behaviour in 27 elections (national, supra-national, and sub-national) in five countries (Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland) and that includes a series of experiments designed to complement the analyses of these 27 elections. The purpose is to ascertain how the rules of the game, especially the electoral system, and the competitiveness and salience of elections influence the reciprocal relationship between voters and parties. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Drawing on two complementary mechanisms, this article explores the question of whether electoral institutions and conditions of electoral competition create incentives to promote electoral misconduct in young or developing democracies. The first mechanism explains how majoritarian institutions like disproportional electoral systems are more likely to trigger electoral fraud than consensus electoral institutions like PR. However, for this mechanism to be activated, the incumbent must feel effectively threatened by the opposition. To better understand the way this mechanism works, the electoral history of the country also needs to be taken into consideration. Democracies which have a historical record of running clean elections are less likely to experience fraud than countries with a history of electoral misconduct. I test these theoretical claims using a dataset that contains relevant information for 323 parliamentary elections in 59 new or developing democracies in the period between 1960 and 2006. The empirical analysis shows a strong and robust empirical support for the two mechanisms.

Esta Crónica Electoral recoge los acuerdos y resoluciones de la Junta Electoral Central relativos al régimen electoral local adoptados por este órgano, que es la cúspide de la Administración Electoral, desde su constitución conforme a la Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General de 19 de junio de 1985, hasta la convocatoria de las elecciones locales por el Real Decreto 508/1987, de 13 de abril.

▪ Abstract  Electoral coordination occurs at two main levels: (a) within individual electoral districts, where competitors coordinate entry and citizens coordinate votes; and (b) across districts, as competitors from different districts ally to form regional or national parties. We know a fair amount about district-level electoral coordination for single-tier electoral systems. In particular, when political actors are primarily concerned with the current election and have good information about the relative chances of potential competitors, two different M + 1 rules apply in an M-seat district. First, the number of competitors entering a given race tends to be no more than M + 1; second, when more than M + 1 competitors do enter a race, votes tend to concentrate on at most M + 1 of them. We know much less about cross-district coordination, in which potentially separate local party systems merge to form a national party system. This essay focuses on the latter, relatively neglected topic.

This paper argues that measuring the degree of proportionality in an electoral system is equivalent to measuring the degree of electoral inequality, defined in terms of inter‐party differences in the seats‐to‐votes ratio. It proposes an index of the degree of electoral inequality which is based on Atkinson's (1970) index, applied originally to measuring income inequality. This index satisfies all the criteria proposed in the literature for evaluating measures of electoral proportionality. In addition, such an Atkinson‐type index of electoral inequality can also be given a welfarist interpretation by directly relating its value to the level of electoral welfare. Under such an interpretation, the disproportionality in an electoral system may be interpreted as being the result of the system imputing voting shares to the different political parties which are different from their actual voting shares. The larger this difference, the greater the degree of disproportionality in the system. The use of this index is illustrated by an application to the outcomes of Irish General Elections from 1923 till 1997.

This paper argues that measuring the degree of proportionality in an electoral system is equivalent to measuring the degree of electoral inequality, defined in terms of inter-party differences in the seats-to-votes ratio. It proposes an index of the degree of electoral inequality, which is based on Atkinson's (1970) index, applied originally to measuring income inequality. This index satisfies all the criteria proposed in the literature for evaluating measures of electoral proportionality. In addition, such an Atkinson-type index of electoral inequality can also be given a welfarist interpretation by directly relating its value to the level of electoral welfare. Under such an interpretation, the disproportionality in an electoral system may be interpreted as being the result of the system imputing voting shares to the different political parties which are different from their actual voting shares. The larger this difference, the greater the degree of disproportionality in the system. The use of this index is illustrated by an application to the outcomes of Irish General Elections from 1923 until 1997. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.