Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?
In: IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology, Band 52, S. 239-84
In: IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology, Band 52, S. 239-84
SSRN
In: Franz Hofmann and Franziska Kurz (eds.), Law of Remedies. A European Perspective, Intersentia 2019, 107-131
SSRN
Title from cover. ; Index to U.S. government periodicals ; Excerpta medica. ; Legal resource index ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
SSRN
In: MAKING TREATIES WORK - HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, Ulfstein et al., pp. 391-409 Cambridge, 2007
SSRN
This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.
BASE
This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.
BASE
In: Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, S. 690-706
In: Sun , X 2021 , ' Politicised Enforcement in China: Evidence from the Enforcement of Land Laws and Regulations ' , Journal Of Public Policy , vol. 41 , no. 1 , pp. 66 -89 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X19000321
Politically motivated interference by politicians, or "politicised enforcement", is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this article develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron–client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote economic growth and carry out clientelistic exchanges affect government decisions on enforcement. Moreover, these correlations remain robust after the implementation of reforms that promoted administrative centralisation within the enforcement agency, suggesting that politicised enforcement reflects the strategic behaviour of the ruling elites of the Party. These findings contribute to the literature on enforcement in authoritarian regimes broadly and in China specifically.
BASE
In: Immigration in the 21st Century: Political, Social and Economic Issues
Intro -- IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ELEMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES -- IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ELEMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION -- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GENERALLY -- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT -- POTENTIAL LIMITS ON THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION -- Constitution -- Selective Prosecution -- "Take Care" Clause -- Statute -- Whether "Shall" Means Agencies Lack Discretion -- Deference to Agencies' Interpretations of Their Governing Statutes -- Executive Branch Self-Regulation -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 TESTIMONY OF RUTH ELLEN WASEM, SPECIALIST IN IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. HEARING ON ''DOES ADMINISTRATIVE AMNESTY HARM OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE BORDER?'' -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- DEFINING "CRIMINAL ALIENS" -- QUANTIFYING THE CRIMINAL ALIEN POPULATION -- Federal-Level Arrest Data -- Federal, State, and Local Incarceration Data -- Estimates from the American Community Survey -- Other Estimates of the Criminal Alien Population -- HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL PROGRAMS -- ICE PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS -- Jail Enforcement Programs -- Criminal Alien Program (CAP) -- Secure Communities -- 287(g) Jail Screening Program -- Task Force Programs -- 287(g) Task Force Program -- National Fugitive Operations Program -- Differences among Criminal Alien Enforcement Programs -- DHS ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES AND DISCRETION -- March 2011 ICE Guidance Memo -- June 2011 ICE Guidance Memo -- August 2011 DHS Announcement and Review of Backlogged Cases -- APPROPRIATIONS -- ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS
On the basis of the science of administrative law and administration, praxeology or organization theory, nowadays, there is a view, that administrative entities should cooperate with each other while performing public tasks. The cooperation of public administration entities as a principle of law, was reflected in the Polish Constitution of 1997 and its content was developed and specified in legislation. The enforcement authorities are entities that enter in different legal relations with participants of the administrative enforcement during their proceedings. At the same time, they are the obligatory participants of the enforcement relationship. The aim of the administrative enforcement proceedings is to compel the obligated entities to meet their obligations which are subject to the administrative enforcement. As the enforcement authorities enter into different legal relations with participants of the administrative enforcement, specific legal instruments were conferred on them, including providing assistance or cooperation. These serve to achieve the aim of the proceedings. Among others, the enforcement authorities cooperate with the police, so that the legal instruments they were given, would be effective. The aim of this article is to outline the essence of the concept of cooperation as a general principle of administrative law and to indicate legal instruments on which the enforcement authorities can cooperate with the police, so that the aim of their proceedings could be achieved. Moreover, the article refers to the procedure for using the legal instruments conferred to the enforcement authorities, i.e. providing assistance and cooperation. It also describes the behaviour of a police officer while being designated for assistance or cooperation. ; Współcześnie na gruncie nauki prawa administracyjnego, prakseologii, teorii organizacji czy nauki administracji panuje pogląd, że podmioty administrujące w procesie wykonywania zadań publicznych powinny z sobą współdziałać. Współdziałanie podmiotów administracji publicznej jako zasada prawna swe odzwierciedlenie znalazła w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., a jej treść rozwinięta i skonkretyzowana została w ustawodawstwie. Organy egzekucyjne to podmioty, które w ramach postępowania przymusowego wchodzą w rozmaite stosunki prawne z uczestnikami egzekucji administracyjnej i jednocześnie należą do obligatoryjnych uczestników stosunku egzekucyjnego. Celem postępowania egzekucyjnego w administracji jest przymusowe doprowadzenie do wykonania przez zobowiązane podmioty obowiązków podlegających egzekucji administracyjnej. Z racji tego, że organy egzekucyjne wchodzą w rozmaite stosunki prawne z uczestnikami egzekucji administracyjnej, przyznano tymże organom określone instrumenty prawne, do których należy udzielanie pomocy lub asysty. Udzielenie organom egzekucyjnym pomocy lub asysty w trakcie konkretnego postępowania egzekucyjnego służy urzeczywistnieniu celu tegoż postępowania. Aby doszło do skutecznego i efektywnego wykorzystywania przyznanych instrumentów prawnych, organy egzekucyjne współdziałają m.in. z Policją. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przybliżenie istoty pojęcia współdziałania jako ogólnej zasady prawa administracyjnego, wskazanie instrumentów prawnych, dzięki którym organy egzekucyjne mogą współdziałać z Policją, aby doszło do urzeczywistnienia celu administracyjnego postępowania egzekucyjnego. Ponadto w niniejszym artykule odniesiono się do trybu korzystania z przyznanych organom egzekucyjnym instrumentów prawnych, tj. udzielania pomocy i asysty, a także dokonano charakterystyki sposobu postępowania funkcjonariusza Policji w przypadku wyznaczenia do udzielenia pomocy lub asysty.
BASE
In: Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Band 35
SSRN
SSRN