Suchergebnisse

Preferential policies, though they are not required by justice, are not seriously unjust; the system from which they depart is already unjust. Deliberate barriers against admitting blacks or women, however, had to be abolished--without explicit barriers discrimination could be conscious or unconscious (motivationally), thus giving support to a self-conscious effort to act impartially. The realization that a social system may continue to deny different races or sexes equal opportunity & equal access to desirable positions even after such barriers have been lifted became evident, since society automatically provides different rewards for different groups. The question is raised: How great is a social contribution to injustice, to what extent is it due to social causes not involving injustice, or to causes which are not social but biological? Can unjustly caused disadvantages be overcome by special programs of preparatory or remedial training? What grounds are to be used in assigning individuals to desirable positions? People less qualified, for whatever reason could be compensated for this disadvantage by having suitably different standards for these different groups. Obviously, this would not be a stable position. Compensatory procedures would then have to be applied in individual bases. The concept of differences advocated by liberals is too weak to combat inequalities dispensed by nature & ordinary workings of the social system. In most societies rewards are a function of demand, & many of the human characteristics most in demand result from gifts & talents. If racial & sexual injustice were reduced we would still be left with the injustice of the smart & the dumb; "at present we do not have a method of divorcing professional status from social esteem & economic reward. In the absence of this, what remains is the familiar task of balancing liberty against equality." S. Cummings.

Focuses on its objectives and characteristics and whether these have been modified or clarified over time; the involvement of women in its adoption and application; and its value. (Abstract amended)

Discusses contemporary approaches to social equality between men & women, or "gender equality" to argue that equal treatment is a constitutive feature of justice. Gender stereotypes of British domestic policy deny men the possible opportunity to become active parents, & thus designate the role of primary care to women. The grand principles of justice & equality are also weakened in a sexual stereotype based concept of gender. Analysis of British legislation on the "principle of equal treatment" & the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act are bogged down in counter-productive clauses. The common division of labor between normative social & political theory & policy design is concluded to not serve the contemporary objectives of equality & justice. Critical interrogation of assumptions about the principle of equal treatment & stereotypes must reconsider sex discrimination measures, & reinterpret what is relevant for both men and women. References. J. Harwell