The study explains the nature and strength of the influence of the determinants of fear of crime. According to other studies gender, age, education, place of residence, material status, worldview and religious orientation, victimization influence the level of fear of crime. In order to verify the impact of these factors, the CATREG analysis technique was used. Variables such as the level of anomie, crime, unemployment and suicide rates were introduced, as an original author's concept. A model of factors influencing fear of crime was created. The most important element of it turned out to be prior victimization, as well as – to a lesser extent – negative attitudes towards state institutions that are to ensure safety and the occupation.
The paper analyzes the attitude of nationalist parties in four Central European states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to European integration. After 2004, some of them, e.g. the League of Polish Families (LPR), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and Jobbik in Hungary, gained parliamentary representation, or even entered governments thus obtaining some (albeit limited) influence on foreign policy. Their attitudes frequently expressed social fears and anxieties related to the accession to the EU. The integration process as such was assessed in different ways: from the demands to leave the Union and warnings that the states will lose their independence, to the approval of the Europe of nations concept, and the endorsement of EU membership. Their attitudes, contained in the political platforms of the parties, also reflected traditional antagonisms and the fear of neighbors and their policies (this mainly concerned the fear of all sorts of German and Hungarian revisionist claims), as well as ther views on the influence of other subjects on the state's sovereignty and condition (including the frequent argument of excessive exploitation and threats to national possessions). ; The paper analyzes the attitude of nationalist parties in four Central European states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to European integration. After 2004, some of them, e.g. the League of Polish Families (LPR), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and Jobbik in Hungary, gained parliamentary representation, or even entered governments thus obtaining some (albeit limited) influence on foreign policy. Their attitudes frequently expressed social fears and anxieties related to the accession to the EU. The integration process as such was assessed in different ways: from the demands to leave the Union and warnings that the states will lose their independence, to the approval of the Europe of nations concept, and the endorsement of EU membership. Their attitudes, contained in the political platforms of the parties, also reflected traditional antagonisms and the fear of neighbors and their policies (this mainly concerned the fear of all sorts of German and Hungarian revisionist claims), as well as ther views on the influence of other subjects on the state's sovereignty and condition (including the frequent argument of excessive exploitation and threats to national possessions).
The paper looks at the issue of the psychological conditioning of the preferences concerning the shape of governance system and the system of political parties in Poland in the light of empirical research (N=1086), carried out in 2009. The analysis takes into account the variables of self-assessment, dispositional optimism, self-efficacy and dispositional fear. These variables, accounting for the cognitive functioning of individuals, the level of their involvement and motivation, have turned out to be significant when differentiating individuals' preferences concerning political systems. ; The paper looks at the issue of the psychological conditioning of the preferences concerning the shape of governance system and the system of political parties in Poland in the light of empirical research (N=1086), carried out in 2009. The analysis takes into account the variables of self-assessment, dispositional optimism, self-efficacy and dispositional fear. These variables, accounting for the cognitive functioning of individuals, the level of their involvement and motivation, have turned out to be significant when differentiating individuals' preferences concerning political systems.
Patients' resistance may occur at any stage of psychotherapy or mediation process. The focus of this paper is on the resistance to use psychotherapy or family mediation. We also explore psychological grounds for the difficulties behind the decision to seek professional psychological help. The resistance in psychotherapy is one of the fundamental problems, hence a lot of research studies and practical techniques can be found regarding the determinants of resistance and strategies how to cope with it. However, in the family mediation literature the conceptualisation of resistance to enter the mediation process has rarely been investigated. In the present paper five main factors of the avoidance of counselling or psychotherapy are analysed, namely: (i) social stigma, (ii) treatment fears, (iii) fear of emotion, (iv) anticipated utility and risk, and (v) problems with self-disclosure. As far as the decision to enter family mediation is concerned the main sources of clients' resistance can be traced to negative convictions, attitudes and fears of the mediation process. The results of the author's own research on this subject show that the main components of resistance are: (1) disbelief in effectiveness of mediation, (2) attribution of negative characteristics to mediation, (3) reluctance to involvement of third party, and (4) fear of disclosure of secrets. In the final part of the paper a discussion of similarities between the factors determining the resistance to participate in psychotherapy and family mediation is presented.
E. Goffman character analyzes into mutual conditionality of concept of physical and social borders abilities of persons for acquisition, disclosure and concealment of information scare. Analysis of strategic interaction relies in Goffman's book on explication capability expedient utilization or duping of partner. Strategic captivation of interaction is game about zero amount, where increment is loss second actor. Our safety is not natural something in structure of social world, but it dates from socially array rule behavior We lived as spies in our daily life if, social world would seem as enclosing scare, where in each moment and it is possible to meet potential cause for fear place.
