Suchergebnisse

Rezension von: Cigar, Norman: Genocide in Bosnia. The policy of "ethnic cleansing". College Station/Tex. : Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1995. XVI, 242 S

All Israeli governments since the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia have adopted a consistently pro-Serbian stand. Israeli public opinion has failed to respond to Serbian atrocities in a way comparable to the response in many other countries. The author argues that an important part of the explanation of this remarkable state of affairs, which puts Israel at odds with most of the western world and the Jewish diaspora, is to be found in Israel's history. Israel was set up at the price of turning the larger part of native Palestinian population into expellees or refugees. Its continued existence as an ethnic, Jewish state is predicated on not admitting the exiled Palestinians back. Collective repression and denial of these facts help explain the unwillingness or inability of Israeli society and its political establishinent to condemn the Serbs' war of expansion and "ethnic cleansing". (SOI : PM: S. 23)

The author analyzes the current trends of the globalization of trade, capital, mass media, communication, transport, tourism and economic migrations. However, there is the backlash to the globalizing processes: cultural particularism which has mobilized traditions and triggered violent outbreaks of hostilities. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama has pointed out that today the key challenges to liberal democracy are a miscellany of particularistic fundamentalism, national extremism, totalitarism and authoritarian paternalism. Samuel Huntington also warns about the dangers of particularism. Within such a framework, the phenomenon of "ethnic cleansing" is only an extreme form of the trend which has marked the 20th century - ethnical homogenization as a reaction to the problems of multiethnic communities. The author is of the opinion that this development need not represent an obstacle for the dialogue and communication among cultures. (SOI : PM: S. 168)

The author analyses the genesis and the scenarios of the Kosovo crisis resolution, as well as the possible political reverberations of the NATO military intervention. The premise is that the Kosovo crisis is only a continuation of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, that Kosovo has for centuries been a separate entity largely populated by Albanians, that the policy of Serbian nationalism has permanently discriminated against the Albanian population and that prior to the recent air strikes against Yugoslavia Serbia had systematically led an ethnic-cleansing campaign on Kosovo. Although the author recognises that the support for the NATO military action can hardly be found in the tenets of the UN Charter, he argues that it can nevertheless be justified by international law. He points out that NATO's military campaign enjoyed a broad support of the people of NATO member countries, but that it has made a rift in the European left. The new left was in the forefront of the action, while the old, dogmatic and sectarian left, found itself in the ranks of its most vocal opponents. The author claims that Milosevic, with his overall politics, and particularly his policy on Kosovo, had propelled the West into an action it could not extricate itself from. He concludes that the consequences of Belgrade's defeat will be: 1. The collapse of Milosevic' regime (the beginning of his end); 2. The final incapacitation of Milosevic' politics to create new conflicts; 3. The protectorate over Kosovo and its autonomy, with a factual independence from Serbia; 4 The independence of Montenegro; 5. Reinforcing the Dayton policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (eliminating centrifugal tendencies); 6. The organised participation of the West in the transitional processes in this region (The Pact on the Stability of Southeast Europe); 7. Bolstering the democratic and weakening the undemocratic tendencies in the region. (SOI : S. 14)

The situation in Kosovo up to 1999, and all attempts which failed in order to find a just and lasting solution for that problem, have fully justified the above criteria for a lawful humanitarian intervention which was undertaken by the NATO forces against the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It seems, however, that the responsible persons in the NATO were not aware of the competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to investigate to prosecute persons responsible for use of prohibited arms and for destruction of some objects. Some of these unlawful acts constitute grave breaches of the 1959 Geneva Conventions and violations of laws and customs of war. In these circumstances it is the legal duty of the Prosecutor to undertake an investigation. In case that he fails in his duty, there are no statutory limits in respect of the crimes provided in the Statute of the Tribunal. (SOI : SOEU: S. 98f.) + Most legal writers in their writings confuse notions of humanitarian intervention, intervention of a State in order to protect its citizens abroad and humanitarian relief. The use of force for protection of citizens abroad, when they are in immediate danger of losing their lives or suffering serious injury, can exceptionally be justified by a state of necessity as regulated in article 33 of Drafts Article on State Responsibility by the International Law Commission. Further conditions for such an intervention are provided in the wording of the US State Secretar, Daniel Webster in the Caroline case of 1837, relating to the self-defence. Actions of humanitarian relief have nothing unlawful in their character, but a question can arise of the obligation of parties to a conflict to receive and allow its distribution to a who are in need. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the First Protocol of 1977, provide in this respect a legal obligation of all parties to internation armed conflicts. Such relief actions can be imposed as obligation to parties to internal armed conflicts as well, by UN Security Council resolutions based on Chap. VII of the UN Charter. + In the view of this author there is no rule of positive international law granting a right to foreign States to intervene by force, either in protection of their citizens, or when a humanitarian intervention is required. The matter can only be of exceptional circumstances precluding wrongfulness of the use of force, which otherwise remains prohibited. When the matter is of humanitarian intervention, circumstances precluding the wrongfulness would, according to this author, be the following: (1) There should be a situation of systematic, repeated and widespread commission of international crimes by a State authority against its own citizens. Special problems are created to the international community by widespread practices of ethnic cleansing. (2) Such a situation constitutes itself a "threat to the peace" calling for an enforcement action by the Security Council according to the Chap. VII of the UN Charter. (3) In case that the Security Council fails in its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and when there are no other means, a group of States or an organization can undertake a humanitarian intervention by use of force in order to stop the commission of crimes. In these circumstances it acts as de facto organ of the entire international community of States. (4) In these extreme and exceptional circumstances, States taking part in such an action cannot obtain any advantages in their profit. (5) Collective intervention by a single State acting in the name of several other States or an organization. However, even such an intervention should have priority over humanitarian intervention undertaken by a State acting in its o name. (6) It is self-evident that in performing a humanitarian intervention there should not be committed international crimes especially against protected persons, including civilian population