The Church, accepting the paschal gift of peace, carries it onto the next generations of the faithful, at the same time dissociates itself from pacifist ideologies. Nevertheless, it does not fear to use military provenance vocabulary in the proclamation of the Gospel. Freedom that Christ brings may be the foundation of freedom for particular nations and states. Apart from philosophers', historians' and political scientists' opinions, theologians' statements regarding anthropologies founding pacifisms send out an important message that can contribute to the national and international security development. ; Kościół, przyjmując paschalny dar pokoju, niesie go w kolejnych pokoleniach wierzących, jednocześnie odcinając się od ideologii pacyfistycznych. W głoszeniu Ewangelii zaś nie obawia się on posługiwać słownictwem militarnej proweniencji. Wolność, którą przynosi Chrystus, może być fundamentem dla wolności poszczególnych narodów i państw. Wypowiedzi teologów o antropologiach fundujących pacyfizmy to obok opinii filozofów, historyków i politologów ważny głos mogący się przyczynić do tworzenia bezpieczeństwa tak narodowego, jak i międzynarodowego.
Terrorism is defined as use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to indulge fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, social or religious. Bioterrorism is terrorism by intentional release or dissemination of biological agents, mainly bacteria or viruses. Use of biological weapons is attractive from the terrorists' point of view because of low production costs, major range and easiness of transmission. The first mention of the use of primitive biological weapons date back to the 6th century. Use of plague-infested corpses as offensive means in the 14th century caused a spread of bubonic plague through the whole Europe. The biggest development of biological weapons took place in the interwar period and in the cold war era. Biological weapon trails and research were conducted by super powers such as USSR, UK, USA and Japan. At the beginning of the 20th century a new form of bioterrorism occurred, which put humanity in the face of a terrifying threat.
Analyses show that the mutual relations between the EU and Russia are marked by profound pragmatism on the one hand (in Russia) and a certain complex of a powerful neighbor and the fear of political turmoil on the other (in the EU). Russia tries to take advantage of these fears in order to maximize her profits and skillfully oscillates between the policy of the USA and that of EU which both count on the benefits to be obtained from the opening of the Russian market. However, the recently popular Russian alliance with China does not pose an actual alternative for the commercial exchange with Europe. This is due to the abundance of Chinese natural resources and expanding Chinese economy that is looking for sales markets rather than offering its purchasing market. In the long run the Russian alliance with the EU will have to be based on new principles that will restrict financial support by the United Europe that will be required to finance its new members.
This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.
This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.
In: Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej; The Impact of the Russian Federation upon the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 73-92
The central concern of this paper is the growing influx of Russian migrants to the Czech Republic and the consequences for political and social order. With nearly 40,000 migrants, Russians are the fourth biggest foreign community in Czechia. Due to their material status, the history of bilateral relations, and the significant role of their homeland in Czech politics, the growing Russian community poses a problem for Czech society. The fear of Russian dominance – in political as well as economical dimensions – as well as resentment about the communistic era, is still present among Czech people. Although most Russians come to Czech to study or to do business and are not engaged in political activity, relations between migrants and the host society can be strained. Mutual prejudices make themselves felt in moments of the political crisis between two countries, such as the recent row over Soviet monuments in Prague. However, this doesn't necessarily mean that the Russian community could easily become a tool for Kremlin propaganda. Russians appreciate the opportunity to live in a rich, liberal and democratic society and even though they keep strong emotional ties with their homeland they are not keen to affirm all of Moscow's deeds.
This article aims to make an insight into the conditions of immigration policy and actions undertaken by the Swedish authorities and political parties in the face of the migration crisis in Europe after 2015. A hypothesis presented here assumes that a decisive evolution of the attitudes of the Swedish authorities, political parties, and society towards a restrictive approach to immigration arose from the awareness of the negative consequences of migration management for the Swedish socio-economic model and the political scene. The theoretical framework used in this article is the concept of policy responsiveness, including the ability of political authorities to respond effectively and lawfully to the needs and expectations of the citizens. Process tracing was applied as a research method useful for following the transformation process Sweden's immigration policy. Statistical data, documents issued by the government and political parties, as well as the subject literature were the sources utilised in the research. Conclusions drawn from the research point to the tightening of immigration policy as a result of the fear of a prolonged pull effect on foreigners and concern surrounding the appropriate handling of immigration in full accordance with the adopted model of immigration policy.
